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It is widely assumed that the French in the
British Isles during the Second World War
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de Gaulle, and that across the channel at
least, the French were a ‘nation of
resisters’. This highly provocative study
reveals that most exiles were on British
soil by chance rather than by design, and
many were not sure whether to stay.
Overlooked by historians, who have
concentrated on the ‘Free French’ of de
Gaulle, these were the ‘Forgotten French’:
refugees swept off the beaches of Dunkirk;
servicemen held in camps after the
Franco-German armistice; Vichy consular
officials left to cater for their compatriots;
and a sizeable colonist community based
mainly in London.
Drawing on little-known archival sources,
this study examines the hopes and fears of
these communities who were bitterly
divided among themselves, some being
attracted to Pétain as much as to de
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British life and how the British in turn
responded. The author finds that while
the public was often charitable, the
Government was suspicious of their
loyalties and even considered general
internment.
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Preface
It is sometimes easier to explain what a book is not about before stating
its purpose. This is very definitely not another study of de Gaulle, the
Free French and the troublesome relations they enjoyed with their
British hosts, although inevitably the name of the general appears
repeatedly in the text. Countless words have already been spilt on these
subjects, and it is likely that more will follow, if only to satiate the
curiosity of a British public which, astonishingly, still seems surprised
that Churchill and the Free French leader were not always the best of
allies.1 Nor is this another account of those secretive and murky rela-
tions that the Vichy government conducted with the Foreign Office
during 1940–42. This, too, has been an overworked topic, maybe in an
effort to counter those disingenuous and tedious arguments continu-
ously peddled by unreconstructed Pétainists in France who claim their
hero was involved in a double game with the Germans, outwardly
proclaiming his adherence to collaboration while secretly negotiating
with Churchill to shield the French people from greater suffering, thus
deserving to be counted among the pioneers of resistance. It should be
further stressed that this is not primarily an examination of those
writers and thinkers, most notably Raymond Aron and André
Labarthe, who made London their temporary home in 1940. To be fair,
we still await a synthesis of French intellectual activity in wartime
London, just as we need an overall account of exiled intellectuals in
Britain’s capital. We are, though, well served by the autobiographies of
the protagonists themselves, and there is no shortage of biographical
studies of the most prominent exiled figures, French and otherwise.
And, finally, this is not an attempt to write the response of British
public opinion to events in France. So dramatic were the ups and
downs of the Vichy regime that the reactions within Britain have been
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amply mapped out, their subsequent course well plotted, and their
importance recorded at every twist and turn. 
All this the book is not. It is instead an exploration of the lives of
those French men, women and children who discovered themselves,
usually by happenstance ahead of design, on British shores in
May–June 1940. These communities constitute what I have termed the
‘forgotten French’, repeatedly ignored by historians who have
preferred to concentrate on de Gaulle and other more visible exile
groups whose experiences have been deemed of greater significance.
Crudely speaking, the ‘forgotten French’ comprised the following:
some 4,000 refugees jostled out of northern France by the battering of
Guderian’s Panzers; maybe 12,000 stranded servicemen, principally
sailors, survivors of Narvik and Dunkirk and those unlucky enough to
be arrested in British ports at the time of Mers-el-Kébir, who would not
be returned home until the close of the year; an indeterminate number
of Vichy officials, possibly 200 or so consular and mission staff,
together with their wives and families, left behind to keep the wheels of
petty bureaucracy turning, despite the breaking off of diplomatic rela-
tions between Britain and Vichy; and a French colony of 12,000 strong,
which decided to stay put on British soil, despite the fact that maybe
18,000 colons chose to return home with the outbreak of war or at some
point during the drôle de guerre.
The objective of this book is, then, to lift these groups out of obscu-
rity – to scrutinise their existence, to assess the material conditions in
which they lived and to probe their concerns, which were as much to
do with social issues as they were to do with political ones.  An under-
lying aim is also to monitor how the British government and public
reacted to these strangers in their midst, foreigners who, unlike the
Norwegians, Poles and Belgians, did not possess a government-in-
exile, thus raising doubts about their loyalty to the Allied cause.
If there exists any burning need to depose the myth that Britain was
a welcoming haven for those retreating from Nazi oppression on the
Continent, then much evidence may be uncovered in the pages that
follow. While the public often displayed charity and sympathy, even if
it was only doling out a cup of tea, a beverage the French did not take
kindly to, government officials at all levels were far less indulgent, and
at times it is difficult not to avoid the conclusion that Whitehall would
much have preferred it if the ‘forgotten French’ had stayed in France,
or at least had joined their cousins in North America, where there
existed a huge colonist community, and where they would have been
Preface ix
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out of view, their incomprehensible arguments a concern for the State
Department rather than the Foreign Office. More fundamentally, this
book helps lay the myth, cultivated by de Gaulle at the time and
believed by many since, notably a British public that readily identified
itself with the general’s courage and isolation in 1940, that the French
in Britain, notwithstanding some obvious exceptions, constituted a
homogeneous group who had quickly rallied to the cause of the general
and, as such, deserve to be counted among the ‘resisters of the first
hour’. This book demonstrates that this explanation will simply not do.
The ‘forgotten French’ were extremely varied in their response to
events and displayed a strong wariness of de Gaulle himself. In this
respect, this study mirrors the approach that historians have increas-
ingly adopted in their research into occupied France. No longer are the
key concerns the high politics of Vichy–German relations, the ins and
outs of collaborationist politics at Paris, the interminable intrigues of
the corridors of power at Vichy and the workings of the Resistance
movements; instead, historians have chosen to look at the history of the
Occupation from the bottom up. Just as historians of Nazi Germany
have become obsessed with Alltagsgeschichte, ‘the history of daily life’,
la vie quotidienne has likewise become the central concern for
researchers into Vichy France.
Viewed through these prisms, the ‘forgotten French’ constitute far
more than a footnote in the history of the Second World War. An
examination of their lives reveals much about of the splintering of
French opinion during the war. Many of the attitudes that have been
identified in metropolitan France, in the different zones created by the
Germans, may also be found among the exiles in Britain. Pétainism, in
particular, crossed the Channel alongside the refugees and servicemen,
while Gaullism struggled to put down roots, even among communities
one might have thought indulgent and sympathetic to the general, and
it is not difficult to perceive similarities between the popular anti-
Gaullism of the Fourth and Fifth Republics and that articulated in
wartime Britain. The experiences of the ‘forgotten French’ also reveal
much about the business of exile, something the French especially have
never warmed to, even though they have regularly made Britain their
temporary home at moments of crisis in their country’s history, for
instance in the aftermath of the Massacre of Saint Bartholomew, the
Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, the Revolution of 1789, and those
upheavals of 1830, 1848 and 1871. As David Thomson observed in his
1951 profile of de Gaulle, ‘Exiles, even those who have courageously
x Preface
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sought voluntary exile in order to continue the battle for their
country’s honour and liberation, have usually acquired a mentality
which, though completely understandable and humanly forgivable,
calls for constant patience and imaginative sympathy on the part of
their hosts.’2
Such a mentality was indeed adopted by the ‘forgotten French’, men,
women and children who generally had not chosen to advance the fight
by settling in Britain, and who were not well cut out for life abroad,
even in a country as geographically close to France as Britain, thus
contributing to an uncomfortable mix of cultures. It was fortunate
both for the ‘forgotten French’ and their British hosts that, often unbe-
known to one another, they shared a set of common values, and
appreciated that these could only be fulfilled with the ultimate defeat of
Nazism.
Notes
1 S. Berthon, Allies at War (London, Collins, 2000).
2 D. Thomson, Two Frenchmen. Pierre Laval and Charles de Gaulle (London,
The Cresset Press, 1951), p. 168.
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The context of exile:
communities, circumstances
and choices
Quitter la France est, pour un français, une situation funèbre. 
(Honoré de Balzac, Le Cousin Pons)1
An independent-minded people, with a strong cultural awareness and
attachment to region, if not always to nation, the French have generally
made unhappy exiles. It has been their misfortune that the many crises
punctuating French history have compelled them to take refuge
abroad, especially in Britain, a land that is so ‘alike’ France yet so
‘different’.2 In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, religious perse-
cution was the spur. The Massacre of Saint Bartholomew in 1572 and
Louis XIV’s Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 banished
Protestants aplenty: soldiers, lower nobility and, crucially, artisans and
craftsmen, men whose skills came to be missed in France and resented
among rival workers in Britain.3 In the eighteenth century, it was the
turn of the philosophes, Voltaire and Rousseau, hounded out by the
ideological intolerance of absolutism, the latter spending much of his
time, miserably, in the mists and rain of Derbyshire, the source of the
following piece of doggerel:
At Wootton-under-Weaver,
Where God came never!4
The philosophes were themselves succeeded by some 100,000–150,000
émigrés of all kinds – soldiers, priests, sailors, peasants and pastry
cooks, significantly not just aristocrats as is sometimes claimed –
fleeing the excesses of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic regimes.5
Most of these unwilling exiles, maybe up to two-thirds, had returned to
France by 1801, when Napoleon signed a Concordat with the Pope and
made overtures to appease the nobility, although a handful of die-hard
monarchists bided their time and did not re-establish themselves in
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their homeland until the restoration of the Bourbons in 1814–15.6
Paradoxically, it was not long before French kings were travelling in the
opposite direction. Both Charles X and Louis-Philippe took refuge in
Britain following the revolutions of 1830 and 1848; and, in 1870, there
came a Bonaparte, Napoleon III, who had already spent some of his
earlier life in London enrolling, in 1848, as a special constable at the
time of the Chartist demonstrations in Hyde Park. After the collapse of
the Second Empire in 1870, he set up an ersatz court at Chislehurst in
Kent, where he died in 1873, not so far from Petts Wood, the tempo-
rary home of General de Gaulle in autumn 1940. For many years
afterwards, the Orpington Museum proudly displayed a copy of de
Gaulle’s bill for coal deliveries.7
The upheavals that toppled kings and emperors also uprooted revo-
lutionaries and artists. The political activists Godefroy Cavaignac,
Louis Blanc, and Alexandre Ledru-Rollin all took shelter in London, as
did the writer and painters Victor Hugo, Camille Pissarro and Claude
Monet, the latter pair seeking to escape the upheavals of the Paris
Commune of 1871, which had seen their homes occupied by Prussian
troops.8 They were accompanied by several Communard insurgents,
the most notorious being the journalist Jules Vallès, who wrote exten-
sively, and very critically, of his time in London; most of these exiles
returned after an amnesty was declared in 1878, although a small
number remained to settle in Soho, for example the Bertaux family
who set up a patisserie in Greek Street, an establishment that survives
to this day, albeit under new Anglo-French ownership.9 In the follow-
ing decade, the ideological battles of the Boulanger Affair brought forth
the general himself, together with one of his most committed champi-
ons, the writer Henri Rochefort. During the 1890s, the Dreyfus Affair
led to a fresh round of exiles, notably that of the novelist Emile Zola,
who lived a clandestine existence in Weybridge where he largely kept
himself to himself, taking photographs of the neighbourhood and
following events in France.10 Ironically Esterhazy, the man who had
sparked off the whole scandal by selling secrets to the Germans, prob-
ably to finance his mistresses and gambling debts, also escaped French
justice by hiding in London. Men and women of a very different moral
calibre – monks and nuns belonging to religious orders dissolved by
the so-called lois d’exception of 1901 and 1904 – followed in the foot-
steps of Esterhazy, discovering Protestant Britain a far more tolerant
refuge than the secular and purportedly liberal-minded Third
Republic.11 It was a symbolic act when the convent at Montmartre,
2 The forgotten French
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dedicated to the English martyrs and set up by religious originally
expelled at the time of the Reformation, was transferred to Tyburn in
the centre of London. As Aidan Bellanger records, history seemed to
‘have turned full-circle’.12
Ideological intransigence, religious persecution and revolution had
thus been the principal factors driving the French across the Channel.
In the early years of the twentieth century commercial factors became
the key. Although the stagnation in French population growth did not
necessarily create a ready band of economic exiles, the downturn in the
European economy in the 1880s, the allure of London as a business
centre and the growing diversification of commercial activities
attracted several large businesses to Britain. On the eve of the First
World War, there were 30,000 or so French living in the British Isles,
the third largest group of European exiles. What is astonishing is that
such an important group of immigrants should have been constantly
overlooked by historians who have tended to concentrate on German,
Russian and Italian arrivals.13 Something of the reasons for this neglect
are addressed in Chapter 5, but it might well stem from the fact that
sources on the French are hard to come by, as they were for this present
study.
War, that defining feature of the twentieth century, also drew the
French to Britain, although it should be stressed that the vast majority
of Continental refugees in 1914–18 stemmed from Belgium, a country
whose low-lying and watery lands had become an ever-moving battle-
ground.14 The foreign ways of the Belgians, their alleged low standards
of hygiene and supposed indiscipline were not remembered with fond-
ness in 1940 when Britain again welcomed Europe’s ‘unwanted’,
although the swift advance of Hitler’s armies ensured that their
numbers (perhaps 20,000) were never as great as in 1914 when some
250,000 had taken refuge in the British Isles. This was the largest influx
of foreigners into the UK since the 1790s, and many had to be housed
in religious houses of Southern Ireland. Initially, the French govern-
ment had only been too happy that such displaced persons should be
dispatched across the Channel, yet already by 1915 the strains of war
meant that Belgians were a welcome addition to the French work-
force.15 At the start of the First World War, Joffre’s ability, or luck, in
holding the Germans at the Marne, enabled the mass of France’s own
refugees to retreat into metropolitan territory where they were at least
among their countryfolk; negligible numbers came to Britain. The
withdrawal inland was imitated by their government, which set up a
Communities, circumstances and choices 3
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temporary home at Bordeaux in 1914, the resting place for some
ministries for the duration of the war.
In the summer of 1940, France once again became a country of
entrances and exits. On 10 May, German forces, having conquered
much of eastern Europe, turned westwards and began their simultane-
ous assault on Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg. Their
advance was so fast that they soon reached Sedan, the cornerstone of
French defences, which fell on 13 May. Two days later, the Dutch army
surrendered; within a fortnight, the Belgians had followed suit. On 28
May, trapped by the German manoeuvre, the British Expeditionary
Force (BEF) started the evacuation from the beaches of Dunkirk,
accompanied by bedraggled elements of the French army. As the
soldiers retreated, the politicians also departed. On 10 June, the same
day as an opportunist Mussolini entered the war against France,
Reynaud’s government left Paris for Bordeaux. Holding a series of
makeshift meetings along the châteaux of the Loire valley, on 11–13
June, the French Cabinet discussed whether to leave and fight on from
North Africa or to sue for an armistice, an option favoured by General
Weygand, Gamelin’s recent replacement as commander-in-chief, and
Marshal Pétain, who had been appointed deputy prime minister on 18
May in a desperate attempt to shore up morale. On 16 June, two days
after the Germans occupied Paris, the government reached Bordeaux
where a dispirited Reynaud resigned and recommended Pétain as his
successor. The next day, this ancient soldier, some eighty-four years of
age and best known for his victory at Verdun in 1916, announced to a
stunned nation that he was in the process of negotiating an armistice.
Signed on 23 June, the terms of this agreement divided France into two
principal zones, the larger area comprising the northern and western
territories, which were to be occupied by the Germans. Still in flight,
the French government eventually retired to the little spa town of
Vichy, often likened to an English Harrogate, Cheltenham or
Tunbridge Wells, where on 10 July the National Assembly voted itself
out of existence and granted full powers to Pétain.16 Politically ambi-
tious and naive of true German intentions, he quickly used his
new-found authority to promote a policy of collaboration abroad and
a reactionary programme of renewal at home. Few dared defy the lead-
ership of this old man whose patriotism seemed unquestionable. One
exception was his former protégé General de Gaulle who, on 5 June,
had been appointed under-secretary of war and who, on 17 June, quit
France for London in disgust at the Armistice and the defeatism of the
4 The forgotten French
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marshal. The day after his arrival, he broadcast to his countrymen on
the BBC urging them to continue the fight.17
In 1940, the success in repeating the retreat to Bordeaux (though not
the victory of the Marne) guaranteed that far more French than in 1914
reached the relative safety of Britain, although it should be stressed that
most still retreated inland. Some, notably civilians and soldiers, had
little choice in their destination, squeezed out at Dunkirk by the
pincer-movement of Guderian’s tanks, and ferried across the Channel
in the ‘little boats’. Others such as de Gaulle deliberately chose London
as it was in the thick of the fighting and the nerve centre of resistance
to Nazism. In an interview of October 1990, Maurice Schumann, de
Gaulle’s broadcaster, admitted that he was happy in London as he felt
he was at the front.18 As Maurice Agulhon remarks, London was also a
place from where radio messages could be transmitted to the
Continent.19 Yet few initially heeded the calls on the BBC; only a
handful listened to de Gaulle’s now famous broadcast of 18 June.20 To
the general’s disgust and frustration, several prominent intellectuals
who had arrived in London at the same time as himself were soon
repacking their bags, destined for the safer shores of North America. It
was with some justification that Elizabeth de Miribel acerbically
observed, ‘In June 1940 London was not a town where you arrived, but
one from which you left.’21 Likewise, Ronald Tree, one of Churchill’s
close associates, recalls how, in the wake of the fall of Sedan, London
University’s Senate House, the wartime home of the Ministry of
Information, was deluged with prominent French figures, all desirous
to secure passage to New York.22 And, finally, there were the existing
colonists, descendants of Huguenots and nineteenth-century revolu-
tionaries, together with economic immigrants, who looked with
sadness and bewilderment at what was happening to their homeland.
The Gaullist legacy
Apart from General de Gaulle and his supporters, who have generated
what one historian has described as an ‘intimidating’ literature,23 those
French exiles who sheltered in Britain during the ‘dark years’ of
1940–44 have largely been forgotten by historians. Why this neglect?
Part of the answer lies in the fact that the French in wartime Britain
constituted a small, self-contained community, or rather communities,
who left few traces of their existence, and who were all too eager to
return to France, some seeking repatriation while the Germans still
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occupied their lands.24 When I was engaged in a fruitless search for the
papers of a now-disbanded French charity, one archivist in the London
Metropolitan Archives compared the French in wartime London to the
present-day Chinese community: both sets of people determined to
keep themselves to themselves, conscious of their privacy, anxious to
assert their independence of spirit, and extremely wary of any
meddling from the outside. This might explain why the French remain
invisible in social histories of Britain during the Second World War,
and earn little more than a footnote in most accounts of wartime
London, the city where a majority of them congregated; indeed, they
are hidden in most survey histories of the capital.25 Piecing together
fragments of the lives of these exiles was thus no easy matter, with
sources elusive and scattered in out-of-the-way places; those scraps of
evidence that do survive often pertain to such mundane matters as
billeting allowances and unemployment relief, testimony to the
prudent housekeeping and Victorian spirit of self-help that pervaded
the British state at war.
It is also apparent that the French have been overshadowed by other
more prominent groups of foreigners who arrived in wartime: Jews,
Germans and American GIs. The abominations that were perpetrated
in the death camps of central and eastern Europe have rightly focused
attention on what Britain, and France, could have done for the victims
of Nazi persecution in 1939–45. Far more is surely the answer.26
Attention has also centred on those politically suspect groups whose
loyalty was called into question in 1940. Italian economic immigrants,
long settled in this country and well integrated into London life, found
themselves serving espressos in Soho coffee bars one minute and
brewing tea in rusty canteens in an Isle of Man internment camp the
next. German arrivals in the 1930s fared no better, becoming immedi-
ate objects of suspicion, even if they had originally fled their homeland
to escape Nazi racial persecution.27 And, of course, there were the
Allies, principally the Americans, who, in the so-called ‘friendly inva-
sion’, brought with them hope, fresh faces, nylon stockings, cigarettes
and candy bars, leaving behind plenty of women holding unwanted
babies.28 By contrast, French exiles never had the same impact on
British culture, although outraged citizens in the garrison towns of
Camberley and Aldershot complained bitterly about the loose morals
and libidinous behaviour of Gaullist troops stationed there,29 reflecting
the widely held notion that French men were sexual athletes ready to
prey on the virtuous womanhood of Albion. Gender issues aside, the
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reasons why the French had such a minimal impact on British culture
are not hard to fathom: their numbers were small, especially compared
to the Americans; their traditions were different; and, ultimately, they
were dependent on their British hosts for virtually everything. Tereska
Torrrès, who at nineteen took the brave decision to quit her homeland
in order to enrol in the Corps Féminin des Forces Françaises Libres, the
women’s wing of La France Libre, relates how she and her colleagues
wore British uniforms until these were distinguished by the addition of
French insignia, thus providing a separate identity.30
It is also possible that French exiles in Britain have been neglected in
favour of their cousins in North America. The French communities in
the USA and Canada, especially, were always much larger than their
counterparts in London. It is calculated that, in 1939, the French-
speaking population in the USA was approximately 1,400,000, the
majority being of Canadian or Louisiana extraction. Some 30,000
French expatriates were located in Washington and New York alone;
London could boast no more than 7,000 colons. Given these numbers,
it was inevitable that the American French communities took a keen
interest in what was happening to their compatriots over the Atlantic.
As de Miribel remarked, the safety of American shores ensured that
their numbers were further swelled by many prominent politicians and
artists.31 While George Bernanos, the Catholic author, and Charles
Corbin, the former ambassador to Britain, headed for South America,
such luminaries as Henri Bernstein, Camille Chautemps, Jules
Romains, André Maurois, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Jean Monnet and
Henry Torrès, father of Tereska, all took up residence in New York. To
be fair to these men, their courage in reaching America was often
considerable. Not all of them had quickly forsaken London, expecting
Britain to be the next domino to fall in Hitler’s game of conquest.
Rather than travelling in relative safety from English ports on board
US-registered vessels, their journey often involved a difficult passage
through Spain and Portugal, and from Lisbon across treacherous seas
to Liberty Island, avoiding German submarines en route as well as the
patrols of the Royal Navy, which, in the aftermath of the shelling of the
French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir on 3 July 1940, was prepared to stop,
board and sink any craft sailing under the tricolour lest it fell into
Hitler’s clutches. Once on American soil, the significant numbers of
intellectuals ensured that New York, together with Montréal, became
the French cultural capital overseas. London could never make the
same claim, this to the disappointment perhaps of British writers such
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as Raymond Mortimer, Cyril Connolly, Kathleen Raine and Stephen
Spender who, according to Arthur Koestler, suffered from ‘French flu’,
all too ready to abandon their normal prudence whenever they saw a
line of French verse or prose, especially if it was written by Vercors,
André Gide or Louis Aragon.32
While the French in Britain might well have been eclipsed by other
groups, de Gaulle at least has attracted intense interest, and herein lies
the principal reason why the French communities have been over-
looked. All too often, the general and his supporters have been seen as
synonymous with all French exiles in London. This tendency even
existed in the war itself. Robert Mengin, a former member of the
Mission Naval Française and later a writer for the British-run
Resistance journal Courrier de l’Air, remembers how his English friends
were extremely perplexed when he explained that he was not a Gaullist.
This caused consternation, and a belated and hesitant question as to
whether he was a Pétainist. To overcome such social embarrassments,
Mengin feigned eccentricity: ‘The easy way was to pass oneself off as a
little mad. A touch of madness is quite well considered in England.’33
Although it is not correct to believe French exiles and the Free
French were one and the same, such misguided ideas are at least under-
standable. De Gaulle was a truly remarkable figure whose importance
in the history of the Second World War and subsequent evolution of
France cannot be overstated.34 In 1940, all the odds appeared stacked
against him. Here was a two-star general, the author of some over-
looked books on tank warfare, and a minor member of Reynaud’s last
Cabinet, who was defying the authority of Marshal Pétain, the most
celebrated of France’s soldiers, the ‘Victor of Verdun’, a man whose
authority and patriotism seemed unchallengeable.35 Here, too, was a
rebellious officer whose claims to incarnate French sovereignty rested
on some highly dubious criteria. Although his legal expert René Cassin
was soon put to work in demonstrating that it was Vichy that was the
unconstitutional regime,36 even the British refused to confer on de
Gaulle the status of a leader of a government in exile, merely acknowl-
edging him on 28 June 1940 as the head of the Free French. The general
was always reliant on British backing, just as Tereska Torrès was
dependent on the British for her uniforms. Initially, this support came
from Churchill himself, who was impressed by de Gaulle’s courage and
who was eager to rein in the pro-Vichy sympathies of the Foreign
Office; later, it was the Foreign Office that became de Gaulle’s princi-
pal supporter, keen to dampen Churchill’s enthusiasm for the
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Americans.37 For their part, Roosevelt and the State Department
retained an outright hostility to the general, the president being unable
to understand how any man could compare himself to Joan of Arc, and
being irritated, as Churchill bemoaned, that he could not get his own
bishops to burn him.38 Yet, against these odds, de Gaulle played what
few cards he had skilfully, building up his support in the colonies,
outwitting potential rivals in the shape of Admiral Muselier and
General Giraud, nurturing his contacts with the Resistance in metro-
politan France, and retaining an extreme suspicion of both British and
American intentions. Such behaviour ensured that, in 1944, he was
acknowledged as the undisputed leader of the French Resistance both
inside and outside of France, although such status did not ensure the
political settlement he craved. For that, he would have to wait until
1958.
Aside from de Gaulle’s obvious political importance, memory has
also played its part in the close identification of French exiles with the
general. To explain why this is so in the case of the British, it is neces-
sary to reflect on the extraordinary and unpropitious circumstances of
June 1940. On his arrival, the general was an ‘unknown’ and received
little publicity: his broadcast of 18 June was not widely reported and
there was little information readily available on his past.39 The Times,
which on 7 June 1940 had published a short biographical sketch of the
new under-secretary of state for war, was one of the few papers to
publish his appel in full.40 Major-General Spears, who became the
liaison officer between the British and the Free French, claimed there
was only one copy of de Gaulle’s Army of the Future in the War Office
whose pages had not even been cut.41 Churchill was so troubled by this
state of affairs that he employed a public relations consultant,
Richmond Temple, to boost the general’s appeal, a gesture that led to a
deterioration of personal relations between the two leaders.42 De
Gaulle complained bitterly that the prime minister would sell him like
a brand of soap, and preferred to keep himself to himself.43 According
to Spears, he regularly used the following phrase in conversation with
staff officers, ‘I do not want to be made a film star by the press.’44 The
historian Douglas Johnson tells the astonishing story of bumping into
Geoffrey de Courcel, de Gaulle’s right-hand man who had boarded the
same aircraft on 17 June 1940, wandering around Frognal looking for
the house in which his hero had once lived, never having visited there
during the war.45
Yet it remains questionable whether de Gaulle needed to be
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marketed by Churchill. The romantic image of this lonely soldier,
defying the menace of Nazism and the cowardice of Vichy, appealed to
a nation that had few enough heroes at the height of the Blitz. His strik-
ing presence, and enormous height, was quickly noted in the streets of
London. When one of the characters, the rather seedy and paedophile
uncle, in Mary Wesley’s wartime novel The Camomile Lawn remarks
how he saw de Gaulle that morning, and had saluted him, this was far
from fiction.46 The general was a familiar sight in metropolitan life, and
quickly become enmeshed in the British legend of a heroic and stead-
fast nation determined to resist the German onslaught at whatever cost.
‘Good old de Gaulle’, cried workers when he visited a munitions
factory.47 As the populist newspaper the Daily Sketch observed in
imagery that might well have appealed to the general himself, ‘He is like
Robinson Crusoe washed up on his island and anxious to save as much
as possible that may be useful to him.’48 Listening in Notting Hill to
one of his first broadcasts on the BBC, the nurse and little-known
diarist Vere Hodgson noted on 28 June 1940, ‘Magnificent personality
he sounds . . . His voice is thrilling, and his answer made me shiver in
my chair. Such tragedy too in his tones.’49 Although public opinion was
often exasperated by de Gaulle, especially by his high-handed methods
and rudeness, which could not always be concealed from the press, and
entertained doubts about his political ambitions,50 it remained
impressed by his heroism and determination. The diplomat Harold
Nicolson, who himself had despaired at the general’s rudeness in the
war,51 caught this mood perfectly when reviewing the first volume of
the Mémoires de guerre in 1955 for the Observer:
For all his rigid ways his potent nationalism gave him charm. We in this
country always have an affection for lost causes and in 1941 the cause of
France did in fact seem lost. De Gaulle inspired us with a glow of wonder
that he should be positive, that he could lead his people out of the abyss
by the force of his dreams and theirs.52
Some fifty years after his flight to London, his voice of defiance still
echoed. Commemorating the centenary of his birth in 1990, the
Institut Charles de Gaulle conducted a sondage among the British
public.53 Of those interviewed, the overwhelming majority recalled that
he had been the leader of the Free French in London. Far fewer recalled
his presidency of the Fifth Republic and, maybe surprisingly in these
Eurosceptic times, the fact that he said non to Britain’s request to join
the Common Market in 1963.
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Within France, too, there has been a tendency to view the Free French
and French exiles as one and the same. This is understandable given the
way in which both Germany and Vichy rigorously censored both press
and radio reports and the manner in which the Free French often domi-
nated BBC broadcasts to France, even though the organisation was only
supposed to enjoy half-an-hour early evening slots in the schedules.54 It
is, though, de Gaulle himself, the supreme myth-maker, who ensured
that all French expatriates in Britain were identified with his cause. To
admit that he had not been able to win over the entire French community
in Britain would have been an admission of failure, and might well have
dented his already precarious position yet further. It would certainly have
undermined his claims to embody the sovereignty of the French people
and the legitimacy of the republican tradition both of which, he argued,
Vichy had illegally usurped. He returned to these themes in his memoirs
written in the 1950s, a time when he was desperate to keep his political
options alive given the difficulties of the Fourth Republic. In recalling
how, on 18 June 1940, his ‘irrevocable words flew out upon their way’,
urging his countrymen, both on metropolitan and British soil, to join
him in London, he readily acknowledges that only ‘isolated volunteers’
reached England: ‘They mostly came from France, brought by the last
ships to have left there normally, or escaping in small boats which they
had managed to seize, or, again, having with great difficulty got across
Spain, evading its police which shut up in the camp at Miranda those it
caught.’55 That more did not sail from France, and that many servicemen
stranded in England did not rally, are conveniently attributed to Mers-el-
Kébir. For de Gaulle, this was ‘a lamentable event’ and ‘a terrible blow for
our hopes’.56 Thereafter, he makes little mention of the French commu-
nity in Britain, other than to imply that he commanded their loyalty,
something that was simply not true. Rather, his memoirs emphasise his
own role in the Resistance, ‘the man of June Eighteenth’ who, as Henry
Rousso writes, personified the sovereignty of the French people and who
single-handedly took ‘under his wing’ the forty million French men and
women on metropolitan territory, turning them into a ‘nation of
resisters’.57 For a set of memoirs written about his time in London, there
is remarkably little about the city itself, the manner in which the Free
French settled there, and their relations with the British and wider French
communities. Just as de Gaulle passes over Jews and Paris collaborators –
two other embarrassing groups of his countrymen, albeit embarrassing
for different reasons – he largely overlooks the many other French citi-
zens in Britain. 
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Since the general’s death in 1970, much work has been conducted
into disassembling Gaullist ‘resistancialist’ mythology, unveiling the
complex nature of the Resistance, both inside and outside of France.58
This work has conclusively demonstrated that Vichy was far from being
an aberration in French history, as de Gaulle always claimed. Instead, it
drew on existing political and ideological traditions, most embarrass-
ingly a potent anti-Semitism, which has recently resurfaced in the
shape of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s extreme rightist Front National.59 The
same research has further demonstrated that the Resistance was princi-
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pally the work of a minority; one historian has calculated that the
number of active resisters was no more than 400,000, in other words,
less than 2 per cent of the population, a claim that will always be
impossible to substantiate.60 The divisions within the Resistance have
also been exposed, not just those between de Gaulle and the far left,
which the general was all too ready to acknowledge in his attempts to
condemn the Communists as revolutionaries, but the deeper personal
and ideological clashes that threatened his overall control. That de
Gaulle was able to take charge of the transitional government in France
in 1944 owed much to his diplomatic and political skills, which had to
be at their sharpest in outwitting the Americans who had plans to put
their own people into position.61
While historians of Vichy France have shown great creativity in
developing new lines of enquiry, the one area where they have not
displayed the same kind of imagination is in uncovering the life of
exiles in Britain. Here, the concerns of scholars have unquestionably
been extensive, but they have also been very traditional, focusing
largely on diplomacy and high politics, the sort of issues that de Gaulle
himself tackles in his memoirs: the uneasy bond between the general
and Churchill;62 the curious triangular relationship that existed
between London, the Free French and Vichy;63 the growth of the Free
French movement itself;64 the squabbles among its leading figures,
especially those with Admiral Muselier;65 the emergence of anti-
Gaullism as an intellectual movement;66 the quarrels over BBC
broadcasts to France;67 the role of intelligence gathering;68 the power
struggle that took place with General Giraud in 1942–43;69 the ambigu-
ous legacy of Jean Moulin, de Gaulle’s close lieutenant on metropolitan
soil and a visitor to England in 1942;70 and the evolution of the
Free/Fighting into an embryonic government, which eventually settled
in Algiers rather than in London.71 Generals, admirals, politicians and
professors thus dominate the history of France in Britain to the exclu-
sion of those other émigrés – the refugees, non-Gaullist soldiers,
Vichyite officials and colonists, the ‘forgotten French’ – who also
sought refuge here in 1940.
Communities and circumstances
The aim of this book, then, is not to write another account of La France
Libre. Nor is it to recount in detail the quarrels between de Gaulle, the
Anglo-Saxons and the Americans. Although this study touches upon the
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French intellectual community in London, these men and women also
have their historians. Several good accounts on all these issues already
exist, and anyone seeking a conspectus on French resistance overseas
would be advised to look elsewhere, notably to Jean-Louis Crémieux-
Brilhac’s exhaustive and magisterial history of La France Libre, which is
broader than its title suggests.72 The concern of the present book is the
‘forgotten French’: to lift them out of obscurity and to dissect their exis-
tence. It would be disingenuous to suggest that these people were
politically more important than de Gaulle’s own supporters; this would
be to stretch revisionism too far. Nonetheless, the book serves as a correc-
tive in that it displays the majority of French men and women were not
enamoured of the general; in many ways, the lure of Pétain was stronger,
even across the Channel. Most exiles were embarrassed and confused by
the political decisions that they had to make, choices that were shaped by
the same factors that confronted their compatriots on occupied metro-
politan soil: the exode; defeat; national humiliation; the future place of
France in Europe and the world; German repression of relatives, friends
and compatriots; and the growth of resistance within France itself. In this
way, the book asks many of the questions that historians have recently
asked about public behaviour in Vichy France, and it is striking that many
of the responses are the same.73
The terrible choices and constraints that dominated the lives of the
‘forgotten French’ constitute a central strand of this study, yet the book
is as much a social and cultural history of exile as it is a political one. In
the social domain, it is interested in the backgrounds of the exiles
themselves. Where in France did they come from, and for what reasons
did they cross the Channel? How did they survive in Britain? Where did
they settle, and why? In cultural terms, it examines how they adapted
to a new country, alien customs and a new way of life, one that was
being constantly buffeted by the circumstances of conflict. Many felt
that they had escaped one war only to discover another, especially at
the time of the Luftwaffe’s remorseless pounding of British cities.
Refugees, in particular, were resentful that they had been housed in
London, which had quickly become the front line. Indeed, the ‘forgot-
ten French’ had to adopt several positions in regard to their hosts; in
this regard, the book is not solely concerned with all things French.
Throughout, it keeps a close watch on how both the British govern-
ment and public catered for and responded to these strange
communities in their midst, communities that often seemed to be at
odds with one another.
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The organisation of the book revolves around the dual themes that
dominated the lives of the ‘forgotten French’: community and circum-
stance. In the midst of my research, it became clear that while many of
the groups often intermixed – for instance, Gaullist troops sought pass-
port advice from Vichyite consular officials in Bedford Square,
intellectuals and refugees rubbed shoulders in Soho restaurants, and
servicemen seeking repatriation frequently read anti-Pétainist propa-
ganda devised by the general’s headquarters in Carlton Gardens – they
also kept their distance from one another, and retained separate iden-
tities. The distinct nature of these communities was reinforced by the
manner in which they were catered for. Within a few weeks of the
Franco-German Armistice, there existed a wide range of different
organisations, British and French, dealing with specific groups. This
often resulted in the replication of effort and endless quarrels over
responsibility, necessitating the creation of Lord Bessborough’s French
Welfare, a sub-committee of the Foreign Office, whose remit was, in
large measure, to keep the peace among competing charitable bodies.
Circumstance further helped demarcate these communities. The
manner of arrival always overshadowed the lives of the ‘forgotten
French’, determined their futures and curtailed their choices. Refugees
could never escape the fact that they had been forced to flee their
homes, and had been pushed towards the Channel. Most had come to
Britain not out of design – out of a wish to fight on, whether with de
Gaulle or the British – but by chance, without money, friends and
English contacts. So it is that an initial chapter examines the ‘misfor-
tune’ of exile, the pitiful story of the 3,500 French refugees whose lives
were dominated by hardship, sorrow and alienation. The ensuing
chapter investigates ‘the conflict of exile’: the experiences of those
soldiers and sailors who were marooned in Britain at the time of the
Armistice and Mers-el-Kébir. These comprised some 2,500 wounded
soldiers, convalescing at Crystal Palace and White City, approximately
100 merchant seamen, also at Crystal Palace, and some 6,500 sailors
billeted in makeshift barracks-cum-detention centres, located well
away from London, generally in the Midlands and north of the
country: Aintree, Haydock, Arrowe Park, Trentham Park, Doddington,
Oulton Park and Barmouth. The ‘conflict’ of their exile was whether to
fight on, either alongside de Gaulle or the British, or to opt for repatri-
ation. While the Free French expended much energy proselytising
among these troops, the British authorities were less anxious to recruit
their services, fearful that they might prove to be fifth columnists or
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German spies. The allegiance of the many French communities was
always in question. To whom did they owe their loyalty? To Pétain? To
de Gaulle? To the British? To Vichy? To General Weygand who, in
September 1940, became High Commissioner in North Africa and
distanced himself from the policy of collaboration that the marshal was
pursuing with Berlin?74
Such dilemmas ensured that both the British and the Gaullists kept a
close watch on the French communities in Britain, on the scent for any
whiff of treachery. In the event, fifth columnists never formed a signifi-
cant, or readily identifiable community, yet it is clear that they gravitated
to one group of men and women who did: the Vichy consuls and lega-
tions, which had been left in Britain at the time of the Armistice.
Although Britain had cut off diplomatic relations with Vichy, it permit-
ted a skeleton consular staff to remain in order to handle administrative
matters and to tidy up the economic agreements that had been concluded
between London and Paris in the course of the war. The lives of these men
and women constitute a third chapter – ‘the surveillance of exile’. The
remaining chapter focuses on the French community in Britain.75 As
already noted, in 1914 this community was the third largest European
immigrant group in Britain, numbering approximately 30,000. The call-
up of French nationals into the army in 1939 reduced numbers to around
12,000, 7,000 of whom lived in London; the remainder were largely
concentrated in the Home Counties. Even so, they still ranked as a signif-
icant immigrant group and were naturally perplexed about what was
happening across the Channel. Some might have wished to keep their
heads down, adopting an attentiste, or wait-and-see approach. Yet this
was not possible. It was inevitable that the new arrivals would seek out
their countryfolk, if only as a point of reference in a strange land that
observed curious habits. Driving on the left, orderly queues at the bus
stop, the totality of the blackouts, the good manners of London motorists
who observed traffic lights even during a bombing raid, and the myster-
ies of the Underground – these were all unfamiliar sights to the exiles and
required explaining.76 Moreover, it was inevitable that the more politi-
cally active exiles would attempt to mobilise the support of the colonists.
Significantly, intellectual exiles would quickly integrate with the
colonists, often making it difficult to distinguish them apart. The British
also kept an eye on these colonists and, although it was quickly decided
that they did not pose any real threat, the deterioration of London-Vichy
relations during 1941 brought with it the prospect of general internment.
Misfortune, conflict, surveillance and tradition: these, then, were the
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circumstances in which the communities of the ‘forgotten French’ –
refugees, servicemen, Vichyite officials and colonists – lived, worked,
talked, dined and argued, never quite able to patch up their differences,
thus presenting an elaborate mosaic of responses to the war, responses
that echoed positions adopted on metropolitan soil, although, Britain,
unlike their homeland, never became subject to the jackboot.
Piecing together the fragments 
Overlooked by historians, eclipsed by other exile communities and
dwarfed by Gaullist mythology, the literature that touches on the lives
of the ‘forgotten French’ does not take long to survey. Admittedly,
there are titles that promise much, notably Pierre Accoce’s Les Français
à Londres and Jean-Paul and Michèle Cointet’s La France à Londres, yet
the former is more or less another history of the Free French, de Gaulle
appearing on every page, while the latter concentrates on the recon-
struction of the French state abroad, a process that, once again, came
to be dominated by the Gaullists.77 A broader picture is drawn in André
Gillois’s Histoire secrète des français à Londres, one of those books that
sits awkwardly on the cusp of being both a primary and secondary
source.78 Having helped coordinate the efforts of the three principal
partisan movements in the unoccupied zone – Combat, Libération Sud
and Franc-Tireur – Gillois fled to Britain in 1942, and his work stands
almost as a memoir of these momentous times.Yet having arrived late
in the day, Gillois was forced to recreate the atmosphere and events of
1940–41. In the words of Emile Delavenay, a journalist working for the
BBC and a resident in London throughout the war, the book is thus,
‘un ramassis de rapports, rapportés sans le moindre sens de la critique
historique’.79 This reservation aside, Gillois still dwells on the high
politics and the key personalities of the day, saying little about the
everyday experience and culture of exile. 
This, then, is a study assembled almost entirely from primary
sources. Just as virtually every member of the Pétain Cabinet chose to
make public their recollections of the Occupation, most prominent
exiles, both Gaullist and anti-Gaullist – Jacques Soustelle, René Cassin,
Maurice Schumann, Jean-Pierre Bloch, François Coulet, Elizabeth de
Miribel, Robert Mengin, to name but a few – have all left their
memoirs.80 While these allude to some of the experiences of exile, they
are, for the most part, the stories of an educated and articulate elite,
newly arrived in Britain. Hence, they focus principally on high politics
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and the wider events of the war; de Gaulle often constitutes the context
in which they articulate their memory. An exception to this pattern are
the articles that Georges Blond wrote for the collaborationist newspa-
per, Je Suis Partout, and that were collected together in his L’Angleterre
en guerre. Récit d’un marin français published in both French and
German during 1941.81 A naval engineer, an ardent Anglophobe and
associate of Robert Brasillach, in 1940 he was interned in Britain along
with other French sailors and did not hide his disgust at the manner in
which he was treated. Repatriated to France, he made his mark as a
right-wing journalist, was sentenced to ‘dégradation nationale’ in 1949,
before resuming his literary career in the 1950s, writing an apologia for
Marshal Pétain in 1966.82
Given the limitation of memoirs, wherever possible this study has
drawn on unpublished diaries of lesser-known figures, together with
interviews conducted among former exiles and their British associates.
Newspapers also proved of value, not so much the British press, but the
many French journals that sprang up in London. For the most part,
British journalism provides few clues to the fact that not all French
expatriates were supporters of de Gaulle, the obvious exception being
the Observer. Under the proprietorship of the Astor family, who had
enjoyed close contact with the French ever since June 1940 when large
numbers of sailors disembarked at Portsmouth where Lord Astor was
mayor, in 1943 the Observer launched a strenuous campaign against the
authoritarian tendencies of the general, siding with the anti-Gaullist
intellectuals who were making similar complaints in London. Among
the French journals, which often ran off the Fleet Street presses, the
newspaper France was widely perceived as a piece of Ministry of
Information propaganda, and contains little other than reporting of
events in occupied Europe, while La Marseillaise peddled the Gaullist
line, supplemented by Les Documents, which drew together the
general’s speeches and proclamations. Of greater value for this partic-
ular study was La France Libre, the journal of André Labarthe and
Raymond Aron (not a Gaullist publication despite its title), which
reveals something about the social and political conditions of life in
exile, providing helpful information about British customs and tradi-
tions, for instance how the London pub differed from the Paris café.83
It is a pity these essays are few and far between. Labarthe himself,
however, bitterly complained that he received far too many articles
from the French colony in London – cooks, hairdressers and the like –
who were eager to recount their personal experiences of wartime rather
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than getting down to the real business of attacking Vichy and debating
schemes for post-war renewal.84
The bulk of the material, however, has emanated from archival
sources, materials to be found chiefly in Britain rather than in France
or in Germany. Given MI5 and Free French concerns that Vichy
consuls in Britain were secreting information out of the country to
both Berlin and the Pétain regime, use was made of the surviving files
of the Buro des Staatssekretars of the German Foreign Office, as well as
reports emanating from the German embassy in Paris. The documents
selected dealt with Franco-British negotiations, yet nothing came to
light to substantiate the spying allegations, although this is not to say
that evidence cannot be found elsewhere in the enormous bureaucracy
of the Nazi state. Papers pertaining to the Ministère des Affaires
Etrangères, held both in Nantes and in Paris, were also consulted, but
these largely dealt with the pre-1940 period. Having, in an earlier study,
perused the personal fonds of the prominent Socialist exile André
Philip, it was tempting to go through the voluminous archives privées of
prominent Free French officials and other noted exiles based in
London, but this would have resulted in me writing a very different
book, the focus shifting immediately to high politics and matters
Gaullist. In Britain, too, I wished to avoid an over-reliance on the
papers of ‘les grands et les bons’; yet with an empty hour to fill in a
particular depot, it was difficult to resist ordering materials of individ-
uals who seemingly had little connection with the ‘forgotten French’.
For instance, at Churchill College, Cambridge, I unexpectedly uncov-
ered a good deal about refugees and soldiers in the personal letters of
the then Labour MP for Derby, Philip Noel Baker, later the minister
Lord Noel Baker, information that proved far more helpful to this
particular study than that on the Special Operations Executive (SOE)
preserved in Hugh Dalton’s archive at the London School of
Economics. Among private documentation, it was unquestionably the
Spears material at Churchill and the Astor Papers, held at Reading
University Archives, that proved most revealing.
For the most part, this book utilised holdings not normally associ-
ated in any shape or form with French history. Olive Anderson, in her
research into British social history, once remarked that she had
deployed a highly unusual reference work in the shape of the London
Yellow Pages when tracking down the location of nineteenth-century
pubs in the capital. This study cannot claim to have shown quite the
same initiative, but it did delve in several nooks and crannies. Much on
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the lives of servicemen, refugees and expatriates was gleaned from the
holdings of the London Metropolitan Archives, Westminster Diocesan
Archives, Mass-Observation Archives, Reading University Archives
and the Women’s Royal Voluntary Service Archives, which, at the time
of researching, were housed in a Pickfords depot outside Wallingford,
Oxfordshire, interestingly a place de Gaulle himself travelled and where
Free French troops went for picnics by the Thames. The BBC Written
Archives at nearby Caversham were also visited, although arguments
about BBC broadcasts to France largely concerned newly arrived intel-
lectuals and Gaullists, not the ‘forgotten French’. While the world of
broadcasting to both France and Europe still requires further attention,
it does not figure prominently in this particular study.
Of most use were the copious holdings of the Public Records Office
at Kew. In line with most other authors who have written about de
Gaulle, I made much of the General Correspondence (France) of the
Foreign Office, series FO 371. Although not always well catalogued, this
critical source unveiled much about British policy towards the French
in this country, as well as revealing much about the day-to-day exis-
tence of refugees and others. FO 371 also contains the important
minutes of the Committee on Foreign (Allied) Resistance, which met
throughout the period 1940–42 and which reported directly to the War
Cabinet. The CFR had begun life as the Vansittart Committee, an inter-
departmental committee created at the time of the Armistice, whose
remit was to look into all matters French.85 Conducting some twenty-
two meetings between 21 June and 8 July 1940, this committee, initially
comprising Vansittart, Spears, Morton and the Foreign Office appa-
ratchiks Strang and Speaight, became so unwieldy that something more
formal was required, and hence the CFR was born.86 Keeping an
extremely close watch on the activities of French exiles in Britain, in
April 1942 the CFR was retitled the Committee on French Resistance,
looking at the wider developments in Syria, North Africa and else-
where.87 It is at this point that the minutes become less helpful for this
particular study, although by 1941 it was already the case that more
attention was being devoted to matters overseas than to developments
within the French communities in Britain. Nonetheless, the material
was certainly sensitive, and an unholy row broke out in 1941 when one
of Spears’s entourage absent-mindedly left a copy of CFR minutes in
the smoking room of the Air Force Club.88
Also of value were two other series that have largely been overlooked
in previous studies of wartime France. FO 1055 contains the papers of
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Lord Bessborough’s Committee on French Welfare. It is a pity that, at
some point, these papers have been carefully weeded, leaving material
pertaining essentially to servicemen and refugees. This is why the
Home Office Aliens Department series, HO 213, proved of such worth;
maybe it was unexpected that a historian of wartime France would take
much interest in nationality files, buried amid applications for natural-
isations and arguments over work permits. Yet here were discovered
detailed records of the numbers of French in Britain, important as the
national census scheduled to take place in 1941 was cancelled because
of the war. It would be myopic to cite all the other PRO series consulted
during this study. A full listing of all these papers, together with other
archival depots, is to be found in the bibliography.
Tentative conclusions
On 1 January 1940, R. E. Balfour, a leading member of the Ministry of
Information’s Foreign Publicity Department, in liaison with the British
embassy in Paris and the Commissariat Général à l’Information, drew
up a very full report on the press reporting of the Franco-British war
effort and how this should be conducted. In this, he observed:
For as long as we can foresee, England and France will be bound together.
We are nations of very different temperament, we do not easily under-
stand each other, and we often disagree. It is safe to say that the ordinary
Englishman with a slight knowledge of the Continent finds the Germans
easier to get on with than the French. It is only those who have time and
opportunity for lengthy travel or residence abroad who discover that
deeper acquaintance with the two nations reverses the position; it reveals
the deep cleavage between the English and German mentality, despite
their superficial resemblance, and it shows how the English and French so
different in everyday life and in apparent approach, do believe in the same
fundamental values.89
Predicting an Allied victory, Balfour could not have foreseen how his
observations would be put to the test by the enforced residence of
thousands of French men, women and children in Britain. That these
people retained an anathema for Nazi values cannot be doubted. As the
war dragged on, their hostility towards Vichy also became readily
apparent, although a lingering respect for Pétain endured, just as it did
in metropolitan France where public opinion quickly distinguished
between the marshal and his government. Indeed, the story of the
‘forgotten French’ is not a edifying tale of a heroic people, embracing
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the Republican tradition, to defy both Vichy and the German occupier
by deliberately choosing to continue the struggle from abroad, from
the one European country that had not fallen prey to Hitler’s insatiable
greed and ambition. Most of the French in Britain, with the exception
of the colons, were there by chance, not by design, and were not wholly
convinced that they should stay. While some were undeniably coura-
geous in their opposition to Vichy and Hitlerism, the majority adopted
a variety of positions; few initially were Gaullist. Only when the war
looked truly won did they begin to rally around the general, and even
then doubts remained. Yet if the ‘forgotten French’ do not emerge
from this study with their reputations unscathed, neither do the
British. While many ordinary people were generous in the help and
sympathy they extended to refugees and other exiles, government offi-
cials could often be uncaring and critical, unable to understand the
culture of another people and unable to hide their prejudices, preju-
dices that had been hardened by the bitter political squabbles that had
broken out among the French themselves. 
This, then is the history of the ‘forgotten French’. It is a tale of several
communities: communities that struggled to acclimatise to life abroad;
communities that kept their distance from one another; communities
that were often internally divided; and communities that frequently
exasperated, irritated and bemused the British government and public.
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2
The misfortune of exile:
refugees
The Frenchman cannot forgive the English, in the first place, for not
speaking French, in the second, for not understanding him when he calls
Charing Cross Sharon-Kro or Leicester Square Lessetair Square.
(Alexander Herzen, My Past and Thoughts)1
On 1 June 1940, as the first Allied troops trickled back from Dunkirk,
George Orwell toured the London railway stations of Waterloo and
Victoria in search of news of a family friend, the eminent surgeon
Laurence O’Shaughnessy, who was attached to the Royal Army Medical
Corps in Flanders. On the platforms, he observed ‘few’ British and
French soldiers, ‘but great numbers of Belgian and French refugees’.2
While the waiting crowd frequently ‘cheered’ the servicemen, the evac-
uated civilians only evoked ‘silence’, maybe because they constituted
such a pitiful sight and conjured up images of what might befall the
British should Hitler’s armies ever cross the Channel. Up until now, the
‘phoney war’ had largely sheltered the public from the suffering that
had blighted the peoples of Eastern Europe and, more recently, those
of France and the Low Countries. Henceforth, refugees were in the
public midst, and could no longer be hidden from view. This ‘silence’
might also have emanated from a fear of fifth columnists. As John
Anderson, Viscount Waverley, the Home Secretary and Minister of
Home Security, confessed to his father on 2 March 1940, ‘the newspa-
pers are working up feeling about aliens. I shall have to do something
about it, or we may be stampeded into an unnecessarily oppressive
policy.’3 At around the same time, the Council of Austrians in Great
Britain protested that such reporting, especially prominent in the Daily
Mail, would ‘only make matters worse’.4 Admittedly, the anxiety about
a fifth column sprang from the notion that Belgian and Dutch refugees,
rather than French, contained large numbers of Nazi sympathisers, and
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would subside in July when the number of incomers dried up,5 yet in
summer 1940 it is not difficult to believe that the British public
suspected anyone with a foreign accent, despite the fact that on 11
September 1940 Count Ciano could confide to his diary, ‘It seems
incredible, but we do not have a single informant in Great Britain.’6
In all probability, the unfortunate citizens witnessed by Orwell
would have been bussed to various reception centres dotted around
London’s suburbs, where they would have been processed, fed, and
examined medically, before being distributed to a variety of lodgings in
the capital, their homes for the remainder of the war, with their stories
to be forgotten by history. To a degree, the retelling of their experiences
involves an analysis of the administrative machinery that was put into
place to assist their welfare, a chronicle culled from travel permits,
ration books, food coupons and billeting allowances, documents that
have survived because they relate to the spending of public monies, and
have thus been retained for reasons of government accountability.
Reconstructing the lives of the refugees further entails an examination
of the emotions that ruled their lives – fear, boredom, alienation and
uncomfortable personal choices – a history that is far more difficult to
recreate, as such feelings rarely communicate themselves through the
faded red and blue lines of ledger books. It is fortunate that those
charged with looking after refugees – principally officials belonging to
French Welfare, the Ministries of Health and Information, the volun-
teers of the Women’s Voluntary Service (WVS) and Mass-Observation
– frequently recorded interviews with those they met, and kept detailed
records of refugee life. Such observations monitor the initial despon-
dency felt by many arrivals in May–June 1940 and something of their
expectations as the war drew to a close. There was a cruel irony in the
events of summer 1944, when many of the French looked forward to
going home only to find repatriation delayed by a fresh batch of
refugees, principally children, rescued from the battlefields of
Normandy.
Preparing to receive
In 1947, Mrs de l’Hôpital, one of the leading lights of the WVS,
composed a report on ‘The Story of the War Refugees in Great Britain,
1940–1947’,7 a detailed study on government preparations for the
arrival of citizens from France and the Low Countries, and a first-hand
account of how her ‘ladies in green’ assisted Europe’s ‘unwanted’.8 For
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the historian, this document is a treasure trove of information, one of
those meticulously prepared dossiers that helpfully brings together a
mass of confusing and tiresome administrative circulars and memo-
randa to make the whole picture that much clearer. It is, though, worth
examining in detail those other documents, confusing as they may be,
for they suggest de l’Hôpital’s report is misleading in two vital regards.
To begin with, she paints a picture of orderliness in Whitehall’s
arrangements for refugees. The whole business is described in the
manner of a precise military campaign, with the relevant officials
standing at the ready, like benign sergeant majors, dispensing disci-
pline and good humour among those who passed through their hands.
Although the handling of refugees did not get out of hand, and never
matched the chaos that was to be witnessed in France, Belgium and
Holland where officials simply fled their posts to join the retreating
flood of humankind,9 the reception in Britain was hardly the smooth
operation she depicts. Moreover, the impression she conveys is of a
gentle and tolerant Britain, a land where the values of forbearance,
assimilation and generosity prevailed, a view that was repeated in the
first official histories of welfare during the Second World War:
throughout the 1930s, it was maintained, brave Albion had constituted
a safe haven for those fleeing Nazi oppression.10 In the same way that
Vicki Caron has dispelled notions that France was a welcoming retreat
for German Jews and others,11 Bernard Wasserstein, Louise London
and Colin Holmes have demonstrated that Britain likewise constituted
a ‘reluctant asylum’.12 The work by Matthew Buck on the treatment of
Belgian refugees in 1939–40 confirms these findings,13 as does an
examination of the reception of the French. At best, British plans for
the welcoming of refugees of all nationalities in 1940 were tardy, ill-
conceived, lacking in goodwill and badly implemented.
These preparations had begun reluctantly in 1936 when mounting
international tension concentrated government minds on the possibil-
ity of a general European war. Given the experiences of the First World
War, it was widely appreciated that any handling of refugees could not
be left solely in the hands of philanthropic bodies, yet beyond this there
was little agreement on what to do.14 Although it was quickly decided
that the Ministry of Health was the most appropriate department to
handle the arrival and accommodation of large numbers of friendly
aliens, this was not a task that Health officials particularly warmed to,
complaining on several occasions that their time would be taken up
dealing with the evacuation of British civilians, a recognition of how
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aerial bombardment would seriously disrupt the rhythm of urban
life.15 Foreign refugees, it was argued, would consume precious
resources and disrupt home defence. It took the advent of the ‘phoney
war’ to speed up matters, various government departments coming
together to pool information and resources. Recalling events in
1914–18, when 250,000 refugees had arrived in Britain from the Low
Countries, an untitled Home Office document of 18 January 1940
anticipated that a staggering 500,000 civilians, mainly Dutch and
Belgian, might make their way to British shores, an indication that
London understood how Allied strategy, a rapid advance into Holland,
would displace thousands of civilians and how these evacuees could not
easily be returned home.16 Although the figure of 500,000 was later
reduced to under 200,000, the possibility of Britain taking in French
refugees never entered the equation; it was naturally assumed that these
unfortunates would be looked after by their own government and, in
any case, would retreat into metropolitan territory just as they had
done in 1914. After all, it was thought that the Allied advance into
Holland and Belgium, together with the protection afforded by the
Maginot Line, would more or less make French territory inviolable. 
It had been further hoped that France would accept the majority of
French-speaking Belgians, yet Paris argued that it only possessed the
resources to cater for its own evacuees, and was anxious that its stra-
tegic plans were not compromised by large numbers of refugees who
would clutter up the roads and railways. In January 1940, General
Gamelin, the commander-in-chief, without consultation with his
allies, announced his army’s intention of conveying all Belgian refugees
to Channel ports for subsequent transfer to Britain. The French
embassy at London was, subsequently, instructed to repeat this stance
to the Foreign Office.17 Not surprisingly, this unilateral decision went
down badly in Whitehall, where privately it was wondered whether
Gallic concerns also hinged on the fact that Belgian refugees, or at least
the Flemish-speaking ones, had not been warmly welcomed in France
during the First World War. (Interestingly, nor had their experiences
in Britain been especially happy.)18 Nonetheless, not wishing to upset
Franco-British relations at such a delicate juncture, and recognising the
logic of French strategic concerns, London exerted little pressure on
Paris over the refugee question, and busily sought out other solutions.
So began an unsuccessful dialogue with the Irish Republic in which it
became plain that Dublin no more wanted foreign evacuees than did
London or Paris. In conversation with the Duke of Devonshire, the
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High Commissioner for Eire explained that his government had no
wish to compromise its neutrality, and recalled that in 1914–18 many
Belgians, albeit Catholics, ‘had proved to be of unsatisfactory character
and undesirable influence in the religious houses in which they had
been received’.19 Distinctly uncomfortable and clutching at straws, the
Commissioner even suggested that Britain was ‘short of foreign
currency’ and was thus exaggerating the possibility of a German inva-
sion of Western Europe in order to ‘depress Dutch and Belgian
securities’ which London would then buy ‘in large quantities’ and
unload ‘at a substantial profit’, an allegation so outrageous that it left
officials in Whitehall dumbfounded.
Resigned to accepting significant numbers of Dutch and Belgian
civilians, and unwilling to argue any further with either the French or
the Irish, in March 1940 the Ministry of Health issued Memorandum
WR1, along with Circular 1983, to local government authorities in
London and coastal areas, that is those regions most likely to receive
refugees. Going into considerable detail about the arrangements for the
reception and treatment of refugees, these confidential guidelines were
augmented by Memorandum WR2 and Circular 1984.20 As de
l’Hôpital recalled in her report of 1947, ‘Landing places were to be
organised at South and South East Coast resorts and at Mersey, Belfast
Lough and the Clyde. Until the moment of the landing the refugees
were to be the responsibility of the Admiralty. Thereafter, the Ministry
of Health would take over.’21 It is interesting to note that, well aware of
their duties come the arrival of refugees, WVS officials closely studied
French plans for the evacuation of Paris and Alsace Lorraine, and were
greatly impressed by what they saw.22 WVS observers were especially
struck by the cooperation of private and public organisations, the revi-
sion of evacuation plans since the advent of the ‘phoney war’, and the
strength of the French family unit, which was deemed stronger than its
British equivalent and which would assist in the orderly withdrawal of
civilians of all ages. No one had foreseen how the tactics of Blitzkrieg
would pay little respect to elaborate government procedures and famil-
ial ties.
Arriving: ‘We of this country wish to offer you our great sympathy’ 
As the exode of civilians gathered momentum in France and the Low
Countries, with possibly some eight million people on the roads, the
first refugees started to arrive in Britain, not in droves as originally
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feared, but in dribs and drabs, and not in orderly convoys to Northern
Ireland and Scotland as anticipated, but at strategically important
southern ports such as Southampton and Portsmouth.23 From there,
they made their way not to the provinces, as originally planned, but by
train to London. As Buck relates, it had initially been the aim to keep
refugees away from the capital, which was likely to suffer aerial
bombardment, yet, on 10 May, the Ministry of Health instructed
London County Council (LCC) to assist in the reception of refugees, a
decision that surprised more perceptive members of the public.24 As J.
W. Dodgson, a lecturer in the Department of Chemistry at the
University of Reading, observed in his wartime diary: ‘What a desper-
ate bit of foolery. If London is a dangerous area it is a doubtful kindness
to stock it with refugees, if it is a safe area why remove Londoners? So
while civil servants are having tennis parties, dances, concerts in the
health resorts selected for their comfort, it is good enough for
terrorised victims of Nazi bombing to go to the place from which these
pampered civil servants have been sent. Either London is safe or it is
not.’25
To be fair, officials at County Hall, the headquarters of the LCC,
remained put and set about the arrangements for the handling of the
expected influx of refugees.26 Within a short space of time, nine recep-
tion centres had been established in the capital. There refugees were
‘fed, bathed and medically examined’ before being transferred to the
twenty ‘cooperating’ borough councils for billeting.27 Once settled in
their new homes, the Local Assistance Boards (LABs) then took charge
of refugee needs. Some effort was also made to explain these compli-
cated arrangements to the refugees themselves. Middlesex County
Council (MCC) quickly drafted an address to be read out by inter-
preters at the key reception centres. Delivered in Dutch, Flemish and
French, it began, ‘First of all, we of this country wish to offer you our
great sympathy in the bitter trials you have had to face, and to assure
you that we will do all we can to help you until the time comes for you
to return once again to your country.’28 Depending on which version
was being relayed, it ended, ‘Long Live Queen Wilhelmina’, ‘Long Live
King Leopold’, and always ‘God save King George’. There was no ‘Vive,
la France’; nor later was there ‘Vive, le maréchal Pétain’, or for that
matter ‘Vive, le général de Gaulle’. 
Reading the minutes of the local government authorities in London,
it seems that the reception of refugees went without a hitch. ‘An inti-
mation from the Ministry of Health that about 1,200 refugees will be
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expected this weekend beginning on Friday’, wrote in confident words
the Director of Public Assistance of the MCC to his town clerks on 14
May.29 Eye-witness accounts, however, suggest that refugees had
exchanged one sort of administrative chaos in France for another in
Britain. As the first trains, brimming with refugees, steamed into
London, officials struggled to cope, especially in late May when immi-
gration procedures were tightened up, following scares about fifth
columnists. On the 23rd of that month, Mrs N—, a high-ranking figure
in the WVS, filed a report on meeting a train of refugees at Waterloo.
In this, she complained that, ‘We were only told at 3 pm that a train was
due at Waterloo station at that same hour.’ A small party of WVS
volunteers thus rushed to meet the coaches, which had arrived by the
time they got there. On board were 150 refugees, half of whom were
British. This was to create problems:
There was no differentiation of treatment for British or foreigners. They
were all herded like cattle, many of the women, young and old, were in
the last stages of exhaustion. They all waited one-and-a-half hours before
the buses came into the station, and though the ambulances were in the
station, they were not allowed to go before the buses arrived.30
Bemoaning the lack of consideration shown by immigration officers
towards British nationals, Mrs N— was also troubled by the behaviour
of the refugees themselves, ‘I was thoroughly ashamed to see such bad
organisation, and even when the buses had come into the station, the
extremely rough and pushing refugees were allowed to push their way
in front of our nationals, and were allowed to get in before women,
children and old folk.’
Although such behaviour was not typical of all refugees and betrayed
something of the xenophobic attitudes of the time, it was understand-
able given the harrowing circumstances that the former had endured.
The scenes in France were chaotic, and have since been vividly evoked
both by novelists, among them Jean-Paul Sartre, and by film-makers,
such as René Clément.31 Yet it is the eye-witness accounts that are often
the most harrowing. The following is an extract from the unpublished
diary of a Monsieur Vila, a man of Franco-British citizenship and a
former employee at the French Railways Office in Piccadilly. Enlisted
into the French army in 1939, he recounts the scene in Montreuil on 13
June 1940:
Once in Montreuil, we very soon realised the tragic panic situation and
the full extent of the upheaval which the war had brought to France.
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Normal life was completely upset and as we moved along the road leading
out of the town we were shocked at the transformation which the deteri-
orating position had caused. Everywhere crowds of refugees were on the
move in cars, lorries, on bicycles and most on foot taking with them only
whatever they were able to transport in clothing and bedding. More
people were watching from their houses uncertain whether they should
join the exodus or remain and hope for the best when the Germans
arrived. There was no further doubt that nothing could be done to stop
the progress of the invaders since the Army was moving south with the
civilians. It was a difficult decision to make for the people watching on
their door steps, but those who remained at home were in the end more
fortunate than the millions who took to the roads, abandoning their
possessions to the bands of looters who followed the crowds.32
For those civilians who were forced off the roads and on to one of the
ships bound for England, the voyage across the Channel was no less
frightening. Buried amid the Middlesex County Council archives is the
following press report, which, through its very terseness and lack of
hyperbole, manages to convey something of the discomfort and danger
that journey entailed:
Most of the refugees have lost everything. Several had not slept for days.
During the twenty-hour journey to an East Coast port, mother and babies
slept on straw in the holds. One baby was born during the voyage.33
Once disembarked on English soil, it was small wonder that most
refugees were fatigued and confused. Those who arrived in the West
Country were characterised by one observer as ‘profoundly
pessimistic’, believing that the food offered them by the local authori-
ties was merely a publicity stunt.34 The following is a WVS interview,
written up in the language of the time, with one new arrival:
The WVS spoke to a Belgian man with a dash of the tar brush, who got
out of the train looking dazed.
‘Can I help you?’
‘Help!’ he said turning on her almost savagely.
‘Can we do anything for you; have you friends? Come and have some
tea.’ After he had tea, he mellowed very much, seemed grateful and went
off to some address he knew.35
The refugee was fortunate in that he at least had an address to go to.
From the Empress Hall Refugee Centre was posted a pathetic letter by
a French refugee, albeit a rather curious individual who was pursuing
theophilosophical science and looking forward to the age of Aquarius,
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who admitted to the Foreign Office that he had desperately looked
through the phone book in order to write to anybody who shared his
name in case they were a distant relation, but with no success.36 The
result, in his pidgin English, was that he had to endure ‘sleeping among
people, ill-breeded enough, talking, smoking and spitting even at
night.’
The pathetic nature of the refugees’ plight is further evoked by the
lists of lost luggage filed with the British authorities. Typical of these
was that lodged by a Mme L— who had arrived from Boulogne on 22
May, and who had since been billeted at Our Lady’s Priory in Haywards
Heath. In a letter to the Commanding Officer of the Crystal Palace
Reception Centre, where she had briefly been housed, she asked after
‘one travelling bag of dark grey material checked dark blue, no address
attached owing to the extreme haste of our departure’.37 Apart from an
expensive fox fur, worth some 2,000 francs, which she had managed to
hang on to, the remainder of her belongings testified to the desire to
recover some dignity by reclaiming what few possessions were still hers.
The bag comprised:
One lady’s mantle, grey mixture 200 frs
One pair lady’s shoes 200 frs
One pair snow boots 50 frs
One pair black stockings (new) 50 frs
Lady’s underclothing 300 frs
In a similar case, a Mlle Le— enquired after a ‘small chromium watch
with a waistband of yellow leather’ that she had entrusted to a Mme
Lefebvre en route to England from Le Havre.38
While some refugees managed to hang on to some of their most
treasured possessions (Orwell observed one with a parrot in cage),39
their lack of material goods testified to the unexpected speed of the
German advance and lack of prior thought civilians had given to the
question of flight. This was a trend picked up by Mass-Observation in
a series of interviews it conducted with sixty-two refugees (French,
Dutch, Belgian, Polish and one Czech) at the Camberwell and Fulham
Road Reception Centres.40 Among this number, 60 per cent had no
plans about their flight, 4 per cent had ‘plans to a point’, 16 per cent
had unsuccessful plans, 4 per cent successful plans, 3 per cent were
unsure how to judge the success of their plans, and 13 per cent gave
‘irrelevant answers’.
What the British had not been counting on was the large number of
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bicycles that the refugees brought with them. Two-thirds of the
refugees questioned by Mass-Observation at Camberwell and Fulham
had possessed a bicycle on the Continent or had access to a car.41 One
man (nationality not given) remarked, ‘I had a bicycle which I used for
about 1,200 km and my trousers were still whole. I didn’t know where
to go, I just rode on with the Germans on my heels.’42 It was not long
before the reception centres in Britain were clogged up with such vehi-
cles of all shapes and sizes. In a report of 25 May 1940, the WVS
complained, ‘Another trouble which is arising very energetically is the
fact that practically everybody is bringing over a bicycle. For instance,
on a train carrying 642 men, women and children, there were 175 bicy-
cles. Our people view this with alarm. The number of bicycles coming
into the country is, I am told, fantastic.’43 The archives of individual
reception centres bear out these stories and frequently contain lengthy
handwritten ledgers detailing the descriptions, serial numbers and
ownership of bicycles, testimony to the wishes of the refugees to cling
on to one of their most valued possessions, a mode of transport that,
more than likely, had helped them evade danger,44 as it had in the case
of some soldiers. Léon Wilson, one of the very first (if not the first)
French soldier to enlist with the British army in the summer of 1940,
recalls how he and a small band of colleagues retreated to Dunkirk.
Some kilometres outside the town, they stumbled across a bicycle shop,
by then deserted, where they appropriated the bikes to speed their
journey.45 Some sixty years later, when revisiting the area, Monsieur
Wilson was astonished to discover that the same shop existed; even
after that period of time, he still felt guilty about taking the bikes, even
though the desperate circumstances had necessitated their acquisition. 
While the reception of refugees might not have passed off smoothly
– bogged down by the registering of property and thrown off course by
the erratic arrivals of trains ferrying civilians from the ports – it is only
fair to say that the British authorities were never overwhelmed and
were frequently touched by the harrowing stories refugees brought
with them. Despite the ‘silence’ that Orwell observed among the public,
and despite a general wariness about foreigners and fifth columns,
there was a general sympathy with their plight. At a café in Waltham
Cross, Mass-Observation overheard a conversation between the sixty-
year-old proprietress and two of her younger customers, in which all
agreed it ‘must be terrible’ for the refugees.46 There were also many
spontaneous charitable gestures. The WVS recalls how, in May–June
1940, it was overwhelmed with offers of interpreters and assistance.47
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At the main London stations, the porters, in the politically incorrect
words of one WVS official, ‘all worked like blacks, without any tips’.48
The suspicion must remain, however, that things would have been very
different if the 200,000 or so refugees that the government had origi-
nally been envisaging had actually arrived.
Late arrivals: The Royal Victoria Patriotic School
With hindsight, what is surprising is the laxity of immigration formal-
ities pursued in May–June 1940, especially given the fear of a fifth
column. While these were toughened up, in part on the recommenda-
tion of the Vansittart Committee,49 they were not foolproof. After the
official declaration of welcome, there might have followed much form-
filling, undoubtedly extended in the course of May, and possibly some
rudimentary interrogation at one of the reception centres, yet it was
not difficult to wander away from these makeshift depots. In an inter-
view with André Gillois, Henri Beausaire, an early recruit for the Free
French, recalled his time at Camberwell, incidentally the same place
that had processed Gilbert Renault-Roulies (later known by his nom de
guerre Colonel Rémy), who was to become one of the most daring of
resisters:
We were not questioned there. In principle we were locked up, but almost
every evening I threaded my way through a hole in the wall in order to live
it up in London. One morning the hole was blocked up. A baker
happened to deliver some cakes by the main door. I took a plate into the
van, and the sentries mistook me for a deliveryman.50
Such laxity was not long-lived. With places in reception centres becom-
ing scarce, and with the declaration of the Franco-German Armistice
and the creation of the Vichy regime, from July 1940 new arrivals –
whether refugees, volunteers for de Gaulle or even British citizens
fleeing the Continent – were likely to discover themselves incarcerated
in prisons until their bona fides could be vouched for. Such was the
case of the writer Arthur Koestler who arrived in Britain from France
at the close of the Blitz after a difficult journey via Marseille,
Casablanca and Lisbon. ‘The last stage of this long trek to freedom was
Pentonville Prison’, he writes, ‘where I spent six peaceful weeks in soli-
tary confinement’. Conditions were not good:
Most of the time – on the average fifteen to sixteen hours a day – the cell
was pitch dark, because the alert usually came with the fading of daylight,
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and the lights in the cell were then switched off to prevent us presumptive
fifth columnists from signalling to the raiders.51
Deprived of matches, Koestler learned how to ignite cigarettes via the
cotton wool of the filters through which was inserted a slither of silver
paper, the makeshift contraption then inserted into a light socket in the
hope of causing a short circuit: ‘Average duration until success is
achieved: one hour.’52 Through a Frenchman, he also learned Marseille
chess, a fiendish game in which a player made two moves instead of
one, and was not allowed to check the king by his first move. Philippe
Barrès and Jean Fayard, two ardent anti-Nazis who had quit France on
board a Polish vessel, were less stoical in the face of Pentonville: one
bath a week, one hour of exercise per day, and thrown in among
common criminals.53 Barrès soon left for the USA.54 Equally outraged
was Hélène Terré, a French Red Cross official, who was detained at the
woman’s prison of Holloway, which also housed a group of young
students from a boarding school near Dunkirk.55 Like Pentonville, this
Victorian jail was close to the railway stations of King’s Cross and
Euston, prime bombing targets for the Luftwaffe. Before long, the
inside of the prison came to resemble Bedlam as the inmates screamed
throughout the air raids. Unwittingly, Terré had come to London
accompanied by a Vichy agent, a Mlle Nicole, whom we shall meet in a
later chapter.
Recognising the unsuitability of prisons, and aware of the with-
drawal of the reception centres, which were increasingly required for
the accommodation of Londoners who had been bombed out of their
houses, in late 1940 the government sought out alternative venues for
the processing of Continental arrivals. An early choice was the Oratory
School, Brompton, today the school of Tony Blair’s son, yet this also
proved too cramped.56 After further searching, the Royal Victoria
Patriotic School (RVPS) in Wandsworth, a former school for the sons
of military officers, was made available to the Security Services.
Capable of holding some 300 residents, the RVPS fell under the aegis of
BS Department in the Home Office, which had hitherto been
concerned with civil internment camps. It was further decided that the
new establishment should be exclusively concerned with men. Women
were to be sent to a new reception centre at 101 Nightingale Lane,
Balham.
As early as March 1941, the Home Office was singing the praises of
the RVPS and the speed that new French entries into Britain were now
being dealt with. It was acknowledged, however, that there had been a
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number of teething problems, especially in respect to the way in which
French volunteers for de Gaulle had been handled, not so much at
Wandsworth, but at Liverpool. In a trenchant letter to the Home
Office, Spears complained that ‘the worst impression’ was being given
‘to enthusiasts who had forfeited everything to come to this country
and continue the fight’.57 On arrival at the port, there was no liaison
officer to handle matters; the French were simply bundled into a Black
Maria and taken off to a transit camp. There, officers had to share a
dormitory with their men and refugees, and suffered the indignity of
having to wash their cutlery and plates after each meal. It would not be
difficult, concluded Spears, to rectify matters and to ensure that some
word of encouragement was passed on to the volunteers.
To be fair, the Home Office was alarmed to hear of the procedures at
Liverpool, which were allegedly being replicated at Glasgow. A series of
promises were thus made to Spears. To begin with, it was made clear
that the practice of driving volunteers to transit camps in prison vans
had been abandoned; as we shall see, it is doubtful it ever existed in the
first place.58 Next, the Home Office promised to ease entry regulations.
If warning of any new arrival was given beforehand, and if this person
could be vouched for by de Gaulle, then the volunteer would be
excused the ordeal of the RVPS. This exemption, it was pointed out,
had recently been made in the case of Colonel Vallin, later to take
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Figure 3 The Royal Victoria Patriotic Buildings, Wandsworth – today
an arts, restaurant and office complex; in 1940 an interrogation centre
for all refugees entering the UK
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charge of the Free French Air Force. In a fictional setting, it is the inter-
vention of Carlton Gardens that saves the young pianist and her
opera-singing companion from a spell in Liverpool gaol, and then
presumably Nightingale Lane, in the 1991 film L’Accompagnatrice.59
Should a French national arrive by plane, or at any other place than a
controlled port, and so long as they did not seek to conceal their iden-
tity, the Home Office promised that they would be subject to only a
short spell at Wandsworth, although reading between the lines it
appears that one Frenchman who had landed thus, a certain
A— C—, had still been questioned at length by MI5.60 Later, in May
1941, the Home Office agreed that British representatives could issue
visas to ‘vouched for’ Free French volunteers in order that they did not
have to attend the RVPS.61
In a further gesture to ease procedures, the Home Office accepted
that the police should adopt a more conciliatory approach when
handling arrivals and, on 5 June 1941, a circular was issued to chief
constables in which local police forces were instructed to reassure de
Gaulle’s volunteers ‘that they are being escorted to the Centre (ie the
RVPS) not because they are personally suspect but in accordance with
security measures’.62 Arrangements were also made for the distribution
of leaflets carrying a personal message of welcome from de Gaulle. And,
finally, the Home Office agreed to seek out further information on the
manner in which French nationals were being dealt with at their point
of arrival.
In some places, it appears the authorities went out of their way to
offer support. The Immigration Officer in Poole replied that it was, on
average, necessary to send one person a week up to Wandsworth.63
Most arrived not by sea, but by plane, and were of ‘the superior type’,
not refugees, but ‘senior officers and men of means’. It had thus been
deemed inappropriate to lock them up in the cells; rather, given their
wealth, they had been able to put themselves up in a hotel where they
had been supervised by an NCO before departing to London the next
day. In the West of England, immigration officers recorded no
complaints at Avonmouth, Whitchurch and Bristol. Instead of putting
new arrivals into prison, they were kept on board their vessels
overnight and then sent on to London the next day.64 At Cardiff, the
authorities also claimed that ‘every consideration’ was given to French
nationals.65 As Spears alleged, it appears that the trouble spots were
indeed Glasgow and Liverpool, the places where, after summer 1940,
most refugees and volunteers for de Gaulle landed. From Scotland, the
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police claimed that every effort was being made to dispatch arrivals to
Wandsworth on the overnight train to London.66 Yet, depending on
the time of disembarkation, this was not always possible, and so they
had to be held overnight. This was the only way in which these people
could be prevented from making contact with the French community
in the city. In future, however, the immigration officers promised to
follow the Bristol practice of keeping arrivals on their ships overnight
until a train was ready to depart.
If the Immigration Office at Glasgow was irritated at the interven-
tion of Whitehall, its counterpart at Liverpool was positively fuming.67
Complaining that the city’s constabulary was already overstretched, it
was angry that police had to be used for the processing of French
nationals. As to the question of housing, the only way to prevent
‘wanderings around the city’, and to maintain proper surveillance, was
to use prison cells rather than boarding houses and hotels. Maybe in
the light of what we know about the behaviour of the nearby French
consulate this was a sensible precaution (see Chapter 4). Moreover, the
immigration officer in overall charge could never remember an occa-
sion when a Black Maria had been used, but conceded that buses might
be employed in future; indeed, a separate enquiry by the Committee to
the RVPS discovered that no prison vans had been deployed, merely
‘charabancs or taxis’.68 The officer also promised to look into the
possibility of keeping arrivals on board ship overnight, and requested
that the Ministry of Shipping be put in charge of these arrangements,
and that a representative of the RVPS be sent up to meet vessels when
docking. In a subsequent letter of April 1941, the Liverpool
Immigration Office made known that future French arrivals were now
held overnight on the Free French vessel La Volontaire until arrange-
ments could be made to escort the men to London.69 However, this
meant that arrivals, sometimes in groups as large as twenty-five, could
not be kept in a state of incommunicado. This troubled the Home
Office, which urged the police in Liverpool to billet them in hotels or
the Liverpool Scottish Drill Hall rather than La Volontaire,70 a change
that was indeed implemented.71 It remains unclear whether the over-
worked and irritable Liverpool police complied with other Home
Office recommendations; the fact that the Spears Mission was still
complaining about the modes of transport in September 1941 suggests
not or, more likely, that the Free French remained very sensitive about
the way in which potential recruits were handled.72
Carlton Gardens was unquestionably the most strident critic of the
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RVPS. There was intense dissatisfaction that arrivals to Britain were
issued with a letter of welcome from de Gaulle, but were then not
allowed to keep it.73 The Français de Grande Bretagne (FGB), the self-
appointed civil wing of the Free French, was also irritated that it could
not distribute its own personal letter of welcome, a move scuppered by
Downing Street, which thought an additional message unnecessary and
likely to upset those who were not for de Gaulle.74 Certainly, the offi-
cial welcoming at Wandsworth was hardly cordial. After a very correct
address, in which the School’s Commandant offered his greetings, the
internees were presented with a set of the rules, which must have gone
down badly with men who had already broken a whole series of regu-
lations to get to Britain in the first place:
1 This Reception Centre has been established with the purpose of offer-
ing temporary lodging to allied and neutral subjects who arrive in
Great Britain.
2 It is duly the duty of the Centre’s officers to assist you in proving your
identity and, to this effect, of seeing all the documents to be found in
your possession, and to ask you for all the information that they will
judge necessary.
Your interest is therefore to reply in a frank and explicit manner to
the questions that are put to you.
3 As soon as your identity and good faith have been established, you will
be sent to the representatives of your country in Great Britain, and
every help will be given to you in order that you can reach your desti-
nation. In waiting, you will understand that, for reasons of security, no
communication will be permitted with the outside, either by message,
letter, telephone or any other means.75
To the annoyance of the Free French, ‘residents’ at Wandsworth were
further required to sign a document to say that they understood all the
rules and that they would observe them during their stay.
A further grumble concerned conditions within the RVPS. In a letter
of September 1941, MI5 revealed that the Free French were especially
disgruntled about the food, the quality not the quantity: ‘We gathered
that something a little more continental would be appreciated! I doubt
whether the Mecca Cafés, or whoever they are, can rise to it, but
perhaps you would like to consider the point.’76 It later transpired the
real problem was the prices in the canteen, which the inmates had to
afford out of their pocket money.77 Across in Nightingale Lane, French
internees appear to have kicked up a fuss about sleeping arrangements,
although this was contemptuously dismissed by the welfare officer, ‘I
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can appreciate that continental women, more especially the tempera-
mental French who normally spend much of their time in well
furnished bed-sitting rooms, may feel rebuffed and disheartened by an
array of army blankets’, but the other nationals were content.78 The
presence of armed guards was, however, thought disconcerting by both
men and women, yet this was insisted upon by the War Office.79 A
further fuss blew up as to who among the French should be sent to
Wandsworth, despite the earlier attempts of the Home Office to deter-
mine which groups needed to pass through the RVPS. It transpired that
some French signed the acte d’engagement abroad, and were thus
exempted from the RVPS; yet, on arrival in Britain, they proved either
unsuitable for service with de Gaulle, or simply changed their minds
and claimed to be mere refugees.80
Just as French arrivals had not anticipated a stay in a Victorian
boarding school, they had certainly not bargained on the nature of
their questioning. Gillois cites the example of Joseph Kessel and his
nephew, Maurice Druon, who, with the help of smugglers, had crossed
the Pyrenees to make their way to London via Lisbon.81 At
Wandsworth, Kessel was interviewed for some 48 hours in total, some-
times in 8- to 10-hour stretches. In the interrogation itself, his
interviewers displayed an intimate knowledge of French geography,
asking him about his mother and how she had travelled through
Luchon on her way to the southern zone; had she gone by train or by
bus. When he replied ‘by train’, his interviewer congratulated him,
remarking that there was no bus through Luchon. When it was the turn
of the aviator Henri Schutz, his inquisitors asked him where he was
born and where he had spent his adolescence; on discovering he had
studied at a particular lycée in Marseille, he was quizzed on teachers
past and present. These questions he could answer; he was genuinely
stumped when asked about the location of a nearby war memorial. This
gap in his local knowledge ensured that his stay at Wandsworth lasted
over a month. Even well-known figures were subject to prolonged
holding. Claudius Petit, a member of the Conseil National de la
Résistance (CNR) and a deputy of the Algerian Assembly, had the
misfortune to land in England with a camera.82 In the ten days’ wait for
a plane to ferry him out of France, he had indulged his hobby for
photography, snapping the local scenery. This raised the suspicions of
his MI5 officers, who developed his film, although quite what they
made of photographs of trees and hedges remains unknown; Petit only
secured his release after his travelling companion, General de Lattre de
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Tassigny, who himself had arrived disguised in beard and civilian
clothes, vouched for him.
Maybe the greatest grumble of those held at Wandsworth was not so
much the conditions or the intensive questioning, which interrupted
community life, and on one occasion prematurely ended a football
match as there were not enough players left on the pitch since one after
another was called away for questioning.83 Rather the greatest frustra-
tion was the delay in reaching freedom. As the Welfare Officer of the
RVPS observed, ‘The dominating idea is to get out; the guests after
many vicissitudes are on the threshold of liberty, impatient to step
across. They are like the passengers of a big liner which, after a rough
passage, has docked in port, who are told they will not be allowed to
land for a number of days.’84 This was certainly the sentiment of
Georges Le Poittevin who, in 1943, had escaped solitary confinement in
a Pétainist jail in North Africa, and who is now president of the
London-based Association des Combattants Volontaires. On reaching
Gibraltar, he boarded a cargo vessel for Liverpool, which arrived only
after being bombed by both the Luftwaffe and U-Boats, taking a direct
hit from a 250 kilogram bomb, which thankfully did not explode.
‘When I arrived in Liverpool, I took a breath and thought, freedom at
last.’85 In the event, he was handcuffed and sent immediately to
Wandsworth where he soon learned he was under detention; although
he had arrived in good faith, he was naturally troubled by stories doing
the rounds among other detainees that some individuals had been shot
as spies.
However unsatisfactory conditions were at Wandsworth, it should
be stressed that the British were only taking prudent precautions. This
was wartime, and after the initial influx of refugees had crossed the
Channel in the summer of 1940, it was certain that later arrivals would
be looked upon with suspicion, even if they had signalled their desire
to join de Gaulle. Moreover, Wandsworth was not the Hôtel Terminus
in Lyon where the SS man, Klaus Barbie, regularly tortured and
murdered resisters, including Jean Moulin. MI5 officers might have
deployed gruelling interviewing techniques, but they were not breaking
people’s arms or using terror tactics. As the former deputy for the
Aisne Jean Pierre-Bloch, an arrival in London in 1942, acknowledged,
some French recognised this.86 For his part, Monsieur Le Poittevin
recalls how he was questioned at length, with ‘a very bright light
shining in my eyes’, yet the ‘tone of the voice questioning me was
always friendly, even when I was erring slightly in my explanations’.87
Refugees 47
2499 Chap2  7/4/03  2:42 pm  Page 47
On leaving, he was given a warm handshake by the colonel in charge
and given 50 pounds sterling, the largest sum of money he had ever had
in his possession, some of which was spent on a ‘wonderful’ steak-and-
chips lunch in Soho and a gold wrist watch that never ever worked. It
should be further stressed that it was principally the Free French that
complained most about Wandsworth, ironical given the scandal that
surrounded their own holding centres at Duke Street and Camberley
where rough tactics, if not torture, were frequently used, and where the
principle of habeas corpus was blatantly disregarded.88 In truth, what
really irritated Carlton Gardens about the RVPS was the fact that the
British were getting hold of French arrivals before Gaullist officials. In
this way, MI5 collated valuable intelligence on French matters. In his
exhaustive history of British intelligence, F. H. Hinsley reveals how
vital information in the preparation for D-Day was culled from
Wandsworth89 something vouched for by Monsieur Le Poittevin who
was questioned extensively about his native Normandy, questions
which at the time seemed utterly futile.90 Information about conditions
in occupied Europe was also passed on to the BBC for its broadcasts to
France.91 The British could also recruit prospective agents for SOE,
before the BCRA (Bureau Central de Renseignements d’Action) could
get their hands on them. In his memoirs, de Gaulle betrays this partic-
ular grievance about the ‘Patriotic School’:
As soon as a Frenchman arrived in England, unless he was somebody well
known, he was confined by Intelligence . . . and invited to join the British
Secret Services. It was only after a whole series of remonstrances and
requests that he was allowed to join us. If, however, he had yielded, he was
kept away from us and we would never see him.92
Such quarrels about the RVPS were, however, nothing compared to the
squabbles that broke out over who should look after refugees once in
the wider community. 
Les pauvres types
How many refugees, especially French, did Britain receive? This is no easy
question to answer. Refugees of all nationalities arrived at different times,
at different places in the country; and were processed in different ways,
some being quickly repatriated. In her report of 1947, de l’Hôpital
records that on 17 May 1940 alone, WVS canteens fed some 8,500 French
refugees at a cost of £100,93 a figure repeated in older histories,94 although
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as we shall see detailed breakdowns, collated from a variety of sources,
suggest for July–August a total French refugee population of about half
this size, an indication that many civilians were immediately returned to
their homeland, alongside the majority of French troops rescued at
Dunkirk. Another problem in counting heads lies in the bureaucracy that
was assembled to register their presence. Despite the eventual imposition
of strict immigration and registration procedures, several refugees failed
to complete the necessary forms, and openly defied restrictions on their
freedom of movement. It is possible that some simply did not understand
what information was being asked of them, especially as official inter-
preters were scarce and were frequently of a poor standard. Others may
have left London to escape the Blitz, or perhaps to seek out jobs beyond
the capital. Such was the case of one Frenchman investigated by the WVS,
‘P.R-D, French, formerly billeted in Islington. Local Authority stated that
he had “left Islington”. Further enquiry showed that he had gone to work
in Ripon. Ripon police stated they had no trace. Scotland Yard stated they
had no trace; and there the matter rests since 3rd December.’95 There was
also the case of nine Frenchmen at the Norwood Centre who had subse-
quently vanished without any forwarding address.96
WVS reports suggest that the French were among the worst of all
nationalities at keeping the authorities informed of their whereabouts.
It is possible that this was a characteristic defiance of authority, or
possibly a churlish snub to the British. It is more likely to have been
prudent behaviour. It was well known that the Vichy consulate, housed
in London’s Bedford Square, was on the look-out for French nationals
living in Britain, giving rise to fears that retaliatory action might then
be initiated against their families on metropolitan soil. As early as
September 1940, the Home Office was instructing police authorities
not to disclose any information about French civilians.97 In the case of
the Dutch, Poles, Norwegians and Greeks, such warnings were
nowhere near as strict. In May 1941, the Home Office repeated the
advice and the ‘necessity of special care in enforcing the general rule in
respect of enquiries which might be received about French citizens
from officials of the Vichy Consulate’.98 It might also be that French
refugees wanted to keep their heads down in order to escape the atten-
tions of Carlton Gardens, which, as we shall see in Chapter 5, was
known to be pressing both the Home Office and Foreign Office for a
full list of French nationals resident in Britain, purportedly for propa-
ganda purposes yet, in truth, for a recruitment drive.
Despite the above difficulties, it is still possible to arrive at a reasonably
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accurate figure for the number of French refugees. Statistics from four
separate sources suggest a sum of 2,500–4,000, roughly a tenth of all
refugees, that came to Britain during May–June 1940. All available
evidence suggests that the French were the second largest group after the
Belgians, who numbered approximately 20,000.99 Interestingly, govern-
ment figures are the least detailed, suggesting how willing Whitehall was
to farm out refugees to local authorities and charitable bodies. In August
1940, the Committee on Foreign (Allied) Resistance (CFR) recorded
2,564 French refugees arrived since May 1940.100 WVS totals for October
1940 are astonishingly similar, putting the estimate at 2,550.101 For its
part, the LCC reported that, by the close of October 1940, 2,905 French
refugees had passed through its reception centres.102 Maybe the most
accurate breakdown comes from the Comité d’Entr’Aide aux Français
(CEAF), a charitable organisation whose remit was the welfare of all
French nationals in Britain.103 It counted 2,046 refugees with addresses
and 1,693 without addresses, an overall total of 3,739. It remains possible
that both the WVS and the government had failed to take this latter body
of non-addressees into their own calculations, or that these elusive
refugees had been repatriated. It is known that over 500 refugees were
sent home in the course of 1940–41 in circumstances of great secrecy,
partly to protect them from patrolling U- and E-boats, which had already
torpedoed a vessel carrying French sailors for repatriation, and partly not
to upset the already fragile relations with de Gaulle’s headquarters. Few
files on refugee repatriation appear to have survived.
It is not hard to ascertain why so few French nationals arrived on
these shores and, for that matter, why the large numbers of Belgian and
Dutch failed to materialise.104 To begin with, the suddenness of the
German victory severed the escape routes on the northern coastline,
forcing civilians to retreat inland, not that they had necessarily put
plans in place for their flight. The questioning of Mass-Observation as
to refugees’ plans for flight will be recalled.105 As the columns of civil-
ians retreated into the heart of France, towns in the south swelled in
size.106 Rod Kedward cites the following examples: ‘Cahors in the Lot
grew from 13,000 to an estimated 60–70,000, Brive in the Corrèze from
30,000 to 100,000, and Pau in the Basses-Pyrénées, a major centre of
exile from the north in 1914–18, from 38,000 to 150,000.’107 Retracing
the steps of those caught up in the exode, Kedward has further shown
how many civilians, confused and without any real knowledge of where
they were going, believed that they might be positively welcomed in
those southern resort towns, which they had first encountered after the
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introduction of paid holidays by the Popular Front, only to discover
their sojourn was a far less pleasant than the one they had experienced
during the avant guerre.108 Interestingly, some Continental refugees, at
least well-heeled ones, might well have travelled to British seaside
resorts, such as Bournemouth, having spent holidays there in peace-
time.109 It was the British government’s belief that French refugees
were trying to reach North Africa.110 The initial impact of Pétainism
may also have stemmed any attempted flight to Britain. As Kedward
has again demonstrated, the appeal of the marshal effectively cast a
trance over the demoralised peoples of France; here was the saviour
who would rescue his people from the abyss.111 Why, then, attempt the
hazardous journey to Britain, a country responsible for the shelling at
Mers-el-Kébir, and a country soon to constitute another piece in
Hitler’s European empire? Such events only fuelled a growing
Anglophobia among the French public, which, throughout the ‘phoney
war’, had questioned Britain’s contribution to the war effort. It is not
hard to believe that something of this Anglophobia travelled across the
Channel with the refugees; certainly, many retained an admiration for
Pétain, believing that he was doing his best in difficult circumstances. 
While it is possible to account for the paltry numbers of French
refugees, it is harder to ascertain their social complexion. As regards
age and gender, WVS statistics highlight two key groups: children and
women born before 1922.112 There is little of surprise here. More inter-
esting is the high proportion of young men. CEAF figures include 740
males between the ages of 17 and 35.113 Why so many young males
should have figured is uncertain. How had they evaded conscription? It
may be that they belonged to reserved occupations, especially since
many stemmed from the industrial heartlands of northern France.
Being young, healthy and without family ties, it might also be that they
were best placed to flee. It is further possible that they were fearful of
what fate might await them when the Germans arrived. In its interviews
with refugees, Mass-Observation uncovered several reasons why civil-
ians had taken to the roads, yet among young non-Jewish men the most
frequent answer was their desire not to work for the Nazis.114 Whatever
the case, in the eyes of the Home Office and MI5, these males were a
real nuisance.115 Resisting calls to join either the Free French or the
British armed services, they were deemed parasitical and a disturbing
influence in that their morale was low. Maybe it would have been better
if some effort had been made to find them employment in their exist-
ing fields of expertise; as we shall see, the government shied away from
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such proposals, fearing that refugees would be accused of stealing
British jobs.
Unsurprisingly, most refugees appear to have come from the
districts of the Nord-Pas-de-Calais, that is those areas that felt the
squeeze of Guderian’s grip as German armour swung towards the coast
to encircle the hapless BEF. Among the addresses of refugees processed
by the LCC, it is the names of towns and villages of northern France
that predominate: Berck-sur Mer; Dunkerque; Boulogne; Armentières;
Calais; Chimay; Sainte Marie Kerque; Lille; Abbeville (the scene of de
Gaulle’s tank triumph); Port de Briques; Albert; Bruay; and Cauchy
(the birthplace of Pétain himself).116
As to profession and social class, no real statistics appear to have
survived, and might never have been obtainable in the first place. In
August 1940, WVS complained that its office only possessed profes-
sional details of 950 of the 2,550 French refugees on its books.117 For its
part, Mass-Observation did a statistical tally of refugees at Camberwell
and Fulham, yet it was acknowledged that the samples were not truly
representative as they included too many middle-class elements.118
Contemporary observations about the wealth of the refugees are also
ambiguous. Having escaped France in 1940, the British journalist
Neville Lytton watched newsreel of the exode in British cinemas:
Since my arrival in England I have seen some films of these refugees and
none of them get the atmosphere quite right. In these films the refugees
seem to be drawn from the poorer classes only, whereas in fact all classes
were on the road. You saw high powered Hispano-Suiza cars jammed in
between farm wagons drawn by horses.119
It appears, however, that those with money and influence were best
placed to evade the German advance by escaping into metropolitan
France; the majority of those who came to Britain appear, in the words
of Orwell, to have been ‘middling people of the shopkeeper-clerk type
. . . in quite good trim’,120 an observation supported by Jean-Louis
Crémieux-Brilhac, who describes such refugees as ‘les humbles’.121 Yet
whatever their position in France, most refugees arrived in England
penniless and without means of support.
Despite the above ambiguities, two groups of refugees do stand out.
In its statistical profile, the CEAF counted some 50 priests and novices.
Other accounts of refugees also point to the presence of both regular
and secular clergy.122 One French woman, evacuated on 22 May 1940,
found herself on a boat of 41 persons, of whom 4 were Sisters of
52 The forgotten French
2499 Chap2  7/4/03  2:42 pm  Page 52
Charity.123 While the evidence may be piecemeal, it tends to support
W. D. Halls’s observation that the Catholic Church was the one body,
unlike local and national government organisations, that remained
alongside the refugees in France, tending for their needs, only for its
own members to be swept up in the general mêlée.124 Interestingly, in
all the reports compiled by British agencies handling French refugees,
little mention is made of Jews although, in its interviews with refugees
during June 1940, Mass-Observation did uncover small numbers.125
Unsurprisingly, these men, women and children had left France and
the Low Countries fully aware of the fate that awaited them when the
Nazis arrived. Later in the war in 1942, shocked at Vichy’s anti-
Semitism, London gave some consideration to taking in some 1,000
Jewish orphans from unoccupied France, resettling them in either
Britain or Palestine.126 As Wasserstein has shown, the shortage of
accommodation, the continued threat of invasion, early preparations
for D-Day and the November 1942 Allied landings in North Africa
effectively scuppered what was, in any case, a very limited humanitar-
ian gesture.
The other readily identifiable body among French refugees was the
large number of French fishermen and their families who made their
home in the West Country. The presence of Breton fishermen has
always been well known. In his memoirs, de Gaulle observes, ‘In the
last days of June a flotilla of fishing boats reached Cornwall, bringing
over to General de Gaulle all the able-bodied men from the island of
Sein.’127 Crémieux-Brilhac suggests that, in September 1940, such
Breton fishermen constituted the bulk of the Free French Navy.128 It is
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true that many of these seamen enlisted with Carlton Gardens, but not
all, some arriving as late as October 1940 without any real prior knowl-
edge of de Gaulle.129 In conversation with a Mr Matthews, the
representative of the French consulate at Penzance, Henry Astor of
French Welfare learned that French fishing boats, principally from
Boulogne and the Breton Coast, had begun to arrive after 19 June,
‘having left France at a moment’s notice in a panic’, making their way
to the Cornish coast where many had fished before the war and,
perhaps in the case of the Breton sailors, to a place where they recog-
nised a cultural affinity.130 In early July, the Foreign Office recorded
seven fishing boats at Penzance alone, all carrying large numbers of
human cargo: Souvenir du Monde (Boulogne), 67 people; Ma Gondole
(Boulogne), 52; Notre Dame de Montligeon (Boulogne), 92; Velleda
(Audierre), 45; Espérance (Boulogne), 52; Corbeau (Carmaret), 19; and
Maris Stella (no port given), 23.131 The writer Ian Hay recalls that one
Boulogne boat arrived at Brixham with 70 passengers on board, each
one with the name ‘Duval’.132
While the families and friends of the fishermen were allowed on
shore, the crews themselves, along with their vessels, were initially
treated as ‘captives’, hardly surprising perhaps given that maritime
relations between Britain and France, never that warm at the best of
times and even cooler at the moment of Mers-el-Kébir, were far from
cordial. Bobbing up and down in Newlyn and Penzance harbours, and
likely to be sunk by the Royal Navy if they attempted to set sail into the
Atlantic, the crews had faced starvation, and owed their survival to
Matthews who, on his own initiative, spent some £400 to feed these
men.133 It remains unclear whether the money was Matthews’ own or,
more likely, that of the French consulate. According to Astor, the
Ministry of Health’s representative at Truro, a Mr Kirby, had been
given permission by Whitehall to repay the amount, yet in late October
1940 Matthews was still waiting for his money.
Just how many French boats, their crews and families, crossed the
Channel to relative safety in England remains unclear. British reports
compiled for the Home Office and the CFR all suggest different figures.
Some of the problems in ascertaining precise figures for this category
of refugees were outlined in a report of E. Ashley Dodd of the Ministry
of Information.134 At the start of August 1940, he travelled down to
Cornwall and Devon, visiting ‘every likely port in the two counties’, no
mean feat given that he was unfamiliar with the localities and was short
of petrol. He reported no French fishermen settled on the northern
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coast but some fifty men and women at Penzance, another thirty at
Salcombe, along with other groups of uncertain numbers at Falmouth
and Plymouth. Clearly this was a shifting community. Some men,
having offloaded their human cargo on the Cornish coast, had quickly
headed back for France before the British authorities could impound
their boats; others had journeyed up to London to be registered or to
enlist with de Gaulle; a small band of men were reportedly travelling up
and down the coast to discover a suitable port to make their home; and
a small number had been interned. Their numbers, however, were infe-
rior to those of the Belgians, as Hay suggests,135 and as the following
police statistics for Newlyn and Brixham in 1940 attest (see table).136
Male Female Children Total 
French 45 30 20 95
Belgian 224 169 135 528
In their work on Belgian refugees, utilising the CEGES archives in
Brussels, Buck and Bernado y Garcia have suggested that the overall
numbers of Belgians in the region might even have been higher, closer to
1,000, dwarfing the figures for the French, an impression borne out by
contemporary observers.137 It is also recalled that relations between the
Dutch and Belgians were not that harmonious. This may be because the
Belgians possessed more boats, and boats of a better quality, than the
French.138 As will be seen, the quality of these craft was later to become a
source of real friction between the fishermen themselves and the Mission
Economique Belge (MEB), part of the Belgian government-in-exile.
Catering for the refugees
As the exode gathered momentum, French refugees were caught up
with other nationalities and were processed in much the same way,
notably through the Central Committee for War Refugees from
Holland, Belgium and France, the local War Refugee Committees, and
the London reception centres, which were often aided by such charita-
ble bodies such as the WVS, the Catholic Women’s League and the
British Red Cross. What is striking is that, as early as June 1940, a
number of specifically French organisations were emerging to cater for
their own nationals. In part, this reflected a strong sense of patriotic
pride, and the impressive organisational skills of a long-established
French colony in London. It also signalled that the refugees were about
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to become part of the political infighting that bedevilled the ‘forgotten
French’, and which partially necessitated the setting up of
Bessborough’s French Welfare.
Foremost among these organisations was the CEAF. As an undated
Foreign Office memo recalled, it had been founded in the first week of
August 1940 to deal with the welfare of refugees and was part of the
many bodies that fell under the aegis of the Comité Central Permanent
de la Colonie Française de Londres.139 Its objectives, outlined in an
open letter to members of the French colony in Britain, were to provide
French refugees with financial and material assistance, shelter and
lodging, meals at reduced prices, medical and hospital services, offers
of employment, education, help with communications to France, and
even advice on repatriation. Although French in origin, it soon had an
English chairwoman, Lady Warwick, the sister of Antony Eden, and
enjoyed good relations both with French Welfare and with the French
consulate in Bedford Square, urging all French nationals to make
contact with this Vichy outpost. As the war progressed, Lady Warwick’s
organisation took on broader responsibilities, looking after men demo-
bilised from de Gaulle’s forces, civilians of the colonie française and the
employment rights of French nationals in this country. Following the
D-Day landings, it held glorified bring-and-buy sales at the Grosvenor
House to help the needy across the Channel.140
Because of its links with both the Foreign Office and the Vichy
consulate, the CEAF soon fell foul of the Français de Grande Bretagne
(FGB), which was also doing battle with the Catholic Women’s League
and the French Red Cross, organisations that allegedly harboured
Pétainist sympathies.141 As the self-appointed civil wing of the Free
French, founded shortly before the famous broadcast of 18 June, the
FGB was eager to recruit as much support as possible. It argued that the
98-year-old Société de Bienfaisance was the most appropriate body to
handle French refugees, partially because this body exuded respectabil-
ity and maybe because it was in such a state of disrepair that it seemed
ripe for a Gaullist takeover.142 As the WVS noted, much of the Société’s
funding was frozen in the French War Loan compelling it to ask the
Treasury for assistance. Interestingly, the CEAF was also subject to
WVS criticism, although the nature of the complaints were very differ-
ent to those of the FGB. ‘General impression was very hole in the
corner’, remarked WVS visitors of the CEAF headquarters, ‘Not calcu-
lated to give any one confidence; though very earnest they don’t appear
to have any initiative.’143
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The competition and sniping among the above agencies eventually
forced the government to act. In a memorandum of early August 1940,
the Foreign Office admitted there was ‘urgent necessity in coordinating
all the many voluntary committees, both British and French, which
have been set up in this country’ in order to expedite the administra-
tion of aid.144 The political quarrels among the French organisations,
alongside the personal rivalries that existed among the English involved
in handling the refugees, were also thought damaging for propaganda.
So it was that Duff Cooper, at the Ministry of Information, asked
Bessborough to handle the new department of French Welfare.145
In many ways, Vere Ponsonby, the ninth Earl of Bessborough, was the
right man for the job.146 He had already witnessed at close hand several
fratricidal quarrels: in 1917, after action at Gallipoli, he had travelled to
Russia as part of the Milner Mission; in 1920, he had been forced to quit
the family seat in Kilkenny, Ireland, because of the civil war. Bessborough
subsequently settled at Stanstead House on the Sussex/Hampshire
border in 1924 and married Roberta de Neuflige, the daughter of a French
banker. During the interwar years, he sat as chairman of numerous
companies, served as governor-general of Canada and took a keen inter-
est in amateur dramatics. In 1940, he had displayed an early concern for
the fate of the French, and put aside Stanstead for the billeting of troops
from Dunkirk.147 Here, then, seemed to be the man who possessed the
necessary authority, diplomatic skills and knowledge of things French to
sort out the Gallic quarrels that irritated both the Foreign Office and
Ministry of Information.
The remit of Bessborough’s French Welfare was large. It was to
oversee Gaullist propaganda and to be responsible for all social and
welfare work associated with:
• General de Gaulle’s movement
• French civilians and refugees
• Those members of the French armed forces who are either undecided
as to whether to remain to continue the struggle or return to France,
including the wounded, and those who have definitively decided to be
repatriated, and who, it seems, may have to be retained for some time
in this country owing to shipping difficulties.148
Situated in the Savoy Hotel, in rooms vacated by the Friends of the
French Forces Fund, he soon discovered his work cut out. At the end
of August, he complained that ‘chaos’ reigned among the many
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committees handling refugees, which were ‘launching out in every
conceivable direction’, partly because they were unaware that his new
body had been set up to coordinate their actions.149 It was thus
agreed to announce the emergence of French Welfare in the press,
and on the radio on at least two or three ‘different occasions’.150 If
the annual report filed by Bessborough for French Welfare during
1941 is to be believed, some semblance of order was established
during that year; as we shall see, various of the charitable bodies were
designated different groups to look after.151 Nonetheless, the impres-
sion is that infighting continued apace. In early October, Sir
Desmond Morton joked that Bessborough was ‘nearly suffering from
a nervous breakdown owing to the appalling time he is having with
these Frenchmen, I don’t wonder’.152 That his work was cut out is
testified by the sheer range of agencies catering for French refugees
and civilians.
So many agencies were there that, in late 1940, the Foreign Office
even published a booklet, listing names, addresses and responsibilities
of the different societies.153
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Despite Bessborough’s good efforts, bickering among the welfare
agencies continued throughout the war. To begin with, this was a turf
war – a struggle to win public and private monies and extend influence
– rather than an ideological battle. In October 1940, Lady Warwick
complained that the statutes of the Société de Bienfaisance were
contrary to the War Charities Act and thus the organisation should
desist from performing its current activities, a charge that proved
wholly spurious.155 In mid-November, Lady Warwick visited the
Foreign Office itself where she vented her anger at the Société, telling
one official that they ‘were an entirely bad lot, that they were in debt
and wanted to collar any refugee money which they could’.156 When
the hapless official looked into the matter, he was told by Lord
Bessborough, ‘that Lady Warwick worried him daily about questions,
and he was not anxious to encourage her’.157 Not to be outdone, the
FGB also moaned regularly about the CEAF, particularly the contacts it
maintained with the Vichy consulate. Eventually, in 1941 some sort of
truce was established when Bessborough decided that, in future, the
venerable Société de Bienfaisance would cater for all those French who
came to Britain before 10 May 1940, that is before the German invasion
of Western Europe. All those who arrived after this date – mainly
refugees – would receive help principally from the CEAF.158 
This, of course, did not please the FGB, which considered it had been
denied a valuable source of recruits. Nor did it please the Free French,
which, in early 1942, attempted to muscle in on the care of refugees,
turning the question of welfare into a more overtly political issue. On
27 January, Colonel Tissier criticised existing welfare arrangements on
the grounds that they ‘helped Vichy nationals too much’ and did not
‘do enough’ for the Free French.159 Interestingly, he also reproached
the FGB. While Gaullist, it was ‘a commercial opportunist movement’,
which had taken organisations under its wing that were part Vichy-
funded, notably the Comité d’Assistance aux Familles des Soldats
Français. To remedy the situation, the Free French had accordingly
established the Assistance Sociale, under the direction of Pleven and
Tissier himself. Linked to the Forces Féminines de la France Libre
(FFFL), its role was to visit and report on the welfare of French nation-
als in the UK, although it was admitted that the training of its female
recruits was meagre.
If Tissier had hoped that the women of the Assistance Sociale would
monopolise the caring for all French refugees in Britain, and no doubt
win some extra recruits in the process, he had not counted on the irre-
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pressible spirits of Lady Warwick and Madame de l’Hôpital whose
timeless sense of patrician and middle-class philanthropy was not
going to pushed aside by such blatant politicking. By March 1942, both
the WVS and the CEAF were becoming agitated at the behaviour of the
forty ladies belonging to the Assistance Sociale.160 A furious row soon
broke out over the care of the unfortunate Madame I—, an elderly
lady, unable to speak English, suffering from paranoia, and with a ten-
year-old grandson to look after, who had been in the care of the
Camberwell Borough British War Refugee Committee.161 This body
had arranged for the grandmother and child to be transferred to a
convent at Baldock in Hertfordshire. In the meantime, two ladies of the
Assistance Sociale had taken matters into their own hands, collecting
the clothes of Madame I—while she was in hospital, but failing to give
these to her, thus leaving the poor lady with nothing to wear when the
time came for her move to the north of London. When the CEAF inves-
tigated the case, it was learned that the same two ladies had regularly
called on the grandson every Thursday, taking him to a school in
Victoria, despite the fact that the local War Refugee Committee had
found him a place at a Roman Catholic school in Camberwell itself.
Before long, Lady Warwick had unearthed further cases of Assistance
Sociale meddling, leaving several no doubt unwanted notes on Lord
Bessborough’s desk. From the West Country emerged the story of Mlle
L—  who had apparently visited refugees in Taunton, St Ives and
Penzance making ‘a nuisance of herself, stirring up ill-feeling and
misinterpreting facts’.162 From the north-west, it was learned that the
Assistance Sociale were setting up foyers for refugees in the Manchester
district, which had turned into political forums, and a quarrel had
broken out over who should be responsible for transferring a refugee
from Warrington for a three-week holiday in Torquay.163 On the south
coast, the Assistance Sociale had apparently promised refugees much,
but had then failed to deliver.164 Indeed, this became the focal point of
Lady Warwick’s criticisms. In April 1942, she reported that the Gaullist
ladies of the Assistance Sociale had caused tremendous disappointment
among refugees, and was alarmed to hear that the organisation was
now in the hands of Capitaine Terré who had been originally
earmarked for a post in the colonies.165 Colonial conditions, the CEAF
chief continued, were not the same as those as in England. Terré had
clearly inflamed the situation by suggesting that French women
preferred to be visited by French women. This was not the case, thun-
dered Lady Warwick. They disliked ‘women in uniform, spying in an
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authoritative manner’, asking political questions, forcing people to join
the FGB and selling the Croix de Lorraine. French refugees, she
concluded, much preferred her own visitors, many of whom were, in
any case French, belonging to the Sisters of Saint Vincent de Paul and
the Little Sisters of the Poor.
At least in one area of welfare, such squabbling was largely avoided,
maybe because the Free French were involved at an early stage: the case
of some two hundred French schoolchildren. While nearly half of this
number had arrived at the time of Dunkirk, the remainder had been
attending the French lycée in South Kensington.166 This latter group
was initially destined to be rehoused at either Reading or Cambridge
Universities, before a country house became available in Bedfordshire;
ultimately they were transferred to Cumberland.167 As to the remain-
ing children, some thirty of these had been farmed out to families in
London, but it soon transpired that another seventy-five had been
studying at a preparatory school for the prestigious military academy of
Saint Cyr, the equivalent of Sandhurst. Most of these boys, or rather
young men, had expressed a desire to enlist with de Gaulle and they had
been permitted to form a cadet corps. Their example had been seized
upon by the Free French, and the British had cooperated in moving
them to Rake Manor, near Godalming in Surrey where the headteacher
of a neighbouring school allowed access to playing fields and class-
rooms. Additionally the British Council provided two teachers, one
French and one English, soon to be joined by a British adjutant and two
NCOs to act as drill instructors. Such skills appear to have been needed
as the discipline of the school was reputedly of a low standard and there
was a fear that the Department of Education might be called in. Matters
were rectified by the appointment of a new commandant, and the
financial upkeep of the boys was assured through the support of the
International Commission for War Refugees in Great Britain. Because
of the Quaker leanings of this organisation, there was a worry that it
might withdraw its assistance when the military purpose of the school
became apparent, but this raised no fuss until it actually had contact
with representatives of the Free French after which its spokeswoman, a
Mrs Crawshay, said ‘she would have nothing to do with de Gaulle or
the cadet school at Rake’.168 As the CFR noted, there was no doubt that,
‘Mrs Crawshay had been extremely badly treated by Free French
Headquarters.’ Carlton Gardens was unmoved. Betraying his
Bonapartist conception of education, if not his Bonapartist politics, de
Gaulle had plans for the ‘technicians’ to remain at Rake Manor and for
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the ‘intellectuals’ to move elsewhere, possibly Lord Desborough’s
estate, Panshanger. It remains unclear whether this scheme was ever
put into operation or whether the International Commission for War
Refugees was coaxed back into assisting with the operation. 
While much quarrelling went on over the responsibility for welfare,
what evidence is there of political infighting among the refugees them-
selves? This was something that the British government was especially
interested in. After all, to whom did they owe their loyalty? Whereas
Belgians and Dutch refugees could pledge adherence to their govern-
ments-in-exile, governments still at war with Germany, the options for
the French were nowhere near as straightforward. It was understood
that it was hard for them to indicate a support for Britain. While
Britain might have provided a safe haven, it had also failed to recognise
their own government of Vichy as the legitimate French regime. Nor
were MI5 and the Home Office oblivious to Pétain’s appeal as a
saviour, a man who was apparently doing his utmost to shelter his
people from further suffering, although significantly refugees in Britain
were never the direct subject of one of his many radio appeals.169 By
contrast, few refugees, apart from the West Country fishermen, appear
to have rallied to de Gaulle. To many, he still appeared an unknown
and rebellious quantity who did not even possess the wholehearted
support of his British adherents. As a French Welfare report of early
1941 observed, ‘A number of the more intellectual had adopted an atti-
tude which, while violently anti-Vichy, approved of the FFL only as a
military government, and did not associate themselves with it or with
the Français de Grande Bretagne.’170 Most, it was stressed, kept out of
politics, although it was admitted that there were some two hundred
who were deemed to be ‘dangerous’. These observations are borne out
in a wide-ranging report on French subversive activities, prepared by
MI5 in January 1941. While the security services had taken an interest
in one or two political circles that had formed within London, refugees
were not singled out for special attention, and were clearly seen as less
of a threat than other groups, including the Free French Navy, which
was thought to harbour anti-British opinions.171
Because the relevant files have been either withheld or destroyed, it
is difficult to say just how much of a threat politically active refugees
posed. Three general observations, however, can be made. First, trou-
blemakers among refugees were never regarded with the same degree of
seriousness as those exiled soldiers and sailors whose Pétainist sympa-
thies were thought damaging to the overall war effort. Second,
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politically suspect French refugees largely disappear from the picture
after 1941, if French Welfare reports are to be believed, suggesting that
they may well have been among the 500 or so civilians that were quickly
repatriated (see below). Third, it should be remembered that, in the
feverish atmosphere of 1940, fifth columnists were to be spotted every-
where, and any eccentric or ‘foreign’ behaviour invited investigation.
Not even government departments were free of exaggeration, the
Vansittart Committee alleging that 500 fifth columnists had entered
the country along with Dutch refugees in the spring of 1940.172 It was
because of these exaggerated fears that a small number of French
refugees with German-sounding names and mixed parentage were
interned. For example, the Jewish artist H— de B— R— , who later
painted a series of panels for the Air Ministry, spent the first two years
of the war in a camp, thanks to the fact that he had been born in
Germany to a Dutch father, although his mother was French.173 A
similar case was that of a wine merchant A— M— , who had traded
extensively in Britain before the war, and who was held at a camp near
to Liverpool because of his German-Jewish mother; his father appears
to have been either Swiss or French.174
It is in WRVS files, which the Home Office officials grew tired of
weeding in the early 1970s, that a handful of other ‘doubtful’ French
cases may be uncovered, testimony to the fact that the Service’s
tearooms constituted a mine of information for the Home Office and
MI5, and proof that government really had little to fear. It is here that
we read the sorry tale of one minor aristocrat, a refugee who had
sought to supplement his income by going to sea, a move that
foundered on the rocks of officialdom.175 He had subsequently written
a letter to the Ministry of War Transport asking that a supposed ‘labour
ban’, forbidding him to take employment at sea, should be removed
forthwith as this was his only suitable means of living. On enquiring
into his background, the Ministry of War Transport discovered that he
was ‘an educated young man, of good birth and now penniless, born on
30 March 1912, in possession of a French passport’, but clearly ‘not the
type to be found working as an ordinary seaman on a Merchant ship’.
Nonetheless, for several months he had been attempting to sign on to
Scandinavian vessels, and had made one trip of eight days, before his
vessel was confined to port. In that brief voyage, he had created
‘considerable trouble among the crew’, although on investigation this
mischief proved less serious than originally feared. He then left the ship
without authorisation and turned up at the Norwegian consulate in a
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state of ‘nervous tension’, ‘completely unnerved as a result of the recent
bombing raid on Clydeside’. ‘In hysterics’, ‘weeping freely’, and speak-
ing of the inevitability of being bombed, he had subsequently been
entrusted to the WVS in Glasgow as he was clearly ‘unsuited for sea
work’ and refused to join de Gaulle because news might reach the
Germans who were holding his brother, the Duc de F— , as a POW.
Keen to pursue the matter, on 3 June 1941 Captain Alan Williams of
French Welfare requested the WVS to provide further information
about this man who was now resident in Inverness.176 A confidential
report, dated 26 June 1941, was subsequently obtained from Mrs B— ,
a canteen organiser.177 Having invited him to tea on 25 June, she
observed that he had work, but no money, and suggested ‘he could
make some extra cash by teaching French’. ‘Being a French man, and
by his own account a journalist,’ she continued, ‘he can talk at any
length on any subject, especially politics, with shattering, if superficial
logic.’ ‘If he had disturbed his fellow seamen’ this would not have been
with ‘malicious intent’, and she suggested he held his tongue when in
the presence of troops or members of the YMCA as, ‘not being jour-
nalists’, they could not be expected to have the same ‘detached view’.
That he had come under suspicion might be attributed to ‘his some-
what misleading voice and bearing’, which was to be attributed to his
Russian ancestry and ability to speak ‘Apache argot’ which ‘communi-
cated itself to some extent to his manners’! Concluding her report, Mrs
B— came to the diplomatic conclusion that here was a man in need of
‘a good doctor’, especially if he was doing heavy manual work. 
If such cases were typical, Britain – or for that matter de Gaulle – had
little to fear from Vichy agents. Instead, surviving documentation
suggests that the concerns of French refugees were less to do with poli-
tics, and more to do with their everyday existence.
Travail, famille, patrie: the everyday life of refugees
As Churchill braced the British people for ‘blood, sweat and tears’,
Marshal Pétain offered his own compatriots a national renovation
based on the values of ‘travail, famille, patrie’. Such reactionary values
were to be inculcated through a wholesale overhaul of French society
and institutions: schools were to teach religious values; the Catholic
Church was to be restored to a privileged position; peasants were
encouraged to return to their farms; women were to give up work to
take up their rightful positions as mothers and housewives; industry
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and agriculture were to be reorganised along corporatist lines; and the
administration of France would mirror that of the ancien régime. These
projects quickly came to naught, undermined by ministerial instability
at Vichy, ideological inconsistency, rival projects based on technocratic
values, the German presence, and material shortages. People quickly
saw through the sham of Vichy propaganda and focused on the harsh
reality of their own lives. Nonetheless, in many regards, their lives were
still ruled by travail, famille, patrie: the need to find work to keep body
and soul together; the pressure to keep families as one, especially given
the upheaval of the exode, the taking of POWs, the introduction of
discriminatory legislation and the eventual deportations to Germany;
and the decision whether to abandon attentisme for resistance.
Strikingly, the everyday lives of French refugees in Britain also revolved
around the same three core issues of work, family and country, for not
dissimilar reasons.
Famille
A primary concern was the family, or more particularly, the reunifica-
tion of families and friends after the exode. The French writer Henri
Amouroux has shown how, in 1940–41, the French press and official
noticeboards frequently carried such communiqués as the following:
Clermont Ferrand, 24 février 1941
Le préfet du Puy-de-Dôme à MM. les préfets des départements de zone
occupée et libre.
J’ai d’honneur de vous communiquer sous ce pli des listes d’enfants
perdus recherchant leurs parents ou recherchés par leurs parents.
AUBE
GRILLOT Françoise, 2 ans et demi (famille de 12 enfants), de Luyères,
était avec sa soeur aînée dans un autocar avec des militaires du 173e R.I.
La grande soeur a été très gravement blessée entre les villages de Dôches
et Laubressel (Aube), s’est évanouie et, depuis ce moment, aucune
nouvelle de la petite Françoise qui a disparu.178
Such notices bear an uncanny resemblance to those posted up, courtesy
of the Ministry of Information, in refugee reception centres. The
following enquiries were made at the King’s Canadian School, Bushey
Park, Hampton Hill, Middlesex:
Jacques Le Cavorzin, age 12, probably evacuated from Boulogne by
British destroyers. No news since beginning of May.
Mlle Nicole Guillot, age 15, formerly of 145, rue de Saussure, Pirie. The
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enquirer, a Mrs Borrias, is godmother to Mlle Guillot and is willing to
take full charge of her if she can be found.
Mme Marie Battez and son Louis Battez, 14 yrs, formerly of 3 Impasse
Clément, Le Portel. M. Louis Battez, on board P.95, Notre Dame de
France, no news of them since May 16th.179
It is known that some 90,000 children were separated from their
parents at the time of the exode, never to be reunited; one wonders how
many were separated by the Channel.180 Government officials were also
inundated with a flurry of letters asking after friends and relations. It is
in the papers of Noel Baker, a politician deeply concerned for the
welfare of internees and refugees, notably Spanish Republicans evacu-
ated at Dunkirk and immediately interned,181 that may be uncovered
several of these examples, notably a request from a South African, long
resident in France, who was anxious to trace a Jewish companion who
had landed at Falmouth in June 1940.182
Alongside discovering relatives, refugees were keen to find new
homes. Memorandum WR1 had originally envisaged the requisition-
ing of empty buildings, which would then be reconnected to power
supplies, and the property owners recompensed by central government
funds. Yet it soon became obvious this would be a costly business.
While the policy was not altogether relinquished, Memorandum WR2
favoured placing refugees with private householders and boarding
houses. Whitehall appreciated, however, that this was a risky policy,
and that families could not be forced to accept the refugees. Not only
had the economic dislocation created by the war made people protec-
tive of their jobs, it had also intensified a mistrust of all things foreign,
a mistrust that was even deeper following the fall of France. Buck has
demonstrated the way unhappy memories of Belgian refugees in the
First World War also created apprehensions. He quotes one
Cricklewood resident who complained to Mass-Observation: ‘They’re
a dirty lot. I used to be in a hotel as a chambermaid and we had to take
them. They ruined all the nice rooms in no time, doing their shoes on
the curtains, and all sorts of filthy things.’183
French refugees had cause to fear rebuff for other reasons. According
to Mass-Observation, before 1939 British public opinion had been
more sympathetic to Germans than it was to the French. ‘The general
stereotype of the French’, it observed, ‘particularly perpetuated in
music halls and cartoons of the popular papers is of a voluble, exces-
sively excitable, often slightly bearded, and somewhat lecherous
personality.’184 As war approached, sympathy for the French state
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grew, but not necessarily for the French people. As Philip Bell and
Ralph White have demonstrated, in 1939 British propaganda made
much of the Maginot Line and the solidarity of the Franco-British
alliance.185 The rapid capitulation of the Allied armies, the signing of
the Armistice, the bombing of Mers-el-Kébir and the creation of the
Pétain government, had thus dumbfounded public opinion. In West
London, Mass-Observation observed that people were so ‘thunder-
struck by the magnitude of the catastrophe that they are as yet unable
to express any coherent attitude to it’.186 It was an attitude also
observed by the American diarist and writer Mollie Panter-Downes:
‘The people seemed to respond to the staggering news [French capitu-
lation] like people in a dream, who go through the most fantastic
actions without a sound. There was little discussion of events, because
they were too bad for that’; she added that,‘what the average simple
Englishman believes about the average simple French man has only
made recent events more difficult to understand’.187 In this situation, it
is not surprising that Mass-Observation occasionally overheard such
comments as ‘Bleeding French’.188 The depth of such feelings was no
doubt hardened by the fact that the Belgian, Czech and Polish exiles in
Britain had quickly, and very visibly, thrown themselves back into the
fight. There was thus a real anxiety among French nationals in Britain
that they would become targets of hostility, a fear shared by Jean
Monnet and his close associates who were initially scared to travel on
the top deck of a London bus for fear of being recognised as French.189
It was, then, an uphill struggle for the local War Refugee
Committees, local boroughs and relief agencies to seek out willing
landlords, and it is to the credit of these agencies that they succeeded in
housing 80 per cent of all London-based refugees with private house-
holders. It is also to the credit of householders that most said ‘yes’ when
asked to take in refugees, testimony to the fact that the British public
was genuinely moved by the plight of these unfortunate civilians, and
was able to put aside its considerable doubts about unreliable foreign-
ers. Nonetheless, every now and again strings were attached to offers of
accommodation. One letter from a nurse in Birmingham to the LCC
asked for a refugee who could look after her two small children: ‘We
would prefer a woman about 35 or so. Good with children, and must
be very clean. A person with nice habits, as I want the children to be
brought up nicely. Dutch preferably.’190 Another lady from Crystal
Palace, on the advice of her worried daughter, offered places to two
refugees in order that they could keep her company during the
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bombing.191 Others were much more blunt in their requests, and were
clearly out to benefit from the fact that billeting allowances were to be
paid direct to landlords, thus creating a guaranteed income. One
enterprising proprietor from Harrow Weald wrote to the LCC: ‘Should
you be requiring flats for refugees, I can offer you three . . .’.192
It will be recalled that it had originally been the intention to house
refugees outside London, but, in the event, most were dispatched to
and housed in the capital, as the following WVS/Home Office statistics
for August 1940 reveal. Of 23,431 War Refugee cards, the distribution
was as follows:
In 16 London boroughs 8,256
In 4 Local Authorities in Essex 733
In 5 Local Authorities in Kent 1,014
In 15 Local Authorities in Middlesex 3,653
In 15 Local Authorities in Surrey 2,206
In 1 Local Authority in Herts 2
Total 15,864
(The remainder were housed in: two London and Middlesex boroughs,
which had not sent in returns; five local authorities in Lancashire; three
in South Wales; and two in Yorkshire.)193
Living in the capital, however, brought with it exactly the problems
that had been foretold, especially when the Blitz started in earnest.
After the initial bustle of the reception centres, refugees had been
impressed by the calm summer skies that hung over London. As Mass-
Observation discovered, within France refugees had been deeply
disconcerted not so much by the fires that accompanied the exode as
the Stukas passed ahead, but by the noise and sight of people panick-
ing.194 The tranquillity of London also struck other prominent exiles,
including de Gaulle, and is frequently commented upon in the
memoirs of the period. In the words of Robert Mengin, walking
through London’s parks on 19 June, ‘The sky was of a purest blue. The
lawns were still green. That silence, that purity, that freshness over-
whelmed you with a sense of transience and fragility.’195
With the fall of autumn leaves came the fall of enemy bombs. The
anxieties of refugees were eloquently put by Bastin, the representative
of the Belgium government-in-exile, to Ministry of Health officials, in
a meeting that November: ‘A great many refugees had the terrible expe-
rience of German bombing in their country and it is not surprising
therefore to hear most of them say that “they have left a hole to fall into
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another.”’196 The question was next raised at the dreary sounding
Fourth Meeting of the Welfare Sub-Committee for War Refugees held
on 25 November 1940.197 Here Bastin, in the stodgy language of the
minute-taker, ‘pointed out how difficult it is for War Refugees
restricted as to their movements and not possessing the language, to
find for themselves suitable rooms in safer areas. Those desirous of
leaving bombed areas are being encouraged to make their own arrange-
ments and for this reason, he raised with the Sub-Committee the
question of setting up suitable machinery which would enable the
refugees to be transferred in groups to selected areas.’ The issue was
handed over to the Central Committee for War Refugees, meeting on
20 November, which recommended to the Ministry of Health that
certain classes of war refugee, ‘women with children and generally
family groups, including the men, when the latter had no employment
in the London area’, could indeed be moved to districts where there
were no security objections and in which billets were likely to be found.
Rather disingenuously C. F. Roundell, of the Ministry of Health,
replied on 2 December 1940 stating that careful consideration had been
given for the initial reception of refugees in the London region.198
Billets elsewhere were so scarce, and general demands on accommoda-
tion ‘so acute’, that the minister ‘has found it necessary to make a rule
that foreign war refugees as such may only be billeted in those areas
specifically set aside for their reception’. He feebly concluded that
refugees could take advantage of evacuation schemes available for resi-
dents; alternatively, subject to police permission, they could move to
any part of the country save those prohibited under the Defence
Regulations. He carefully sidestepped Bastin’s argument that refugees
lacked both the language and the freedom of movement to seek out
other homes, although those hurdles clearly did not deter those inde-
pendent-minded French who were eager to shake off the unwanted
attentions of the Vichy consulate. 
The Blitz aside, life within refugee homes appears to have been bleak
with many chores falling to the women, at least if WVS reports are to be
believed. The following is an account of a large house in St John’s Wood,
just behind Regent’s Park in London, which provided shelter to 11 fami-
lies (7 Belgian, 3 French, 1 Portuguese) 42 people in all (26 adults, 16
children): ‘Each family has one bedroom, children curtained off, plus one
large sitting room.’199 There was also a large sitting room shared by all:
The women are divided in groups to do the house work, the cooking and
the general tidying up in the house. The cooking is done by 3 women for
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3 days running at the end of which they leave that department spotless for
the next group to take on. The three women, who have had their turn at
cooking, do their own small laundry and the turning out of their rooms.
Once a week, all the women and bigger children knit and mend clothes
sent from the Clothing Centre. We hope to get material soon for the
people to make their own winter clothes. On Saturday morning, the hot
water installation is turned on and everyone takes baths and does the
heavier laundry. The catering is possible on a cheap basis because of
numbers and allows us to be well in the grant.
As the report implies, refugees were desperately poor. Not only were
they destitute when they arrived, they received little financial assistance
from their British hosts who devised a fiendishly complex system of
welfare support, worthy of the Victorian values of thrift and self-reliance.
Whereas those in requisitioned properties (the minority) drew financial
aid through the pre-war Prevention and Relief from Distress (PRD)
apparatus, administered through central government’s Unemployment
Assistance Board (UAB), those in billets (the majority) were supported
by the Public Assistance Committees (PAC) which fell under the control
of the Ministry of Health. As already mentioned, PAC aid was paid direct
to the householder who would then decide how to use this money. This
had several consequences. First, it denied refugees any real independence
of their landlord. Second, it kept them in a state of impoverishment. This
was, in part, deliberate. The government had no wish that public monies
should favour foreigners over the destitute of this country,200 and there
was clearly some public resentment that, at a time of national crisis,
taxpayers’ money was being spent on ‘outsiders’. Nonetheless, as early as
June 1940, Whitehall recognised that refugees needed some measure of
financial independence, if only to pay for a cup of tea, and it was thus
decided to issue ‘pocket money’; it was exactly that.
Given that government paid so little, and given that the complicated
welfare machinery it had set in place often failed to function smoothly,
it is small wonder that refugees abused the system. On 6 May 1941, the
St Marylebone War Refugee Committee, based at 128/134 Baker Street,
reported to WVS that there were 107 refugees in the borough.201 On
investigating some 35 cases, 14 were guilty of ‘systematic misrepresen-
tation with the purpose of drawing full billeting allowances, Public
Assistance, or evading a proportionate rental’. The cases investigated
appear mainly to have been Polish, Belgian and Czech. There is no
mention of the French maybe because, unlike their Continental coun-
terparts, they could not defraud the system by drawing on benefits
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from their own government, subsidies that they then did not declare to
the British authorities.202 On several occasions, Colonel Tissier
reminded French Welfare that the Free/Fighting French possessed
insufficient funds to assist their destitute compatriots living in the
British Isles although, as we have seen, this did not stop the Assistance
Sociale from attempting to monopolise refugee relief, a project that was
doomed from the start. 
Ultimately, Vichy stepped in to assist impoverished French nation-
als, whether refugees or otherwise. In October 1941, the
Consulate-General in Bedford Square suggested that the Reciprocal
Advances Account, which had been set up to deal with the liquidation
of the French government’s assets and obligations in Britain, could be
used to assist the needy, a gesture that was warmly welcomed by the
Foreign Office as Vichy was doing something similar for British nation-
als in unoccupied France.203 While wary that this money might be used
to promote pro-Pétainist sentiments, reassurance was drawn from the
fact that, in the case of refugees, it would be distributed through the
auspices of the CEAF, a move which must surely have angered the FGB
and Free French. Whatever the case, there was no denying the enthusi-
asm of the CEAF which, on the death of its Lady Warwick in 1943,
chose to bring its good works to the attention of the Foreign Office.204
By that stage, it was spending approximately £125 a month on refugees
and the destitute of the French colony, the following list outlining
certain of its costs:
Distributed cash £22 7s 10d
Oculists bills £5 5s 0d
Dentists £5 4s 6d
Milk bills (children) £6 9s 9d
Patent food £6 15 s 0d
Clothes distributed (approx value) £135 7s 2d
Visitors dealt with 75
Employment found for 11
Billeting troubles 7
General info (lodgings) 22
Red Cross messages sent 4
POW parcels sent 6205
Such voluntary work was no mean achievement, given that the CEAF
no longer relied principally on subscriptions, but on private sources; it
remains unclear whether it still benefited from the Reciprocal
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Advances Account. In 1943, it boasted that it already possessed the cash
to carry on for at least another 18 months,206 something that could not
have pleased the Assistance Sociale.
Travail
Despite the efforts of the CEAF, it was manifest that the only way in
which French refugees could escape the poverty trap was to find
employment. For its part, the government was also eager to draft as
many able-bodied people as possible into the war effort. In February
1941, French Welfare reported on twenty men and women who were
employed at the Burtonwood Aircraft Repair Depot in Lancashire and
a similar number, over military age, who were attached to demolition
squads.207 Yet the government was far less keen on French refugees
taking up their pre-war professions lest this created resentment on the
part of British workers fearful for their own livelihoods. So it was that,
in July 1941, the case of four Trouville boat workers arrived on
Bessborough’s desk; it was suggested that they had been sacked from a
British shipyard because of trade-union pressure. On investigation, it
transpired that they had been dismissed simply because their work had
been ‘poor’.208
This concern about the protection of British jobs might explain why
the government made the employment bureaucracy for refugees so
daunting, although we should never overlook the Victorian values of
thrift and self-help that underscored the whole welfare apparatus. On
arriving in Britain, refugees had been issued with a notice in their
native language that explained the processing, housing and food
arrangements.209 Within 48 hours of arriving at their billets, all
foreigners were to register at a police station where they would be
issued with Registration Certificates. If refugees were able to work, it
was their responsibility to report next at the local Employment or
Labour Exchange. Explaining that there was a ‘present need for skilled
and unskilled agricultural workers, forestry workers and workers in
saw mills’, hardly the type of job to be found in London where most
refugees were located, a warning ensued that refugees could not take on
a job without a permit from the Labour Exchange and notification to
the Ministry of Labour. All of this, even if explained in French, must
have been terribly confusing to a refugee already disorientated by the
experiences of the exode and arrival in a strange country.
Confusion naturally ensued. The WVS was especially concerned,
and cited the case of a certain De P— , whom its volunteers discovered
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at CEAF headquarters: ‘De P— said that he had first to apply to the
police – then to the Labour Exchange – who referred the matter to the
Home Office – who held it up indefinitely.’210 Although De P— was
unflatteringly referred to as ‘just the sort of person for whom no one
would bother to do anything’, the WVS concluded, ‘There is a great
deal of dissatisfaction among the refugees due mostly to their not
having anything to do except to make complaints. The effect is to
demoralise them and the people among whom they are living.’ On
occasion, when jobs were found, they were not to the refugees’ liking.
In October 1940, Lady Warwick complained to the Foreign Office
about the behaviour of one Mr O’C— from Denmark Hill, presumably
an official at the local Labour Exchange, who had been pressurising
French women to take jobs in a munitions factory.211 He had been ‘very
rude and rigorous in his methods’, continued Lady Warwick, explain-
ing that these women were reluctant to accept such employment as
they feared they might end up assembling bombs that would be
dropped on France. The jobsworth at Denmark Hill was not alone in
his uncaring attitude. In suburban Teddington, one French male, too
ill to fight and suited only to a ‘light sheltered job’, had been told that
he had to take up demolition work or forfeit his money. According to
Margaret Green, an expert on African matters who had been lecturing
the Free French on colonial administration, he had been so dispirited
that he had sought repatriation, believing this was the only option left
to him.212
Perhaps the most contented of the refugees were those fishermen
and their families who had landed in the West Country. Some of these
had been immediately shipped off to London for registration. There,
they had been billeted at empty houses in Pembury Road in
Tottenham, only a stone’s throw from White Hart Lane, the home of
Tottenham Hotspur, whose towering and ramshackle East Stand was
being used as a mortuary.213 Most had registered through the proper
channels, several aligning with de Gaulle. In addition, the families were
given a fortnightly 75s allowance, yet their great desire was to be
allowed to return to Penzance to fish, and to join up with crews they
had left behind; only, in 1941, after much pressure from French
Welfare, was their request granted. When they eventually resettled in
Penzance, they found homes waiting for them, but no furniture. In
Newlyn, French fisherwomen reputedly announced that they could not
sleep on straw mattresses: ‘nous sommes pour de Gaulle, et de Gaulle
ne couche pas sur la paille’.214
Refugees 73
2499 Chap2  7/4/03  2:42 pm  Page 73
In the meantime, their compatriots in Devon and Cornwall had
already begun to adapt to life in exile, although this process had not
been without teething problems. Having spoken with the many
London-based agencies concerned with the French fishermen, in
October 1940 Henry Astor of French Welfare set off on a tour of the
West Country to see what was happening with his own eyes.215 Arriving
first at Plymouth, he discovered no French fishermen as such, but only
‘Frenchmen serving with the Royal Navy’. According to a Miss
Waveney Lloyd, of the Ministry of Information, these men felt they
were ‘merely tolerated’ and were not appreciated as an ‘asset’. There
was disquiet that English lessons, initially provided by the local author-
ities, had now stopped, and that the French were kept apart from
British ratings, although one Frenchman had complained that he was
being forced to work on a vessel manned by his own countrymen! In
conversation with Captain Lush of the Admiralty, Astor learned that
there were five French fishing boats still lying in the mud at Plymouth;
these were, however, in a poor state, and needed considerable amounts
of ‘time and money’ spent on them. In far better shape was a French
sand dredger, the Ingénieur de Jolie, said to be in ‘perfect condition’,
together with a complete crew, which Lush was keen to have trans-
ferred to Liverpool, lest the men set sail for France. For his part, Lush
had faith only in those fishermen whose families were based in
England, thus deterring them from flight. This point was echoed by
Miss Lloyd who was keen to do everything in her powers to reunite the
fishermen with their wives. As Lush grumbled, there had already been
two cases of boats ‘escaping and returning to France’.
Travelling next to Falmouth, Astor discovered a healthier situation
with no ‘idle boats’ and fishermen ‘perfectly contented living ashore
with their families’, occasionally deploying their boats for secret work
on behalf of the Royal Navy. Brixham also presented an encouraging
picture, with twelve men and four trawlers, earning a good living,
happy that their families were ashore. At Newlyn, Astor was unable to
meet any of the authorities dealing with the refugees, but was fortunate
to speak to the fishermen themselves who belonged to some five boats.
Once again, the fact that families had been reunited was a key factor in
the contentment of the men, yet given the disadvantage that their boats
were only suitable for long-line fishing, there was concern as to what
would happen over the winter. Here, no arrangements had been made
to support the men, via PAC, should bad weather prevent them fishing,
as was the case in Brixham. Over in Salcombe, where many boats had
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first landed, only four fishermen remained, together with two vessels,
the Pourquoi Pas, in need of repair, and the unfortunate Sainte Isabelle,
which had recently sunk. Not surprisingly, the concern of the four
remaining Frenchmen was with their material welfare. Unable to fish,
they had turned their hands to salvage work, earning paltry wages for
the Southern Salvage Company; with the arrival of winter all salvaging
had ceased. Lonely and dispirited, with their families in France, these
men did not hide their desire to return to their homeland.
Nearby, in Dartmouth, no fishermen remained, two abandoned
boats the only sign of their visit. In better shape were the nine boats
that Astor discovered in Southampton. These boasted semi-diesel
engines and had been refitted shortly before the war by the French
government on the condition that the vessels would be put to govern-
ment disposal at a time of crisis; four had been fitted with
mine-sweeping gear, which the Admiralty was now contemplating
removing. Probably because of the importance of the port at
Southampton and its place in the front line, considerable thought had
been given to relocating these particular fishermen, and it was
proposed that the boats and their crews be transferred to the west coast
of Scotland for the purposes of herring fishing, although it should not
be forgotten that the Admiralty also used such boats for spying
purposes.216
All in all, the French fishermen appear to have been more contented
than their Belgian counterparts where quarrels between French and
Flemish speakers were rife. As Buck relates, these arguments did not
merely reflect national differences but the fact that the Belgians owned
numerous well-equipped vessels.217 Such a catch proved too tempting
for the Belgian government-in-exile, yet its ham-fisted attempts to
assert authority over the fleet only succeeded in precipitating an
almighty quarrel with the fishermen themselves, who were supported
by Bryan Stevenson, a local fish wholesaler who doubled up as the
Belgian consul. The Belgian government’s insistence that the fishermen
paid insurance premiums direct to itself only created further discon-
tent.
For once, the French were models of good citizens.218 The West
Country fishermen rarely figure in the CFR minutes and, in 1942,
French Welfare reported that the welfare of the remaining pêcheurs had
passed from the CEAF to the Free French, although problems clearly
remained.219 While the Free French provided free medical attention,
children under school age were catered for by the Child Welfare
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Department; those of school age came under the aegis of the Ministry
of Education. Perhaps typical of a male-dominated profession, it was
the women’s welfare that was being neglected, leaving the CEAF
anxious to establish some kind of health insurance benefit.
One of the reasons why the Free French were happy to take on board
the welfare of the fishermen was that most had rallied to de Gaulle and,
in 1940, had readily manned his fledgeling navy. Nor did it go unno-
ticed that the coastlines of Devon and Cornwall were ideal landing
grounds for those French men and women escaping metropolitan soil.
Whereas in 1940–41 there had been a constant worry that the fisher-
men would abscond, in 1942 it was more likely that they would be
welcoming and assisting boats escaping France. In September 1942 two
such vessels, the Marie Henriette and Muse des Mers, carrying thirteen
men, arrived in Newlyn where they were welcomed by representatives
of the Admiralty, French Welfare and the Fighting French.220 In 1940,
these boats would have been confined to harbour, this time the
welcome was far better coordinated, the police being ‘very kind’ and
the immigration officers ‘restrained’. A half-tin of tobacco was drawn
from Customs for each man; the local WVS and PACs provided parcels
of food and gifts; and French Welfare laid its hands on sizeable quanti-
ties of cider and beer. Entertainment was arranged on the quayside and,
on 20 September, a party lasted from 6.00 to 9.00 p.m., to which local
French fishermen and Free French soldiers were invited. Even the
Gaullists could not grumble about the arrangements and, on 26
September, the newly arrived refugees were transferred to London for
registration and security purposes, presumably for a stay at the
Patriotic School, before being allowed to return to Cornwall.
Patrie
There were those who wished to travel in the other direction, and be
repatriated to France. Such a sentiment was, in many senses, perfectly
understandable. It will also be recalled that this was an extremely deli-
cate subject, especially with the Free French. When Chartier of the
Consulate-General asked that information about repatriation be
broadcast on the BBC, his request was flatly turned down; the news was
instead to be relayed through French charitable agencies, no doubt
pinned on an obscure part of their noticeboards.221 Moreover, repatri-
ation involved making complicated shipping arrangements, always a
hazardous business since the Germans refused to grant a safe passage
even to boats flying a neutral ensign. Nonetheless, this prospect of
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being torpedoed by a U-boat did not prevent some 500 refugees from
returning to their homeland in the immediate six months after the
Battle of France. Quite who volunteered for repatriation is unclear.
While it is likely that this number included troublemakers identified by
the British, it also comprised those who simply could not adapt to a
new way of life. As we have seen, Britain was a strange land with strange
customs, the welcome of officialdom had not exactly been overflowing
with charity, few refugees appear to have known the English language,
the Blitz was a stark reminder that the war was not over, and there
remained the prospect of a German invasion. Yet maybe the greatest
attraction of repatriation was the prospect of being reunited with fami-
lies. Such was the case of a handful of male refugees from Brest and
Dunkirk, in the words of Chartier ‘travailleurs sérieux’, who had taken
work in British factories and who were contemptuous of their fellow
refugees who preferred to live ‘dans l’oisiveté aux frais da la charité
publique’.222 More than anything, he continued, these men were
worried about their families.
As the full extent of German oppression and of Vichy impotence
became transparent, the prospect of repatriation must have become
less than appealing, yet at least the rallying of large parts of the
French empire to the Allied cause offered one possibility of return-
ing to lands that were ‘forever French’. Until the conquest of North
Africa in late 1942, when a large segment of the Free French estab-
lished itself in Algiers, this process appears to have happened in dribs
and drabs and involved military, rather than civilian, personnel.
However, in January 1943, French Welfare arranged for two parties
of such people to travel to Madagascar via Fleetwood.223 The local
WVS, unaware of the nature of the parties, was accordingly
instructed to meet these groups as they arrived from London in the
North West, and to arrange for temporary billeting, food and neces-
sary clothing.224 As handwritten telephone messages in the archives
attest, arrangements did not go as planned. Although WVS represen-
tatives were instructed not to meet the train, and thereby bring
attention to themselves, news of the arrival appears to have been
leaked, compromising the safety of the mission, although ultimately
the party did manage to set sail without mishap.225
By this date, thought was already turning to the Liberation of Europe
and the eventual repatriation of all French refugees.226 De l’Hôpital
records how:
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in the tense weeks before D Day 1944, top secret plans were put in hand
for the reception of persons who it was expected might escape from the
coasts of Normandy and Brittany to seek refuge in England soon after the
invasion. A large camp was set up in Sussex at Shoreham to be a
Reception Centre, staffed by the military assisted by Ministry of Health
officials, with WVS responsible for welfare and clothing. This camp was
to be the first stop and after a stay of twenty-four hours each batch of
refugees would be moved to London where a large centre had been
opened comprising several houses in Onslow Square, in which WVS
would again be responsible for welfare and clothing.227
While WVS officials set out for Sussex, these arrangements never went
to plan; and, in the event, the process of receiving refugees bore an
uncanny resemblance to circumstances in May–June 1940. To begin
with, refugees did not arrive at designated ports.228 Second, the
numbers were fewer than predicted. In a letter to Lady Reading of 20
June 1944, Grace Peel of the Amis des Volontaires Français (AVF)
remarked, ‘I have heard from the French Consul General that so far the
numbers of French refugees are very small and that at the request of the
British authorities the work in connection with them is to be under-
taken with as little publicity as possible.’229 Third, there was squabbling
among French agencies as to who should cater for the refugees. French
Welfare soon found that it was having to act yet again as an arbiter
between the AVF, CEAF, FGB and WVS. Fourth, given the launch of
the dreaded V1 and V2 rockets, there were considerable doubts about
London as a suitable depot. Lady Peel wondered whether it would be
better to send refugees down to the West Country where the fishermen
were settled: ‘Little French colonies exist in Devon and Cornwall, our
French Friends would therefore not feel so depaysés. The Free French
Committee with the help of the British Council have established 4 or 5
little French schools where, after attending English schools, French
children continue their French lessons and can qualify for their
Certificat d’Etudes.’230 As Peel continued, there were several offers of
accommodation:
I also heard when lecturing at Ilfracombe last week that schools were
being circularised asking them to take two or more refugees. Miss Warrell
Bowring of the Adelaide Girls’ College was willing to take two girls if they
were French . . . Mr and Mrs Johnstone who have over a period of years
collected a large family of about 25 French orphans and brought them
over here in 1940 are willing to take 12 more. Mrs Johnstone would like
some quite young babies amongst them. I can assure you the children
would be wonderfully looked after. There are 12 children of all ages at
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Silverton so the newcomers would feel at home. The Johnstones make
only two conditions: the children should be French and above all they
don’t want to take any Mothers.’
In a final echo of the situation of 1940, public charity and goodwill
contrasted markedly with the parsimony and obduracy of government.
When, in August 1944, Lady Reading suggested to the Ministry of
Health the possibility of flying over two or three hundred ‘delicate
French children’, she received a lukewarm response.231 Having sought
the opinions of the Ministry of Education, Board of Trade and Foreign
Office, a Health representative replied:
Although, as a general proposition, the value of a successful international
gesture of this sort can be very great, our feeling is that unless it could be
extraordinarily well done, it might be as likely to result in complaint or
misunderstanding as gratitude. Not only would the risks of bringing deli-
cate or rickety children from the warmer climate of France to the rigours
of an English winter be serious, but we have lost a great deal of the perma-
nent accommodation which existed before the war in this country for
such children and would have to find special ad hoc premises and staff.
An even greater difficulty perhaps is that if we made such a gesture to
France we could hardly resist pressure to do so successively for Belgium,
Holland, Norway and, perhaps, even Poland, Czechoslovakia, Greece and
Yugoslavia.232
In the event, some French children did arrive, but numbers were small.
Often they had been orphaned, and were being sent to these shores
principally for a break, rather than long-term settlement.233 Many of
their parents appear to have died in concentration camps or had been
killed fighting in the Resistance.234 Having rested in the Lucy Cohen
Convalescent Home in Hove, they spent two months among English
families before returning to France.
Brighton was, with Shoreham, one of the dispatch points from where
long-term French refugees were returned home. This was a task over-
seen by the usual bodies – French Welfare, CEAF and WVS – alongside
the newly established delegations of the French government. On 4
April 1946, the WVS regional officer for Brighton and Hove recalled
the scenes in late 1944/early 1945: ‘They came through in 50–100 at a
time. I believe the WVS there did a grand job, and on occasions had to
house them for twenty-four hours if the boat failed to sail.’235 Indeed,
the activities of the Sussex WVS drew warm thanks from Henri Frenay,
the famous resister, recently appointed Ministre des prisonniers de
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guerre, déportés et refugiés.236 So it was that the French refugees, unex-
pected and unwanted in 1940, slipped out of England, unnoticed and
unlamented, in 1944. 
Conclusions
It remains unknown how many refugees chose to stay in these isles at
the end of the war. Surmise suggests it could only have been a few:
possibly women who had married British men, and maybe some of
those fisherfolk and their families who put down roots in the West
Country. Of all the groups making up the French community in exile,
the lot of the refugees was the most uncomfortable. In the first place,
their arrival had not been foreseen. In the strategic planning for the
war, both France and Britain looked on refugees of any nationality as
an irritant that might upset carefully laid military plans. During the
ensuing discussions, Paris largely triumphed. Keen not to upset its
chief ally, and recognising the logic of the French position, Britain
reluctantly agreed to accept the majority numbers of Belgian and
Dutch civilians, and drew up contingency plans accordingly. Reading
these documents some sixty years after the event, they possess a
convincing, albeit cynical, logic. Whether they were ever practical
remains dubious. Goodness knows how Britain would have coped with
the 500,000 Dutch and Belgian refugees it had initially anticipated
receiving. If such numbers had ever entered, it is tempting to believe
that Britain would have experienced the same confusion witnessed in
the exode, leaving the country vulnerable to a German invasion. In the
event, the small numbers – Dutch, Belgian, French – that eventually
arrived could be managed without too much bother. They never posed
a security threat and cost little to the taxpayer, however much Ministry
of Health officials might have grumbled. The refugees did, however,
constitute a political target for Gaullist agencies, yet a majority of them
were deeply reluctant to abandon their attentiste position. This reluc-
tance was never truly appreciated by the FGB and Free French, which
indulged in a constant struggle with the CEAF, a conflict that often
degenerated into parish-pump politics. Disorientated, distressed and
desolate, the principal concerns of the refugees were, above all, practi-
cal ones: housing; clothes; food; and employment. Accordingly, they
kept themselves to themselves and made little attempt to mix with the
British public. Undoubtedly, their ‘foreignness’ and their impoverish-
ment set them apart, yet the overriding impression is that, after the
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fifth-column scare of May–June 1940, they elicited sympathy and
support at least among the public, unlike their compatriots in the
French army and navy who decided on early repatriation rather than
serve with de Gaulle.
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3
The conflict of exile:
servicemen
Qui se pourrait d’elle laisser
Toujours sa beauté renouvelle.
Dieu! Qu’il la fait bon regarder,
La gracieuse, bonne et belle!
Charles, Duke of Orléans (1391–1465)1
In late January 1941, French Welfare concluded that the most urgent
problem it had confronted during the first six months of its existence
was not the handling of refugees, but what to do ‘with the considerable
number of French soldiers, sailors and merchant seaman in this
country who had not immediately expressed their willingness to join
General de Gaulle’.2 These men were, of course, the majority. When, on
18 June 1940, de Gaulle emitted his ‘call to honour’, the response was
feeble, a fact acknowledged by even the most unreconstructed of the
general’s hagiographers. It has been calculated that, in mid-August
1940, the numbers of Free French, ‘volunteers of the first hour’, in both
Britain and across the world, numbered approximately 8,000.3 It is,
though, these initial ralliés whose stories have been told over and over
again, both by historians and by themselves.4 History remembers the
winners, and there is little desire to recall the pitiful history of the
remainder of the French armed forces during the war years, except to
recount how those soldiers, sailors and airmen, principally in the
colonies, eventually rediscovered a dignity and retrospective glory by
rallying to de Gaulle. Unquestionably, it was these colonials that trans-
formed the Forces Françaises Libres (FFL) into a truly formidable
force, enabling it to play an important role in the ultimate defeat of
Nazism. By contrast, the rump of the French forces in metropolitan
France had an undistinguished war. According to the terms of the
Armistice, Vichy was left with an army of 100,000, men whose job was
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primarily the maintenance of order, and whose every action was closely
watched by the Germans. Determined to maintain the principle of
conscription, Vichy was compelled to create a series of youth move-
ments, principally the Chantiers de la Jeunesse and the Compagnons de
France, which espoused the values of both Baden-Powell and the
National Revolution, ideals that are not as dissimilar as might be imag-
ined. The air arm was a shadow of its former self, while the navy, the
most advanced section of the French military, had an ignominious
campaign: sunk by the British at Mers-el-Kébir in July 1940, and scut-
tled by the French themselves at Toulon in November 1942.
To read the many histories of the French armed forces during the
Second World War is, then, all too often to read the history of the Free
French.5 Little mention is ever made of the sizeable numbers of French
sailors and soldiers, over 10,000 in total, stranded in camps in Britain
at the time of the defeat, and who largely chose repatriation over
enlistment in the Free French or action with the British services.6 They
are alluded to briefly in de Gaulle’s memoirs, as one might refer to an
embarrassing relative at the dinner table, before they are passed over in
favour of another subject.7 As noted in Chapter 1, de Gaulle conve-
niently blamed their unwillingness to join him on Mers-el-Kébir, and
suggests that the British were not as supportive as they could have been
in his recruitment drive. There is a measure of truth in these claims, in
particular the accusations against London. The British government had
serious doubts about the reliability of French servicemen and their
worth in battle. Yet, as will be seen, the reasons behind the failure to
rally were far more complicated; and it is significant that the attitudes
of many exiled servicemen reflected those of their comrades-in-arms in
metropolitan France.8
Arriving: Narvik, Dunkirk, Compiègne and Oran
In explaining why large numbers of French servicemen were to be
found in Britain during the summer of 1940, it is necessary to read the
roll call of Narvik, Dunkirk, Compiègne (where the Franco-German
Armistice was signed) and Mers-el-Kébir, hardly the most illustrious
episodes in French military history. In Norway, on 8–9 April 1940, a
joint Franco-British naval force battled with a German expeditionary
mission in an attempt to disrupt the flow of Swedish iron ore that
passed through the port of Narvik on its way to Hitler’s factories.
Although this episode prompted the Norwegians to abandon their
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neutrality in favour of the Allies, the operation was a disaster for the
French and British, because of woeful military preparations and, most
importantly, because of insufficient air cover.9
As French ships slipped into British harbours, transporting seriously
wounded troops from the abortive Norwegian campaign, far greater
numbers of retreating servicemen were gathering on the beaches of
Dunkirk.10 Initially, on 27–29 May, it was principally the BEF that was
being ferried across the Channel, prompting Darlan to remark acer-
bically, ‘The British Lion seems to grow wings when it’s a matter of
getting back to the sea,’ a sentiment that was shared by several of his
countryfolk at the time, and one that has not altogether disappeared
since.11 In truth, the French had been kept fully informed of the Royal
Navy’s evacuation plans, but had anticipated Dunkirk holding out for
longer, and were disadvantaged in that the bulk of their own ships were
in the Mediterranean.12 Aware that British troops were withdrawing in
an orderly fashion, whereas their French counterparts were being left
to flounder in the waves, and conscious that an overstretched RAF
could not provide the air cover demanded by Reynaud, Churchill
attempted to save the Anglo-French alliance by agreeing that French
and British troops should be evacuated in equal numbers.13 This deci-
sion had a dramatic impact. Whereas, by 31 May, some 150,000 British
soldiers had been removed in comparison to a paltry 15,000 French, at
the close of so-called Operation Dynamo, on 4 June, the total stood at
224,320 British and 141,842 others, principally French.14 Such statistics
were cold comfort to those 30,000–40,000 French soldiers who
remained behind to protect the bridgehead, and who spent the next
five years in German prisoner-of-war camps.
The overwhelming impression is that Dunkirk evacuees, of all
nationalities, were given a hero’s welcome on their arrival in Britain,
this to the astonishment of some French soldiers who feared that they
would be accused of letting Britain down. Such was the anxiety of a
Lieutenant ‘B’, later killed while fighting with the Free French, who was
overwhelmed by the kindness shown to him by the British public.15
Indeed, the cheering crowds that Orwell witnessed at Victoria and
Warterloo were replicated elsewhere. In a wide-ranging thesis on
Franco-British relations during 1940, Joan Delin recalls several similar
incidents in Southampton where schools were given over to housing
the men.16 Some sixty miles north in Reading, chemistry lecturer
Dodgson was so impressed by the manner in which the veterans were
received that his diary quotes extensively from one eye-witness
94 The forgotten French
2499 Chap3  7/4/03  2:43 pm  Page 94
account, published in Home and Country, on the scenes in southern
England during late May/early June:
Upon arrival I found that trains were pulling up at our little station laden
with tired and hungry men and it was our job to cut up sandwiches for
them so tables were erected and preparations made for catering on a very
large scale. Never have I seen at one place so many loaves, tins of corned
beef, eggs, sausages, fruit, etc. Trains were sometimes arriving every ten to
fifteen minutes so that we had to work hard to ensure every man having
a cup of tea and something to eat. As time went on, helpers came from
neighbouring villages and we worked in shifts sometimes 40 at a time.
The food was packed in large boxes and taken to the station in lorries. At
times, we were held up for bread and butter but in no time such consign-
ments arrived and we carried on. At Headcorn alone, 3,600 loaves, 8,000
eggs and 100,000 cups of tea issued between Wednesday and Friday.17
Such morale-stirring accounts were commonplace in the British
press that summer. One of the more unusual stories was that included
in The Times Educational Supplement of 15 June 1940. It reported how
the playing fields of a London secondary school adjoined the main line
from the south coast to Victoria. For nearly a whole day, trains carry-
ing French troops rescued at Dunkirk were held up outside the
school.18 It was not long before the boys had made contact, scampering
down ‘the slippery embankment’ to offer gifts of sweets, chocolates and
biscuits to ‘these bearded, tired-eyed and dusty men’. By the afternoon,
‘convoys had been organised, bringing water and cakes and fruit’.
‘Nous n’oublierons jamais cet accueil chaleureux. Merci!’, scribbled
one soldier on the back of a packet of cigarettes. Once disembarked in
London, there were further gestures of kindness. Helen Long, who later
acted as an interpreter among other duties for de Gaulle and his wife,
recalls how her Paris-born father was so ‘devastated’ by the collapse of
France that he set off to Olympia, where many of the Dunkirk veterans
and early Free French supporters were gathering, his car overflowing
with vin ordinaire.19 He later arranged for such troops to receive loaves
of bread in the shape of baguettes, a gesture that deeply touched de
Gaulle himself, who described it as ‘gentil’.20 In another show of soli-
darity, the Palladium Theatre, then showing the play Garrison Theatre,
reinserted the scene in which French soldiers marched through the Arc
de Triomphe, to the sound of the ‘Marseillaise’, the display having been
dropped at the time of Dunkirk.21
As with the exode, it is the eye-witness accounts that convey the
horror that was an integral part of the Dunkirk evacuations. The
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following is an extract from the unpublished diary of Mlle Toutain, a
nurse attached to the 68th French Infantry Division, who later became
one of the founding members of the Corps Féminin of the FFL:
As we got nearer the North, refugees and cars were coming in an endless
stream. French army lorries were abandoned, no more petrol! . . .
Wounded French and English soldiers sitting on the side of the road
begged us for a lift. But we had no room, we were stocked with supplies.
Suddenly a terrific roar and screaming of a plane overhead made us stop.
I was just about to get down, when machine-gun fire started. A German
Stuka dive-bomber was behind us. We decided to move on. The scream-
ing of the plane was heard again, and at the same time we saw it disappear
in front of us, then a terrific explosion shook the ambulance, almost
lifting it up. Jacqueline (my friend and driver, to die at Dunkirk) stopped,
we got out and looked around. We then saw that two bombs fell in the
road just missing us, I made the sign of the cross but my driver, her hands
on her hips said: Not very good aim. I could have choked her! . . . We then
resumed our route.22
Despite such bravery, there was no disguising the fact that the
morale of French troops was extremely poor on arrival in England. As
Robert Mengin observed, ‘For us, the French, . . . Dunkirk was the
collapse of France. For the English, it was a battlefield like any other.’23
Nor was it likely British propaganda would play well with the French.
As Philip Bell observes, broadcasts such as that of J. B. Priestly’s in
which he urged the steamers Brighton Bell and Gracie Fields to leave
‘that innocent foolish world of theirs to sail into the inferno’ merely
caused offence.24 Helen Long remembers how the mood among the
French, even at the improvised Gaullist barracks at Olympia, was
downcast.25 For her part, Gwen Rennie, a nurse stationed at a hospital
in ‘the south of England’ recalls how, after Dunkirk, her ward was
inundated with French soldiers and Moroccans, 108 men altogether,
only a few of whom were injured.26 Clutching German propaganda
leaflets, they ‘pelted’ the nurses with bread and butter at teatime, and it
was not long before a fight broke out between the Moroccans and a
French soldier. Rennie was appalled to learn that these men had looted
on their way from Dunkirk, and she thus refused a gift of a pair of
gloves. When the day came to be repatriated, she records that only two
elected to join de Gaulle. To be fair, the overwhelming majority of
French troops were never given that choice as, on arriving in Britain in
early June, they were immediately ferried back to France, via
Normandy or Morocco, to carry on the battle, the intention being ‘to
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stabilise the fighting front on the Seine, Lower Normandy and the
Marne, thus repeating the September 1914 miracle’.27 Not all were keen
to return to the fray, recognising the battle lost. One such was Pierre
Veydert, but for very different reasons to his comrades.28 An ardent
Anglophile and a truly exceptional figure, he was keen to stay on British
soil where he believed he could be of most use in the fight against
Germany. Ordered back to France, he later became part of the same
Parisian resistance network as Samuel Beckett, and was deported to
Mauthausen, where he lived out the war, perfecting his command of
the German language.29
The soldiers remaining in Britain were soon to be joined by sailors
and merchant seamen. At the time of the Armistice, several French
ships had taken refuge in British harbours. As with the Dunkirk evac-
uees, the mood among these men was not good. In a telephone call with
his son David, who was serving with the marines in Portsmouth, Lord
Astor learned that ‘discord’ and ‘fighting’ on the ships was common-
place.30 The younger sailors, worried about their families and
economic prospects, were already keen to go back to France. Troubled
by this state of affairs, on 30 June Astor addressed a letter to Dr
Alexander, a minister at the Admiralty, in which he recalled how, in the
West Country, there were several thousand sailors, some of whom had
been there weeks, others a matter of days.31 On the whole, the ‘men and
petty officers are sounder in their views about the future than the offi-
cers’. The officers’ sense of discipline had made them more likely to
follow the orders of the Bordeaux government. To win over the ratings,
Astor continued, there was a vital need to settle any terms of enlistment
in the British armed forces. Overtures also needed to be done through
indirect propaganda, difficult as the officers forbade any ‘direct
approach’ to the men; a promise of good pay; and generous hospitality
on the part of the local community, especially French-speakers, if
possible ‘intelligent French ladies’.
Such advice fell on deaf ears. In the aftermath of the Armistice, the
British government was deeply concerned about the future of the
French fleet and was utterly unconvinced by French reassurances over
its future. Nor did it set much store by recruiting among the French
sailors who were viewed as highly unreliable, even though rumours
quickly grew among an agitated public that they would enlist in large
numbers with de Gaulle.32 So it was that Churchill ordered the shelling
of those vessels anchored at Mers-el-Kébir to prevent them falling into
German hands, an episode that cost the lives of some 1,200 sailors.
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After the decision to attack was taken, Spears recalls how he drove his
car through Hyde Park, where he saw French sailors with red pompons
on their caps playing games with some English girls, prompting him to
think of those other French sailors wearing the same uniform in their
ships off the coast of Africa, ‘What would happen to them tomor-
row?’33 As de Gaulle himself recalls, the British coordinated this
operation with an occupation of ‘French warships which had taken
refuge in British ports’; their officers and crew were ‘taken ashore and
interned – not without some bloodshed’.34 All in all, some 130 French
ships were seized in this manner, among them 2 battleships, 2 light
cruisers, 8 destroyers and 5 submarines.35
Hardly the most natural of Anglophiles at the best of times, these
seamen bitterly resented the manner in which they had been rounded
up. In September 1940, French Welfare officials, visiting camps in the
Liverpool area, reported that a recurring complaint ‘was the way in
which these officers and men were removed from their boats’, often
early in the morning ‘at the point of bayonet’ and, virtually ‘frog
marched’, perhaps an unfortunate turn of phrase, ‘down the streets to
be locked up in some jail or other’.36 Much controversy centred on
whether the officers had been bundled into Black Marias. Such officers
further alleged that they had ‘been looted by the British soldiery’.
Subsequent investigations, however, had ‘proven that a considerable
amount of loot has been found in the possession of the French them-
selves’. When, earlier in 1940, the sailors’ camp at Aintree was
inspected, a ‘good deal of mess plate’ was uncovered along with ‘the
personal belongings of officers’.37 Apart from seizing the ships them-
selves, another thing that the British claimed was a sizeable quantity of
red wine, some 7,000 barrels in total discovered on board the vessels,
and which was subsequently distributed among Gaullist forces.38
Perhaps most important, Britain seized vital French naval codes, which
created intelligence problems at Vichy.39
There is little doubt, however, that the French sailors were treated in
a rough fashion. Whereas at Dundee, the commander of the submarine
Rubis was approached in a polite manner, possibly because his men had
already opted for de Gaulle, matters were different elsewhere. Warren
Tute records how, on 3 July, the two French submarines Ondine and
Orion were docked at Portsmouth to undergo repairs.40 Their crews
resting on shore, the two sentries were easily overpowered and the
boats seized. The captains, Vichot of the Orion and Bourgine of the
Ondine, were not informed beforehand of British intentions and were
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brusquely summoned to Fort Blockhouse, the British submarine head-
quarters, where, as Tute writes, they were presented with an
ultimatum:
The Franco-German Armistice terms require the French fleet to be
disarmed under the German-Italian control. The British government is
aware that the Germans have already broken their word. Under these
circumstances therefore we very much regret – but you will realise that we
have been so ordered – to require you to choose either to continue to fight
loyally and wholeheartedly on the side of Great Britain and its Empire or
to return to France.41
Not allowed to contact their senior officer, the two captains put the
above choices to their men, Vichot opting for repatriation, and his
junior colleague Bourgine siding with de Gaulle, together with a major-
ity of the ratings. Further along the coast at Plymouth, the crew of the
gigantic submarine, Surcoeuf, reputed to be the largest vessel of its type
in the world, had no time for Gaullist overtures and actively resisted the
British boarding party. Two Royal Navy officers, Lieutenant-
Commander Sprague and Lieutenant Griffith, were killed, along with a
French engine-room officer.42 Three other Frenchmen were wounded.
Apparently, the man responsible for the deaths of the British seamen
was, at the last minute, hauled off the SS Djenne, as she prepared to set
sail from Liverpool in autumn 1940 with a cargo of repatriated French
sailors on board.43
Although this was the only act of bloodshed in the takeover of
French ships, it created great resentment both at Vichy and among the
French in Britain. In May 1941, Admiral Darlan delivered a speech in
which he proclaimed, ‘Au mépris de toutes les lois de la mer l’amirauté
britannique a pris l’habitude en ce que concerne la France, de trans-
former le droit de visite en droit de prise, même quand les bâteaux sont
vides.’44 Within Britain itself, naval servicemen were always going to be
prickly customers. Under the military discipline and Pétainist influ-
ence of their officers, the soldiers and sailors had been deeply dismayed
by the events of May–June 1940, and were quick to blame London for
their misfortune. The demoralising speed of the German advance had
reactivated suspicions, present during the phoney war, that the British
had not contributed enough to the war effort; the British then had the
temerity to rescue the bulk of the BEF on the back of the French army.
In these circumstances, an armistice, concluded by the most patriotic
and celebrated of French soldiers, had been the only solution; yet
perfidious Albion had once again behaved in an ungallant fashion,
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shelling the fleet at Mers-el-Kébir and interning French sailors in
British ports in the most heavy-handed of operations. The manner in
which the British subsequently looked after those servicemen exiled
from France only exacerbated their discontent.
Counting heads: les effectifs
Counting the heads of the servicemen who discovered themselves in
Britain during the summer of 1940 is fraught with the same kinds of
difficulties as assessing the numbers of refugees. Official figures often
contradict one another, and are frequently at variance with those cited
in such authoritative works as Crémieux-Brilhac’s La France Libre.
There are several reasons for this. As we have seen, the majority of men
rescued at Dunkirk were quickly returned to France. Of the 141,000
rescued at the start of June, 45,000 remained towards the end of that
month.45 Despite the efficiency with which the evacuations had been
conducted, it was difficult keeping tabs on soldiers as they were trans-
ported across the country to rejoin the battle. Some degree of
repatriation also appears to have been conducted immediately after the
Armistice, although this proved increasingly difficult especially when,
on 24 July, an E-boat sank the Meknès, transferring some 1,200 men to
France, at the cost of 400 lives.46 It is further apparent that those who
rallied to de Gaulle did not do so in one mad rush; they came in dribs
and drabs. To compound matters, it appears that the majority of
servicemen were not ‘interned’ in the strict sense of the word, as was
often alleged, but were held in makeshift camps from which it was not
difficult to abscond; at White City, Léon Wilson recalls being able to
move out of the camp almost at will, on one occasion walking as far as
Charing Cross Road; there he went to a dance at the Astoria Theatre
where he met his future wife.47 He later walked as far as Shoreditch, to
his fiancée’s house, to continue the courtship. Elsewhere, local police
authorities reported on French soldiers wandering around the coun-
tryside, without any papers, and with far less purpose than Monsieur
Wilson. The final complication in counting heads is the question of
desertion. To judge from Home Office files, this was commonplace in
both the Free French and the Vichyite forces in Britain, although the
full scale of the problem is never disclosed.48
A memorandum in the files of French Welfare, on the size of the
Gaullist forces, reveals both the difficulty in drawing up precise statis-
tics in general and the precariousness of the general’s situation in
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particular. In August 1940, between 2,000 to 3,000 men were believed
to belong to de Gaulle’s army at Aldershot; and another 300 were
thought to be under the command of Admiral Muselier in the Free
French Air Force, although several of the officers were flying with the
RAF. Figures for the navy were unobtainable as many men were still
deciding whether to sail with the British or with Muselier,49 described
as a ‘cad and a blister’ by Rear-Admiral Watkins following a cocktail
party in which the Frenchman accused the Royal Navy of stealing his
officers.50 Crémieux-Brilhac suggests that, at this point, the marine
counted 3,200 men.51 In November 1941, we know that the Free
French Navy comprised 287 officers and 3,839 ratings; 20 officers were
sailing with the Royal Navy, along with 408 men.52 By any reckoning, it
was a pitiful number. When, on 14 July 1940, de Gaulle marched his
troops past the Cenotaph and the statue of General Foch in Grosvenor
Gardens, provoking such headlines as ‘France Celebrates Liberty. In
London Only’, the British public had witnessed almost the entire
strength of the general’s fighting men.53 As Crémieux-Brilhac reminds
us, the Czechs, Polish and Norwegian exiled forces were almost as
impressive in numbers as the French.54 As Mollie Panter-Downes
observed, the fact that de Gaulle’s men were housed at Olympia, a
building associated in most Londoners’ minds with Christmas circuses
and the Ideal Home Exhibition, did not help the cause.55
Outside de Gaulle’s forces, it is possible to identify four other cate-
gories of French servicemen in Britain. First, there were some 1,000
wounded, housed in four major London hospitals and three large
hospitals in the Liverpool and Manchester districts, presumably casu-
alties from both Narvik and Dunkirk.56 By August 1940, 100 of these
men were still too ill to be moved. They had initially been cared for by
the Centre Medical Français, based at 14 Grosvenor Gardens, London
SW1.This official organisation had been set up in early June 1940 with
the specific purpose of looking after French wounded from Dunkirk.
At the time of the Armistice, however, ‘its personnel turned out to be
entirely pro-Pétain’ and ‘left this country for France with the French
Chargé d’Affaires’.57 The Centre had subsequently lost its financial
support and was in the hands of just one French representative, a Mlle
Herinex, who was struggling to raise enough volunteers. Nor did it
receive much support from the French Red Cross Society, which was
under the control of Vicomtesse de la Panousse. In the words of
Bessborough, this was no match for the British Red Cross and had
displayed a ‘rather low standard of efficiency’.58 The situation was so
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serious that the United Associations of Great Britain and France
Solidarity Committee (UAGBF), founded at the outbreak of the war,
had donated £100 to the Centre, and the British Red Cross was looking
at how it could assist the situation.
The second group of French servicemen were convalescents. While
some of these had been sent to the Victoria Hospital at Westbury
(Wiltshire), the overwhelming majority, 1,650 men and 70 officers,
were housed at White City in West London. As a matter of prudence,
it was deemed necessary to place the officers at the York Hotel in
Berners Street where their Pétainist sentiments would be less conta-
gious.59 Significantly, few of these soldiers had been interned.
The third category comprised 1,000 officers and ratings of the
French merchant navy ‘who had said they did not wish to continue
serving on their ships, but wish to return to France’.60 They were
housed at Crystal Palace, alongside French refugees, and were catered
for, in part, by the LCC. Before long, the inadequacies of Crystal Palace,
in particular the shortage of blankets and the fact that the men lived
under glass with no nearby air-raid shelters,61 became so obvious that
380 of the officers were moved to the Bedford, Imperial and Royal
Hotels in Bloomsbury.62 Subsequently, 240 of the men, plus 10 officers,
were transferred north to the Wavertree Blind School and placed in the
care of Ministry of Health Officials and Liverpool Corporation.
Their numbers, however, were dwarfed by the final contingent of
servicemen: the large quantities of sailors from the French navy, 341
officers and 6,206 sailors of other ranks.63 These men fell under the
aegis of Western Command, which appointed Rear-Admiral Watkins
as its naval liaison officer. Initially rounded up at Plymouth and
Portsmouth, they lived in a series of makeshift settlements in the North
and Midlands, which also housed 269 colonial troops.64 There were
seven camps in all: Aintree, near Liverpool, and the site of the Grand
National (13 officers and 380 sailors); Haydock, also in the Liverpool
area (52 officers and 1,305 men); Arrowe Park (55 officers and 140
men); Trentham Park, close to Newcastle-under-Lyme (49 officers and
1,829 men); Doddington, bordering Nantwich (51 officers, 307 petty
officers and 880 men); Oulton Park, in the vicinity of Winsford,
Cheshire (33 officers and 959 men); and Barmouth, West Wales (6 offi-
cers and 500 men).65 Strictly speaking, Barmouth and Arrowe Park
were not ‘camps’. At Barmouth, the men were housed in billets in the
town. Arrowe Park was more of a detention centre, housing unruly
elements. According to Lady Peel of the UAGBF Solidarity Committee
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there was a further camp at Towyn in Wales, which housed 500 men
and 6 officers.66 However, French Welfare denied that there had ever
been a base at Towyn; the site had been proposed, but had been quickly
ruled out.67 What is known is that, on 3 August, the camps at Aintree
and Arrowe Park were scaled down, and the men placed into smaller
units, with some of the officers rehoused in Blackpool,68 described by
Georges Blond, the writer and naval engineer held by the British since
July, as a ‘Jewish town’ thanks to its seaside amusements and because
of its boast that it had not yet been bombed!69
At the races: life in the camps
In July and August 1940, the British press, in a morale-boosting effort
orchestrated by Churchill, printed photographs of de Gaulle visiting
Free French troops at camps ‘somewhere in the south of England’.70 It
is almost certain that these barracks were those at Aldershot and
Camberley, where Gaullist troops gathered, having enlisted first at
Olympia. By contrast, no photographs appeared of the general visiting
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the large numbers of sailors in the north-west of the country, with good
reason, as these men proved almost impossible to enlist. Several
reasons combined to undermine his efforts, yet a key factor was
unquestionably conditions within the camps themselves, especially
those sited in the Liverpool area. Even the government recognised that
this sort of bivouac, while adequate for soldiers on active service, could
not be accepted by ‘neutral sailors awaiting repatriation . . . without
demur’.71 Little, however, was done to improve matters, creating a host
of resentments.
Although conditions in the sailors’ camps varied widely, the camps
shared similar problems, suggesting that the problems that had been
associated with internment camps in the First World War had not been
overcome.72 The overriding issue was that of the accommodation itself.
The best housed appear to have been those men at Barmouth who were
billeted in the town, rooms incidentally ‘that were urgently required by
evacuees from heavily bombed districts’.73 Elsewhere, the majority of
men were under canvas, including a handful of officers. When, on 13
September, 29 officers were transferred from Arrowe Park to
Trentham, they were shocked to find only tents awaiting them. This
provoked a vigorous letter of complaint from Captain Albertas who, on
his arrival, had initially been offered a corner in a building occupied by
British troops and officers: ‘J’estime qu’il n’est pas digne d’un grand
pays de traiter de cette manière des officiers qui ont combattu deux fois
à côté de ses marins et dont quelques-uns ne sont plus de la première
jeunesse.’74 In the event, Albertas chose to sleep in the open air. Despite
the fact the night was a fine one, his dignity had suffered and his anti-
British attitude was later credited to this ‘studied insult’.75 For the most
part, however, officers were under more secure cover. At Oulton, they
slept in tin huts, and at Arrowe Park they were housed in a cricket
pavilion.76
The shortcomings of tented accommodation were clearly recognised
by the British authorities. Visiting Aintree, Haydock Park and Arrowe
Park in late July 1940, Dame Rachel Crowdy, Regions’ Adviser to the
Ministry of Information, reported, ‘Tents are many of them badly
pitched [sic], in some cases having subsided owing to the sailors having
removed the tent poles in order to saw them up for firewood.’77 The
fact that many shelters were erected on unsuitable ground was also a
problem. In autumn 1940, the playwright Edward Knoblock, once
described by John Gielgud as ‘the most boring man in London’, and an
author whose name gave rise to adolescent giggles among London’s
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literati,78 wrote a report on the camps for his new employers, French
Welfare. Of Haydock Park, he observed, ‘The camp itself is on heavy
clay soil, which even with the little rain till now is quite churned up . . .
In the rainy season this place will become a swamp.’79 At Doddington,
the tents were at the edge of a windswept lake ‘very pleasant, no doubt
in summer, but already very damp and chilly on the day we called –
October 1st’. With winter pressing and repatriation seemingly no
nearer, the pressure was on to find alternative accommodation. At
Aintree, the men were placed in riding stables. This provoked a storm
of protest on the part of their commanding officer, Captain de
Vulliez.80 However, on inspecting the area, the captain discovered that
the stables were dry, lighted by electricity and, in some cases, heated,
although extra stoves were thought necessary. At Trentham Park there
were also proposals to move the men into the stables, this time the
disused stalls owned by the Duke of Sutherland.
Facilities in the camps varied widely. Not all had hot and cold
running water. While Arrowe Park and Oulton both had ‘excellent’
showers, at Doddington there was only cold water for washing and cold
douches.81 When visiting the Liverpool camps in late July, Spears
remarked that the washing arrangements were ‘deplorable’ although he
admitted that the sanitary arrangements were not too poor ‘consider-
ing how deplorably bad the French are in this respect’.82 Kitchens were
also primitive. At Haydock, the men cooked in field kitchens
surrounded by turf walls, a situation replicated at Arrowe Park where
the men prepared meals in ‘gypsy’ fashion. Matters were relieved by the
intervention of various charitable agencies. At Trentham, the YMCA
and the Catholic Women’s League intervened to set up a series of
canteens, and were rewarded with a grant of £200 by the Bishop of
Birmingham. Aware of the general shortages, Lady Moncrieffe, based at
the International Sportman’s Club, was busy getting hold of red wine
and Petit Caporal cigarettes.83 Spears thought Woodbines, that thin
acrid cigarette favoured by Irish navvies, was more appropriate.84 Yet,
despite these efforts, food apparently remained in short supply and the
men were offered an unchanging diet.85 Matters were made worse by
the fact that cooking utensils were scarce, a point of great concern to
the senior French personnel; at Arrowe Park, the senior French officer
claimed that it was beneath his dignity to eat off tin plates and to drink
from mugs rather than glasses, a complaint echoed by his counterpart
at Trentham. It was further believed that such officers might be
destroying food to exacerbate anti-British sentiments.86 Blond’s
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comment that men at Trentham killed the deer because they faced star-
vation should be treated as the comment of a petty propagandist.87
Far more worrying were the shortages of hospital supplies, especially
serious given the number of convalescents. Medical supervision of the
camps was left in the hands of French doctors who were grossly over-
worked. Whereas Knoblock was generally happy with this level of
provision, especially at Aintree where some of the colonial troops were
suffering from malaria, Beryl Fitzgerald of the UAGBF painted a less
healthy picture.88 In her mind, the infirmary at Trentham was a
‘scandal’: ‘I feel ashamed of being a British woman every time I go to
the camp and face Dr Laglotte (the camp’s doctor) in that awful infir-
mary.’ To be fair, Rear-Admiral Watkins, who it will be recalled was in
overall charge of the camps, recognised that the French doctors worked
hard and ‘recommended that they should be paid for their duties’.89 It
is unknown whether this recommendation was put into effect. It is
further known that the doctors were struggling against widespread
venereal disease, but that their officers had prevented them from
reporting this.90
Although the doctors might have been busy, the men were bored. As
a government note observed, ‘Nothing demoralises Frenchmen as
much as idleness.’91 On his trip to the camps, Spears noted, ‘What was
deplorable was the lack of employment for the men. Lack of work and
nothing to think about has combined to cause moral deterioration and
exasperation.’92 While men at Haydock were drafted in to help with the
harvest, elsewhere the sailors whiled away the hours smoking, playing
board games and listening in to the radio, usually to broadcasts from
Paris, hardly a source of pro-British feeling. Aware of the dangers of
such idleness, in early August 1940 Lord Astor suggested to Aneurin
Bevan, at the Ministry of Labour, that the sailors be enrolled into a
French Pioneer Corps, to be involved in agricultural and forestry work,
as were other exiled Europeans.93 Such a move would engender pro-
British sentiment, reward the men with a better rate of pay than that
they were used to in the French navy, and would not contravene the
Armistice terms, as they would be involved in a non-combatant role.
‘Young and healthy men’, concluded Astor, ‘tend to deteriorate if kept
in enforced idleness without discipline.’ Replying on behalf of Bevan, a
ministry official replied that his department was merely a technical
body and, as such, could hardly begin to place ‘these men in civil
employment for the duration of the war until the policy has been
decided by some competent authority’.94 Preliminary enquiries had
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been made as to the possible deployment of French exiled labour but,
as will be seen in Chapter 5, these became bogged down with technical
difficulties.
Unable to work, French sailors became increasingly anxious about
money. By early August, the ratings had exhausted their pay. They had
been anticipating another instalment from the mission militaire, but
this was not forthcoming. In this situation, camp commandants had
authorised the payment of 6d a day as a supplementary mess
allowance.95 By contrast, the officers appear to have been relatively well
off receiving, depending on rank, either 4 shillings a day or 2s 6d, paid
through the Vichy consulate in Bedford Square, although occasionally
deductions were made to pay for damage perpetrated by the ratings.96
When the officers came to leave White City, British officials were
surprised that they possessed ‘very considerable sums of English money
to exchange for French’;97 as to the ratings, they had hardly a penny to
their name. One explanation for this might lie in an MI5 report of
September 1940, which uncovered that officers had seized a large quan-
tity of banknotes, both English and French, at Dunkirk.98
Letters from France were a further problem. With the eagerness for
news about relatives at home, this lack of information created anxiety
and deterred recruits for de Gaulle, although Free French volunteers
also experienced difficulties in communicating with friends and rela-
tives. As Stewart Savill of the French in England Fund, remarked: ‘Far
from being able to send an occasional gift from home, these relations
are unable to send even a message to say they are alive, and their fate is
a matter of constant anxiety to the men who are carrying on the fight
in exile.’99 He perhaps did not realise that such families might also have
been afraid of posting such messages for fear of reprisals by the Vichy
authorities, which, through the contrôle technique, closely monitored
all mail coming in and out of the country.
Although the communications breakdown within the camps was
blamed on the British, something repeated in history books,100 it was in
fact the Free French who were to blame, something Blond was quick to
point out.101 In his extensive report of (probably) October 1940,
Knoblock discovered that some 200,000 letters, nine-tenths dated June
and July, had been held up at Carlton Gardens, which acted as a clear-
ing house. The correspondence had at last been handed over to
Rear-Admiral Watkins who employed eight people for five days to sort
through the backlog.102 Problems persisted, thanks again to the Free
French who acted as censors on behalf of the British government. In
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September 1940, Captain Moret of the Forces Navales Françaises Libres
(FNFL) handed over to the commandant of the Crystal Palace camp a
list of stipulations that had to be observed by men when writing
home.103 All letters had to contain correspondence only; the content
had to be ‘rigoureusement personnel’; no mention was to be made of
place names, individuals and affairs in England; and nothing was to be
said that might endanger families still in France. Although these were,
in many regards, prudent guidelines, Chartier of the Vichy consulate
bemoaned the complex bureaucracy of the system.104 He suggested that
sailors’ letters be collected by a French vaguemaitre – a term that baffled
the English, until it was discovered it meant a type of naval orderly or
baggage handler – who would put them into mail bags to be handed
over to the French legation at Lisbon after censorship. The proposal
was thought a sensible one, but it remains unclear whether it was ever
implemented. In any case, not long after, most of the sailors had been
repatriated.
Given these grumbles, it is no surprise that discipline was a problem.
Haydock was the exception where morale was described as ‘good’ and
the men ‘neat’.105 Maybe this was to be expected when penalties were
severe: seven days in the guardhouse for hunting rabbits.106 Elsewhere,
matters were less impressive. On visiting the camps near Liverpool,
Dame Rachel Crowdy observed, ‘Waste material and rubbish is thrown
all over the camping ground.’107 In a later report of 16 August 1940, she
remarked on the deaths among deer and ornamental geese over at
Trentham, deaths, it will be recalled, that Blond had ascribed to
hunger.108 The trustees for the late Duke of Sutherland, who owned
Trentham, were quick to present a bill for the cutting down of trees, the
killing of deer and the breaking of locks, as well as letters of complaint
about the use of the dairy house as a latrine.109 Blond’s claim that the
repair costs demanded of the men ran in to millions of pounds sterling
was a nonsense.110 At Arrowe Park, it was rumoured that the men had
threatened mutiny, although on inspection this claim proved much
exaggerated. A salutary respect for authority had settled in after guards
had fired at a Frenchman who had walked too close to the wire.111 Nor
was it just the British authorities who were appalled at events in the
camps. The Free French recruiting officer based at Stoke-on-Trent was
aghast at the general lack of discipline, especially ‘their carryings on
with the girls’.112 Interestingly, locals in the Camberley area made
exactly the same complaints about the Free French troops stationed
nearby. In his account of exile, Blond was quick to complain of the
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seductive techniques of British women who had allegedly targeted
married French sailors.113 Clearly sexual politics, and accusations of
collaboration horizontale, were a means by which officials on all sides
could assert moral superiority when fighting out their battles. 
Poor discipline among the sailors cannot be attributed solely to poor
living conditions. Part of the problem lay with inadequate British
supervision where barbed wire compensated for the lack of patrols. In
a letter to Desmond Morton, Spears complained that ‘the chief diffi-
culty in administering the French camps is the ineffectiveness and
inadequacy of the assistance from the army’.114 The extent of this ‘inad-
equacy’ was revealed in a report for Lord Bessborough: ‘Rear Admiral
Watkins a short while ago asked that at least one company should be
stationed at each camp as well as the 15 military police, but none of the
camps have anything like this number of soldiers, and the few military
police that were stationed there previously have been withdrawn. At
one camp the military contingent consists of one officer and 8 men.’115
Nor were the British commandants necessarily of a high quality.
Admittedly some passed muster. Major Orchard at Haydock Park drew
particular praise, as did Captain Macbeth at Trentham Park.116 In the
words of Blond ‘un rat à moustache’, Macbeth was a temporary officer
who, according to Dame Rachel Crowdy, had ‘lived in France thirty
years and understands the French as well as they understand him’.117
Having taught at the Ecole d’Hydrographie at Marseille, he was a
genuine Francophile and had done much to improve living conditions
and mutual respect, in particular by organising a football match
between French and British officers, which the French had won 4–3.
Macbeth even elicited praise from the notoriously disaffected captain
of the Albertas: ‘Je rends hommage à l’activité du commandement
anglais le capitaine Macbeth qui s’est employé avec les faibles moyens
dont il dispose d’améliorer notre situation matérielle.’118 Elsewhere,
however, the English commandants drew criticism. While it was
acknowledged that Major Anderson at Aintree displayed a genuine
concern for his men, he was thought to perform his job in a perfunc-
tory fashion. In the words of Knoblock, he had ‘grown a bit stale over
his work’, and was principally concerned with the British troops who
were also stationed at the camp.119 The ‘lack of discipline’ and defi-
ciencies in the ‘sense of trimness in the Frenchmen’s appearance’ was,
in turn, attributed to this lacklustre leadership. At Arrowe Park,
Knoblock uncovered two senior British officers, one excellent but the
other far less suited: ‘rather the old blustering type of major, I
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gather’.120 It is not hard to believe that this type of job invited that
genre of officer.
Given the dispiriting conditions in many of the camps and the half-
hearted leadership of certain camp commanders, it is small wonder
that resentment towards the British was widespread. As Beryl
Fitzgerald complained to Sir Aidan Baillie, ‘Had we a decent camp it
might have turned potential bitterness into pro-British feeling amongst
those who have been and who I hope will still be our allies in the
future.’121 Yet other factors also played their part, many of which we
have encountered already. To begin with, there was a residue of anti-
British sentiment, only to be expected among French sailors, and
hardened by events at Dunkirk and Mels-el-Kébir. Reporting on sailors
in Liverpool, Noble Hall of French Welfare was informed by one
medical officer that ‘although he hoped Germany would ultimately be
beaten, France would never forget that after she had been crushed by
the enemy, her former friend and ally destroyed her fleet when it was
unable to defend itself and killed more than 1,250 French sailors in cold
blood’.122 When Sir Evelyn Wrench of the Royal Empire Society invited
sixty French sailors to an evening’s entertainment at the Empire
Rendezvous at Liverpool, English members of the audience were aston-
ished at the hostility expressed by the ratings, together with their failure
to appreciate ‘the true facts of the sinking of the French fleet at
Oran’.123 The manner in which the officers had been rounded up also
left bitter memories. The Bishop of Liverpool reported how his wife
and other French-speaking women had tended to the men at Aintree.
There, the episode at Oran clearly rankled, ‘but what sticks in their
gizzards is the way they were taken off their ships – at 4 am – with very
little notice, and by an armed guard. Somebody blundered over this.’124
In the eyes of many sailors, the treachery of Britain had been further
revealed in the abortive attack on the submarine base on Dakar in
September 1940 and the blockade of French ports. Noble Hall was
brusquely informed that the embargo ‘was unfair to France’.125 ‘The
unoccupied portion’, the interviewee continued, ‘had neither wheat
nor cattle, and the blockade which could not stop Germany getting
food from South-Eastern Europe would be very hard on what was left
of France. It was a most unfriendly act.’
Such Anglophobic attitudes caused anxiety in several quarters. For
his part, Lord Astor believed that the huddling of men in large camps
would contribute to the spread of disorder. In a letter to Oliver Harvey
at the Ministry of Information, he urged, ‘Do all you can to keep the
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sailors in relatively small units so that they do not go Red, or even Pink.
Remember that Bolshevism is apt to spread like wildfire.’126 In a further
letter to the Bishop of Liverpool, Astor elaborated on his fears and
claimed that, if the men at Aintree continued to be treated like animals
they would eventually return to France as ‘potential Communists with
a strong anti-British bias’.127 There is, however, little evidence to justify
these fears. While discipline and morale among the ratings was
undoubtedly poor, and while they often disobeyed their British guards,
the overwhelming impression is that French officers still retained a
measure of respect and military control.
Among the officers, the real danger was not Bolshevism, but
Pétainism. Reporting for French Welfare, Noble Hall remarked that
nearly all the senior personnel he interviewed ‘were in favour of the
Pétain government as honnête et seul capable de remettre de l’ordre en
France’.128 Although he uncovered a high-ranking medical officer who
had been a former member of the Grand Orient, the largest of the
masonic lodges, most were Catholic with strong Action Française lean-
ings:
They said it was not only in military matters that the world had had a
lesson from Hitler. They praised the German youth movement and hoped
it would be adopted in France. They talked exactly like Sir Neville
Henderson did to me in Berlin. He said Pétain, Weygand, Beaudoin [sic],
Prouvoust [sic], were blinded by social prejudice, that at heart they hated
democracy and were intolerant of everything that had sprung from the
French revolution.129
Such sentiments were also commented upon by de Gaulle’s agents.
Returning home after visiting Trentham Park, Sylvia Fletcher-Moulton
stumbled across a young French officer in charge of the France Libre
recruiting bureau: ‘He was in despair and I don’t think enough
Stoke/Trentites speak French for him to have got it off his chest
before!’130 He denounced those wanting to return to France as
‘mauvais garnements’ with ‘some obvious Nazis in their number,
responsible for some violently anti-de Gaulle propaganda’.
From where did this Pétainism spring? It was, in part, ideological: a
faith in traditional right-wing values, commonplace among the officer
class. It also stemmed from the attitudes of the Catholic priests who
visited the camps, as we shall see in Chapter 5. Social status further
determined outlook. Accustomed to greater privileges and better pay
than their British counterparts, French officers had greatly resented the
conditions within the camps, which they saw as an affront to their
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dignity.131 Most importantly, their maréchalisme originated from the
conviction that the old soldier was motivated by the most patriotic of
motives. As Blond claimed, his very name was a sufficient safeguard of
national honour.132 To go against his authority was thus to fly in the
face of reason. The war was lost, and there was little point in dragging
out the suffering. In this respect, de Gaulle, together with his close
associate Admiral Muselier, one of the first high-ranking recruits for
the Free French and perhaps the originator of the emblem of the Cross
of Lorraine, fared badly. Already known to naval men, Muselier was
thought ‘unapproachable’ and lacking in charisma, a view also
expressed by Blond.133 De Gaulle himself was an ‘unknown’, but was
associated with the army, which was blamed for losing the Battle of
France.134 He had also disobeyed his superiors. Several considered that
his position might initiate a civil war.135 This anxiety was noted by Lord
Astor who spoke widely with the survivors of the Meknès. ‘The argu-
ment which appears to have carried most weight’, he remarked, ‘was
the suggestion that France must above all remain united so as to
prevent the risk of civil war or Bolshevism. Hitler made Pétain and his
colleagues believe (just as earlier he convinced Hindenburg and his
friends) that civil war is the worst catastrophe a nation can endure.’136
Through the defeat of the General Strike, concluded Astor, England
had maintained its unity, and it was now desirable to ‘make the French
realise that even civil war with its bitterness is preferable to the impo-
sition of permanent fascism’. Just as Pétain had dismissed the
possibility of a guerrilla or civil war when put to him by Churchill at
the French Cabinet meeting on 11 June 1940,137 so too was it rejected
by the French officers.138 Order, stability, discipline: these were the
values to be preserved, and it was precisely these qualities that the offi-
cers expected of their men, even though they themselves hardly set an
example. Indeed, the only area in which the officers appeared anxious
to impose some sort of discipline was in threatening the lower ranks
with punitive action should they opt for de Gaulle. In July 1940, the
registrar at Alder Hey hospital in Liverpool complained that officers
from nearby Aintree had visited the wards claiming that any man who
volunteered for the Free French would be under ‘penalty of death’.139
It was frequently noted that recruitment picked up when the men were
separated from their officers.140 As we shall see, officers went to great
lengths to stymy British propaganda.
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The Randolph Hotel, Oxford: a polite exile
The neo-Gothic hotel, the Randolph, built in 1864 and facing the
Ashmolean Museuem in Oxford’s Beaumont Street, has been the scene
of many dramas: political and donnish intrigues; illicit love affairs; and
literary whodunnits. In 1940, it was the home to a handful of the most
prominent French naval personnel stranded in Britain at the time of
Mers-el-Kébir, the hotels’s interior splendour thought fitting for such
high-ranking officers, described by Spears as ‘a polite exile’.141 There
were six men in all.142 The first, and most important, was Rear-Admiral
Gaudin de Vilaine. A First World War veteran, who had seen distin-
guished service, on the battleship Courbet, he had been the
commanding officer of all those ships that had taken refuge in
Portsmouth at the time of the Armistice.143 Angered at the manner in
which his ships had been seized, he was quickly dismissive of de Gaulle.
When Thierry d’Argenlieu spoke to him of rebuilding the French navy,
he quipped, ‘On what will you build?’, adding for good measure that
Muselier was nothing more than a womaniser.144 Less is known about
Rear-Admiral Cayol who had exercised similar functions to de Vilaine
over French ships at Plymouth, except that he was already struggling to
maintain control among both his men and officers, who were angered
to see British civilians enjoying their summer holidays.145 Additionally,
there were two captains, Le Chuiton and Guillaume, as well as two
other captains whose names are not disclosed in the surviving records.
Indeed, there is little on these men in surviving official Foreign Office
and French Welfare files, except a letter of protest from Chartier of the
Vichy consulate who believed their incarceration would play into the
hands of German propaganda, a charge that caused some amusement
in Downing Street, which wondered which side of the war Chartier was
really on.146 It is thanks to the private papers of the Astor family that we
can glean something of the lives and opinions of these senior person-
nel. While it should be stressed that these six men were held separately
precisely so their opinions did not infect their juniors, there can be
little doubt these views were shared by a majority of their officers.
It was while on business, visiting Chatham House transplanted to
Oxford during the early stages of the war, that Lord Astor learned of
the presence of Admiral Cayol, a man whom he had first known at
Plymouth.147 Anticipating that this wounded sea lord would be ‘sulky
and unapproachable’, Astor was surprised at his attitude. Meeting at
the Randolph, they ‘reestablished friendly relations, good chat, some
Servicemen 113
2499 Chap3  7/4/03  2:43 pm  Page 113
laughs’. To get the ‘French sailors in a friendly state of mind’,148 Astor
made arrangements for people in Oxford to show these senior officers
‘some of the colleges and buildings, plus tea’.149 He further wrote to
London requesting that he invite Cayol and his colleagues to the family
house of Cliveden, but recognised that this would require a special
dispensation as his stately pile lay outside the twenty mile restriction
zone imposed on the officers in Oxford.150 London was apprehensive
remarking that ‘Admiral Cayol . . . is a very difficult person and has
been a disturbing influence almost from the beginning.’151
Nonetheless, permission was granted and the chief constable of Oxford
informed, along with strict orders that the admirals should, at no point
in their journey, come into contact with their ratings.
The two admirals took lunch and tea at Cliveden on the first Sunday
in August, before returning to Oxford for dinner at All Souls. The trip
provoked a warm letter of thanks from Cayol, who deemed it kind in
these ‘moments pénibles’.152 Astor also drew up a lengthy memoran-
dum on his impressions of the two men. He began with an assessment
of de Vilaine.153 On the ‘defensive’, the rear-admiral was convinced
that ‘Pétain, Weygand and Darlan must have been influenced by inside
information unknown to us outside’. It was ‘further essential to keep
France united’ as ultimately it would rise again ‘just as Germany rose
after 1918 and in Napoleon’s time’. On the question of de Gaulle, de
Vilaine was dismissive, calling him an ‘unknown’:
Has he any known respected men with him? Who are on his so-called
Committee? Does it include Blum or Cot or other such discredited politi-
cians?
Turning to the British, de Vilaine claimed that London merely wanted
French ships, not sailors, an observation not far from the truth. Those
men who went with de Gaulle would be ‘sold’ and turned into soldiers.
Bemoaning the British blockade, the admiral asked ‘What is America?
Always late.’ Warming to his themes, although ‘mellowing’ by the close
of the evening, de Vilaine dismissed Laval as a ‘politician’, condemned
parliament as ‘out of date’, and suggested what might be needed was
‘some sort of military dictatorship’, although Astor observed he had no
liking for Hitler.
As to Cayol, he was ‘admiring’ of Churchill, but still resented the
seizing of French ships.154 He considered that he himself would have
ordered the scuttling of the boats rather than let them fall into German
hands. Like his colleague, he was dismissive of de Gaulle, believing his
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force ‘too small to be of much use’. Only later, when the tide had
turned against Hitler, might it serve as a ‘rallying cry’. In Astor’s mind,
he was a ‘likeable man’, with his ‘heart still in the fight’, but he was
clearly worried about his wife and young children, as well as his son
who was with French sailors at Liverpool. When out of de Vilaine’s
earshot, the officer was more candid, describing the events at Mers-el-
Kébir as a ‘shame’, and bemoaning the pro-Bordeaux and anti-British
sentiments of some of his colleagues.
Astor’s impressions of the two admirals were borne out by a further
report drafted by a L. J. Beck, an official at the Ministry of Infor-
mation’s offices at Chatham House, who had invited all six officers
to his house in Oxford.155 Of the two admirals, de Vilaine was ‘the most
striking and leading figure’. He seemed ‘to dominate the others in every
way’. He was an ‘authoritarian’, frequently speaking of ‘the need for
discipline’. Although not a practising Catholic, he expressed a strong
resentment for ‘politicians and Jews’, bearing a particular grudge
against the Jewish mayor of Le Havre, together with a more general
hatred of Communists and Russians. Cayol was not such ‘a strong
character’. He was ‘rather talkative and a bit of a bore’, with less defi-
nite opinions than his superior and generally less well informed about
political matters, although neither of the two admirals knew much
about current affairs. Taken as a whole, Beck concluded that all six offi-
cers at the Randolph were in want of news from France, and reported
that they felt they were being ‘deliberately kept from seeing French
papers’. While there were occasional flashes of Anglophobia, the men
restrained their anti-British sentiments and spoke highly of the English
people, although de Vilaine found it hard to keep his tongue, a trait put
down to his Normandy ancestry. They were, at least, unanimous in
their hatred of ‘les Boches’, but pessimistic about Britain’s chances in
the coming airwar. In de Vilaine’s mind, the Germans were ‘invincible’.
Oran was a subject best avoided, yet de Gaulle cropped up regularly in
conversation, albeit as a persona non grata. In their eyes, he had
committed the unpardonable offence of having disobeyed orders. In
France itself, ‘il y a travail à faire’, and much praise was heaped on
Pétain. The admirals were especially pleased he was appointing naval
men to colonial posts, although it was pointed out to them that they
were unlikely to benefit as they had probably been put on to the ‘retired
list’. Whatever the case, their social standing and rank weighed heavily
with them. In a separate letter of 19 August 1940, Heather Harvey told
Astor that she had recently had Captain Le Chuiton to dinner, where
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he had been terribly embarrassed by the fact that he had only one suit;
his dress wear had been seized with his ship.156 He was clearly bored at
the Randolph, and annoyed that he could not go to the cinema because
he did not possess a gas mask.
Despite Astor’s good intentions, on 6 September 1940 Duff Cooper
wrote to the proprietor of the Observer to let it be known that his
Ministry considered ‘de Vilaine a hopeless case and that Cayol is
completely influenced by him and would not disobey his superior’.157
Morale among the six officers was undoubtedly on the wane. On 9
September the admirals were described as ‘increasingly reserved’.158
Their ordeal was, at least, near a close. On 18 September, they quit
Oxford to be repatriated. On departing, their mood was characterised
as ‘anxious and resigned rather than happy; but all longing to see their
families again’.159
Clearly, it would be hazardous to generalise about the overall senti-
ments of French naval officers held in Britain on the basis of
British-prepared reports on six unusual and high-ranking personnel.
Nonetheless, so many of their attitudes seem to reflect those of their
fellow officers elsewhere in England: a respect for military discipline;
an admiration for Pétain; a belief that France was somehow in need for
renewal; a dislike of the Germans; a seething resentment over Mers-el-
Kébir; a strong suspicion of de Gaulle; a sense that their dignity and
status had been undermined, especially by the manner in which they
were initially arrested; a wish to return to their families; a fear for
economic security; and a mistrust of the British and their intentions.
Small wonder that in August–September 1940 further efforts were
made to segregate the officers from their ratings, especially in the trou-
blesome Liverpool area.160
Recruiting and proselytising
Although officers and ratings were separated, the concerns of the two
bodies of men were not dissimilar, explaining why ultimately recruit-
ment for both the British and the Free French forces was disappointing.
Charles Ingold, a fighter pilot and a early recruit for the Free French,
noted in his diary how, at Arrowe Park, all the men were in a hurry to
return home as they considered the war lost.161 Even de Gaulle himself
could not hide his frustration. In his memoirs, he recalls how, on 29
June 1940, he visited Trentham Park where he rallied:
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a large part of the two battalions of the 13th Half Brigade of the Foreign
Legion, with their leader, Lieut-Col. Magrin-Veneret, known as Monclar,
and his number two, Captain Koenig, two hundred Chausseurs Alpins,
two-thirds of a tank company, some elements of gunners, engineers and
signals, and several staff and administrative officers, including
Commandant de Conchard and Captains Dewarin and Tissier.162
The next day at Aintree and Haydock Park, he had less luck, being
turned away by the British authorities in Liverpool, lest he provoked
disorder. Arrowe Park, visited a few days later, proved more rewarding,
yet indifference and hostility were still the overwhelming responses.
White City proved a particular disappointment, given the proximity of
de Gaulle’s recruiting bureau at nearby Olympia. Of the 1,600 or so
troops that passed through there in the first two months of the camp’s
existence, only 152 signed up with de Gaulle, a further 34 with the
British army, and another 35 with the Royal Navy.163 Within the
sailors’ camps recruiting moved at a snail’s pace. Although men at
Haydock were relatively enthusiastic, by mid-September a mere 100
men a week were volunteering to serve with either de Gaulle or the
British, the latter option being the more popular, largely because the
pay was better,164 although those who did choose thus soon became
objects of derision on the part of their comrades.165 It is also worth
noting that in the case of those few eager to enlist, enrolment with the
British Army offered a much quicker return to action than would be
had by joining the Free French.166 Whatever the reasons, recruitment
soon tailed off. When it was learned that a majority of the soldiers at
White City, and men in other camps, had plumped for repatriation,
and that some vessels had already sailed for France, ‘recruiting dropped
badly, as the predominant desire of all these men is to return to their
families in France’.167
For the British, at least, these results were not overly disappointing.
Although there were those Francophiles like General Spears and Lord
Astor willing to lend initial support to de Gaulle’s recruitment drive,
elsewhere there were reservations about supporting this campaign. The
Admiralty, War Office and Foreign Office all had sizeable doubts about
allowing large numbers of French servicemen to remain in England.
Whereas the last of these departments was apprehensive of de Gaulle
himself, neither the War Office nor the Admiralty wanted to enlist
large numbers of French servicemen. Dill, the CIGS, summed up such
sentiments when he quipped that all French troops should be told, ‘any
man who wants to stay and fight here can do; and then I hope they will
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all go back’.168 Not only was the loyalty of the French in doubt, given
the advent of the Vichy regime; they would also need to be trained –
difficult in view of the language difficulties and general shortage of
weapons. As Knoblock commented: ‘The difference of language makes
it difficult for the them to follow commands. Their habits and their
ideas of food are different from ours. Besides the innate French char-
acteristics of questioning and doubting orders might at times lead to
serious misunderstandings.’169 With an invasion pending, it was thus
preferable to concentrate efforts on British and Imperial forces. As de
Gaulle himself complained, the result was that the British only lent
half-hearted support to his recruitment campaign. In his biography of
Major-General Spears, Max Egremont recalls how, on 22 July at one
London hospital, wounded French soldiers were asked whether they
wished to stay in England.170 None of the nurses involved could speak
French, and the invalids were given a 10-minute period to make up
their minds. Anxious for news, the men were not impressed and
resented being treated like prisoners, a complaint echoed elsewhere.171
As one wounded soldier remarked, ‘Si les Anglais nous traitent comme
des prisonniers ici, vaut mieux rentrer et être des prisonniers chez
nous.’172 Not that the Free French themselves were any more agile in
presenting their case. One official at Saint James’s Hospital in Leeds
was dumbfounded at the cack-handed recruitment methods of one
Gaullist officer who reminded any potential recruits that, should they
enlist, they would be immediately under sentence of death; later, he
was unable to field any questions about rates of pay, the position of the
British and the prospect of returning to France.173 So it seems that the
example of aloofness set by de Gaulle himself was emulated by several
of his officers!
While the government was not inclined to help any real recruitment
drive, either for the Gaullist or the British side, it was keen to promote
better Anglo-French understanding. In the short term, this would ease
discipline problems among the servicemen. In the longer term, it
would promote goodwill towards London when repatriation eventually
took place. Such a campaign might also distract from criticism in the
press. The Times followed the fortunes of the soldiers at White City
with a feverish interest.174 Far more critical of the government was the
left-leaning New Statesman and Nation. In an article for its ‘London
Diary’ of 10 August 1940, it rehearsed several familiar complaints
about the treatment of French sailors:
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I am constantly hearing fresh instances of our total failure even to try and
win the support of French soldiers and sailors. A French merchant ship,
for instance, arrived at Glasgow: its crew of 40 was immediately thrown
into jail. Then it was transferred to an internment camp near London
where they are living under canvas, idle and embittered. No effort was
made to enlist the support of the men nor were British seamen from the
Seaman’s Union encouraged to get on friendly terms with them.175
The article went on to contrast the situation with the Norwegians.
Here, contact had immediately been forged between the Seaman’s
Union and its Norwegian equivalent. The WEA had also done its bit to
encourage good relations among fellow sailors with the result that
40,000 Norwegians were helping in the war effort. The article
concluded with a further criticism of government and its failure to
create comradeship. It did, though, provoke a riposte from one French
colonist André Clast, living in Exeter. On 17 August, the New
Statesman and Nation published his letter in which he congratulated
the WEA and the Ministry of Information for organising talks to
French sailors in the Plymouth area, efforts no doubt aided by Lord
Astor.176 In a rejoinder to this correspondence, the editor said how
pleased he was that such good work was being done in Plymouth, but
still drew a contrast between the Norwegian navy and the French
sailors.177
Ultimately, this attempt to build bridges proved a fruitless
campaign. To begin with, the British had to get to the men themselves;
they might have been in British-run camps, but they were overseen by
their superiors who were especially bloody-minded and threatened
their underlings with retaliation.178 At Liverpool, the Anglican bishop
reported how the commanding officers had declined to hand out 1,000
copies of a Ministry of Information tract on the Armistice on the
grounds that it was ‘propaganda’.179 At Haydock and Aintree, Edward
Shiel, a company director with strong ties to France, was dismayed at
the way in which the officers thwarted all attempts to promote propa-
ganda,180 a situation replicated at Crystal Palace and White City.
Major-General Spears had a particularly torrid time when attempting
to combat such actions. Visiting Aintree, where French sailors had
recently been pelting their British guards with stones, he discovered
that the loudspeaker wires had been cut when he attempted to address
the officer body.181 On mentioning Vichy, hecklers called out ‘the
government of France’. Discovering that officers were deploying gardes
mobiles to prevent the circulation of Gaullist propaganda, he was
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fearful for his own safety and, at one point, thought he might be
assaulted.182 Shortly afterwards, the Earl of Derby, who hosted a recep-
tion for French officers at the Adelphi Hotel in Liverpool, advised
Spears and others not to deploy the words ‘Vichy government’ as it
simply backed the argument that the Pétain regime was the true
government of France.183
On a day-to-day basis, the lack of good interpreters also hindered
attempts to promote Anglo-French goodwill. Few of the servicemen,
even among the officers, knew English, and few British troops spoke
French. It appears that most interpreters were Royal Army Service
Corps drivers and held non-commissioned ranks. In a letter to Western
Command, Rear-Admiral Watkins stressed that several of these men
had ‘carried out excellent work, which has proved invaluable in provid-
ing information unobtainable and also in furthering recruiting’.184
Especially commended were the six corporals and lance-corporals at
Doddington and Oulton Park, who were also acclaimed by
Knoblock.185 ‘It is regrettable’, continued Watkins, ‘that these men had
been obliged to draw on their private means in order to entertain
French sailors.’186 It was thus recommended that these ‘ambassadors’
should be given special allowances and promotion. Further praise was
heaped on the interpreters at Barmouth and Haydock, although one
private at the latter camp was deemed ‘incompetent and lazy’. At
Trentham a lance-corporal and two privates were said to possess ‘insuf-
ficient knowledge of French’, while one man was to be retained because
of his standing among the sailors. Worryingly, at Arrowe Park and
Aintree, there were no interpreters whatsoever. Curiously, however,
French Welfare and Western Command were reluctant to accept
outside help. When the Manchester businessman, Edward Shiel, a
fluent French speaker, offered his services, aware that men at Haydock
and Aintreee were willing to sign up for either harvest or fishing work
until the wider situation of the war became clearer, his proposal was
turned down.187 At least, his démarche brought the situation to the
attention of both the Ministry of Information and the British Council,
although it remains unclear exactly what was done.188
To compensate for the lack of interpreters, lectures in French were
arranged. In the West Country, Lord Astor arranged for a Dr Chaput,
a French Canadian and professor at the University of Exeter, to give
talks to seamen at Devonport.189 How successful such lectures were is
open to doubt. On 14 October 1940, John Christie, ‘a teacher of
English’, filed a report on life at Trentham Park, in which he had
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Figure 4 The first edition of the Journal du Camp, a newsletter hastily
improvised by the government to promote better understanding of the
British war effort. This was distributed among French servicemen held in
camps across the UK
J O U R N A L  du  C A M P
Ce journal sera édité quotidiennement pour vous
renseigner et vous distraire. Les dernières nouvelles
vous seront données d’une façon tout a fait objective
NOUVELLES RETROSPECTIVES.
LA GRANDE-BRETAGNE RECONNAIT LE GENERAL DE GAULLE.
Le Ministère de l’Information britannique annonce officielle-
ment que le gouvernement de Sa Majesté a décidé de reconnaître le
Général de Gaulle, ancien sous-secretaire d’Etat à la guerre dans le
Cabinet Paul Reynaud et président du Comité National Français de
Londres, comme “chef de tous les Français libres qui se joindront à
l’Empire britannique pour défendre la cause commune des Alliés”.
A ce sujet, nous sommes en mesure de démentir les bruits qui
ont circulé ces jours derniers, selon lesquels des hommes politiques
français entreraient dans ce Comité.   Le général de Gaulle a
formellement affirmé que seuls feraient partie de ce Comité des
militaires et des techniciens en petit nombre.
PLEINS POUVOIRS POUR LE GOUVERNEMENT PETAIN (11 Juillet, 1940).
Au cours d’une séance secrète, heir soir, la Chambre et le Sénat
ont donné au Gouvernement Pétain pleins pouvoirs pour l’élabora-
tion d’une nouvelle Constitution suivant un programme fasciste.
Le scrutin était de 569 voix  pour, 80  contre, et 15 abstentions.
Le vice-président, Pierre Laval, agissant au nom du
Maréchal Pétain, communiqua à l’Assemblée un message de Maréchal
qui s’excusait de ne pouvoir assister à la réunion.  La Constitution
sera, paraît-il, présentée au peuple sous forme de référendum.
M. Laval ne précisa pas si ce référendum serait appliqué dans toute
la France, ou seulement dans la partie de la France non-occupée.
De nombreux télégrammes émanant de députés s’excusant de ne pouvoir
être présents furent communiqués à l’Assemblée.   Il paraît que
certains députés de droite raillèrent le nom de Daladier lorsque
celui-ci fut prononcé.   En plein brouhaha, M. Herriot se leva contre
cette manifestation et prit la défense de M. Daladier.
D’après le “PETIT DAUPHINOIS”, le préambule de la Constitution
annonce:   “A travers l’un des plus cruels moments de son histoire,
la France doit accepter la nécessité d’une Révolution Nationale.  Le
Gouvernement doit avoir tous pouvoirs pour sauver ce qui peut encore
être sauvé, comme pour détruire tout ce que doit être détruit.    La
Nation doit prendre une oreintation nouvelle et doit faire partie
intégrante du système continental de production et d’échange.   La
France doit, avant tout, revenir à la vie des champs et developper
son agriculture.   Il est par conséquent indispensable de mettre fin
aux désordres économiques par l’organisation rationnelle de la
production et de ses institutions corporatives.
Les allemands prétendant qu’il y eut de nombreuses dissensions
parmi les Parlementaires français.   Certains auraient demandé que
les notes sténographiques soient publiées pour que leur opposition
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spoken on English life and customs, addresses he had first delivered at
the University of Lyon.190 The welcome he received was not the same
as that he had experienced in peacetime.
Alongside lectures, the British prepared printed material. To begin
with, this took the form of amateurish roneoed newsletters, entitled
Journal du Camp, rapidly produced by the Ministry of Information.
From these, it is clear that the British favoured a ‘softly-softly’
approach, reporting on British successes in the war and highlighting
German cruelties. Issue 7 of 31 August 1940 spoke of political develop-
ments in France, in particular the emergence of the out-and-out
collaborators at Paris:
Il est évident que Paris est aujourd’hui en rivalité avec Vichy – exactement
comme la Commune était en rivalité avec le gouvernement légal de
Versailles en 1871. Seulement, aujourd’hui, quels sont les maîtres de
Paris?191
The answer was Doriot and Bergerey [sic], the editors and ideologues
of such papers as La France au Travail [sic] and L’Oeuvre. Issue number
8 of the Journal du Camp, 1 August 1940, spoke of how Vichy’s efforts
to mollify the invader ‘ne racontrent que le sarcasme, cynisme et
menaces de repression futures’.192 After announcing that leading
members of the Third Republic were going to be put on trial, the
journal referred to a ‘mécontentement général de la population’. In a
further comment on life in occupied France, the paper reported on
high unemployment in the unoccupied zone, angry crowds gathering
at factories, food shortages and demonstrations, especially at Marseille,
Lyon and Clermont-Ferrand. Ominously, the report concluded by
remarking that many firearms had not been handed in to the authori-
ties.
In preparing such propaganda, the Ministry of Information was not
short of advice from interested parties. Having spoken to the French
admirals at Oxford, Lord Astor urged that the following points be
borne in mind:
• That de Gaulle is unknown and a young man. Reply: Among other
things, when Napoleon started his career his contemporaries probably
said exactly the same thing.
• The French navy would never have yielded a ship to Germany even if
they had been allowed to return to France. Reply: If we were able to
seize the ships Germany could have done so, especially if the ships had
been laid up temporarily and the crews demobilised.
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• Continue emphasising the treachery of Hitler. The French don’t half
understand that. Remind them that Hitler has murdered the young
Nazi colleagues when he thought this necessary, has deceived his own
general public, has bumped off his own German generals, etc. It is
most important to keep rubbing this in: also to explain how Hitler
took in the aged Hindenburg.
• Need to prepare the French for the starvation which is coming this
winter – this due to Hitler, not to Great Britain.193
Whether this advice was heeded remains unclear, but it is known that
the Journal du Camp gave way to a far more impressive publication,
entitled France, which had the look and feel of a proper newspaper,
being produced on Fleet Street presses. Something of the controversy
over this newspaper, its left-wing stance and occasional criticism of de
Gaulle, will be tackled in Chapter 5; what should be noted here is its
impact on the morale of French troops. French Welfare was upbeat,
remarking that this fledgeling paper was ‘quite a success and is being
freely distributed in all of the camps although the news items are read
with some scepticism’.194 That scepticism was perhaps more deep-
rooted than French Welfare cared to acknowledge. In the words of
John Christie, the lecturer seconded to the Liverpool camps, the paper
was regarded as nothing more than ‘English propaganda’ and was
widely ignored.195 It is in the Spears papers that a copy of France, recov-
ered from one of the camps, may be found with the handwritten
injunction, ‘Lire entre les lignes.’196 Beside the phrase ‘Paroles d’un
chef’, the word ‘chef’ crossed out, is added ‘acheté par l’Angleterre’;
‘L’ex’ is placed before ‘Général de Gaulle’. On the reporting of the
blockade, there is appended the following, ‘Voilà comment les anglais
traitent nos femmes et nos enfants en France. C’est vrai que M. de
Gaulle lui ne risque rien. Les lieux sont bien au chaud en Angleterre.’
Blond reports that when at Blackpool, officers read collaborationist
papers such as Gringoire and Candide, which had been smuggled off
French ships in Liverpool port.197
Repatriation
With such a lacklustre response, Whitehall focused less on promoting
Franco-British understanding and more on repatriation, despite the
episode of the Meknès. Several other factors concentrated minds on this
possibility. An unsigned report of 5 September 1940, for the CFR,
remarked that the War Office, Admiralty and French Welfare all agreed
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‘that repatriation is as urgent as ever, more so in view of air raids’.198
There was also the problem of morale. While a good number of the
sailors were out of the public eye in Liverpool, in London it was learned
that the French wounded from White City were threatening to demon-
strate in front of the American embassy in Grosvenor Square to win
over US public opinion and so bring pressure to bear on London to
facilitate their speedy resettlement.199 Moves were quickly put into
place to ensure that large numbers of the internees at White City did
not abscond. Conditions in that particular camp were recognised to be
reasonable; the same was not true elsewhere. In view of the coming
winter, which was likely to prove especially cold, the British agreed that
it would no longer do to have large numbers of men sleeping in their
tents ‘under the stars’. Should the sailors outstay their welcome into the
new year, they would have to be found new homes and would become
an even costlier burden with still no prospect of them joining de
Gaulle. 
A further impetus to repatriation sprang from the wish to clamp
down on the behaviour of the Vichy consuls, especially in Liverpool.
Here, the Naval Liaison complained that 300 ratings, who had disap-
peared from Aintree and elsewhere, had been demobilised by the
French consulate.200 The consulate apparently had ready the necessary
English documentation for the men to travel on Portuguese and
Japanese steamers, and thus back to France.201 French officers were also
assisting illegal repatriation. Léon Wilson recalls that when recuperat-
ing in a hospital outside London, after being rescued at Dunkirk, senior
ranks mentioned to him that they could assist him in returning
home.202 What is astonishing is that the British should have allowed
such behaviour to go unchecked although, as will be seen in Chapter 4,
eventually the Liverpool consulate, along with those at Glasgow and
Cardiff, was relocated out of harm’s way.
While the Vichy consuls might have done their bit to ease repatria-
tion, their government took retaliatory action. In addition to a feeble
bombing of Gibraltar in revenge for Mers-el-Kébir, on 3 July the
French seized six British-registered ships on the West African coast. On
1 August, the steamships Hermes and Temple Pier were held at Algiers,
and their crews detained at Camp Carnot. While the Hermes had 12
British seamen on board and 57 from Calcutta, the Temple Pier’s crew
comprised 40 British ratings, including some Lascars. Through the
American Consul General in Algiers, it was learned that ‘the official
reason for detention of crews of the two vessels is given as alleged ill
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treatment of French officers and sailors in a detention camp at
Liverpool. The Consul General states that such allegations are
contributing to a growing animosity against British subjects in French
naval circles, even among persons who have hitherto been favourably
inclined.’203 US representatives had thus been asked to look after the
crews and help arrange their repatriation. Meanwhile, in Beirut, the
French had seized the crews of the Brodwal, Pegasus and Lesbian.
Whereas the ratings had been interned, the officers had succeeded in
obtaining parole and were living in a hotel. By early October, much to
the dismay of the Ministry of Shipping, there had been little success in
obtaining the release of British sailors in either Algeria or the Lebanon,
and it urged that a full enquiry be made into the conditions at the
Liverpool camp to refute the French allegations.204
Although events in Africa called for an early release of the French
sailors in Britain, this was no easy matter. To begin with, the men had
to be rounded up. Theoretically, this should have been an easy task, yet
the lack of discipline in the camps meant that several men had gone
AWOL. Blond recalls that he travelled to London, and went to see
Stoke City play football.205 Watkins was alarmed to learn that some 500
sailors had returned late one evening after their passes had expired.206
At Haydock, it was reported that 4 officers and 75 men were ‘adrift’,
even though provisions had been allocated to these individuals for
some time. It was thought possible that they had already been demo-
bilised by the French Consulate-General in Liverpool or that they had
joined either the Free French or the British armed forces without
Watkins knowing. Blame, it was agreed, could not be attached to the
British commandant as he had only one officer and 10 men to run the
whole settlement. At Arrowe Park, a further four French officers were
reported missing; another two had gone for two weeks, and it was
supposed they had been repatriated by the French consul. For his part,
Knoblock claimed some 300 men were at large in the Manchester area,
many of whom were no longer wearing uniform.207 He had no doubt
where blame lay: ‘French commandants are very lax about keeping a
proper list of the men in their camps.’ Roll-calls were perfunctory and
rare. ‘It will give the police a lot of work to round these men up’, he
moaned. ‘If they are not caught they will ultimately become a charge to
the community, or, what is worse still, will fall into bad habits and end
by being imprisoned.’ This was also the concern of MI5 whose officers
periodically dressed up as refugees and took to the streets of Soho
where they mingled with French sailors, eventually asking them to
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produce identity papers to prove that they were with de Gaulle, netting
both Free French deserters and escapees from White City and else-
where.208
The other problem holding back repatriation was the fact that the
Germans would give no guarantees for a safe passage.209 It will be
recalled that on 24 July, the Meknès, carrying French repatriates, was
sunk by an E-boat. Rather than send the men back to the camps from
which they came, they were billeted in Plymouth, Portsmouth and
Skegness.210 Guy Millard, a former Foreign Office official conscripted
into the navy, witnessed the survivors arrive at Skegness.211 The men
were in an ‘appalling condition’, many without shoes, some half naked,
others in women’s clothes; the officers, however, were still in uniform,
having taken to the lifeboats first. The mood at Skegness was downcast
except for the behaviour of one homosexual British guardsman who
organised concert parties, and delighted in saying, ‘500 sailors in this
camp and every one of them normal except me’.212
Repatriation was not helped by the fact that Vichy subsequently
impounded two British boats that had been earmarked for the task. As
a leaflet for the men in the Crystal Palace camp explained, London and
Vichy now intended to use French boats, presently in US waters, for
repatriation purposes.213 Given the ensuing difficulties over the suit-
ability of the boats to be deployed, the suspicion arises that Vichy itself
wanted to prolong the repatriation process as long as possible so as to
create good anti-British propaganda. It also appears that, at one point,
the Pétain regime hoped to break the British blockade by loading the
boats with supplies from Canada and the USA, a move that was scup-
pered with the assistance of the Americans themselves.214 Such delaying
tactics naturally played badly with the British, one high-ranking official
suggesting that the men should simply be dumped on a Moroccan
beach.215
The first men to be successfully repatriated were those invalided
soldiers at White City, who left, via Liverpool, on 16–18 September.
Watching the scenes by the quayside, Knoblock, Noble Hall and Hugh
Astor, all of French Welfare, were not impressed: ‘too many official
fingers in the pie’.216 First to arrive, on the morning of 16 September,
were the grands blessés on stretchers. Rather than being embarked as
quickly as possible they ‘were kept waiting for some time on the floor
of the outer shed where it was cold and drafty’. The French medical
officer and the MI5 officer soon fell out with one another, the latter
making matters worse by his ‘tactlessness’. In Knoblock’s eyes, he was
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clearly not up to the job and went off in a ‘huff’, eventually turning up
late in the afternoon ‘and then did nothing but strut around’. While the
examination of the men’s luggage passed off without incident, it soon
became clear that the Vichy consul did not have enough French
currency to distribute. So it was that Western Command in Chester
provided some 3 million francs to bail out the situation. The next day,
17 September, was the ‘most strenuous’ as it was then that the bulk of
the troops from White City appeared. Arriving by train early in the
afternoon, they had a five-and-a-half hour wait before embarking.
They were remarkably patient despite the fact there was ‘no food, no
drink, no way to get it to them’. Apparently the Salvation Army had
been asked to provide a mobile canteen, but had refused on learning
the men were not joining de Gaulle. ‘A strange attitude’, observed
Knoblock, ‘for an institution that prides itself on following the Good
Samaritan’s example.’ Customs and the censoring of papers followed,
both procedures proving farcical, although one man was caught in
possession of a bag of diamonds. The next day further special cases
boarded the ships, the Sphinx and the Canada, which were ready to set
sail. When they did, ‘Nazi planes appeared, and amused themselves by
trying to bomb us – an effort which, luckily for our French friends as
well as for ourselves, was not successful.’ For future embarkations,
Knoblock recommended the changing of money at the original camps
whence the men came, the provision of mobile canteens (at least two,
providing coffee as ‘they don’t like tea’), and the distribution of gifts
such as cigarettes and playing cards at the London stations.
Whether these recommendations were implemented remains
unclear. It is known that from November onwards the steamers
Canada, Djenne, Winnipeg and Massilia, the famous vessel that had
carried a small number of parliamentarians from Bordeaux to North
Africa, were kept busy ferrying men back to France. By Christmas 1940,
6,574 officers and men had been repatriated, and the French camps
were closed down.217
One unexpected upshot of their departure was that the British made
a determined effort to improve the lot of Gaullist troops at Aldershot
and Camberley. When attempts had initially been made to encourage
families to show hospitality to these men, it quickly became clear that
the public did not distinguish between Free French volunteers and
those servicemen desirous to get home, admittedly a difficult task as
their uniforms were more or less identical bar the Cross of Lorraine, a
point of detail also picked up by the reporters for Mass-Observation.218
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As Bessborough remarked of the aid given to sailors in northern
England, ‘helping the French came wrongly to be regarded in the
minds of some as service to a body of people who preferred to endeav-
our to return to their homes than to continue to fight against
Germany’,219 a sentiment no doubt reinforced by reporting in the Daily
Express which had labelled the sailors ‘fifth columnists’.220 Similar
sentiments were expressed by an outraged vicar from Chester who
noted how French sailors near to his parish freely moved around and
were housed in ‘first-class army bell tents’ on which were inscribed the
signs ‘Nous voulons rentrer en France’.221 Further worrying news came
from a Ministry of Information poll of January 1941, which displayed
that the public, while overwhelmingly against Vichy, were 40 per cent
pro-de Gaulle, 30 per cent anti-de Gaulle and 30 per cent uninterested.
Nearly everyone canvassed believed that Anglo-French friendship in
the future was either unlikely or undesirable.222 In this regard, it is not
difficult to believe that the role of other nationalities in Britain
damaged the Gaullist cause. At the height of the Battle of Britain,
though the heroics of Pierre Clostermann were always accepted, it
seemed in government newsreels that only Czech and Polish airmen
were flying alongside the RAF.223 This courage contrasted badly with
the lack of organisation displayed at Dakar, which, according to Mass-
Observation, had given rise to a general feeling that de Gaulle’s men
were ‘ineffectual’.224
To promote better relations between the Free French and the British,
in early 1941 commanding officers of units near Aldershot and
Camberley were instructed to invite their French counterparts to ‘regi-
mental dances, concerts and other functions’. In addition, families in
the neighbourhood, especially those who understood French, were
encouraged to take the men ‘to their homes for meals and friendly
visits’.225 This proved highly successful. In February 1941, the whole of
the Free French army in England was given seven days’ leave, and virtu-
ally all the men were placed with families where they were surprised by
the levels of ‘generosity, hospitality and kindness shown to them by the
average English person’. Such temporary billeting continued through-
out the war. Georges Le Poittevin remembers how he stayed for a week
at Wembley among a family who treated him as though their own
son.226 To encourage further fraternisation, trips were organised to the
local countryside, including picnics on the Thames between Reading
and Shillingford.227 Within the camps themselves, the AVF, a Franco-
British initiative, which we shall meet later in Chapter 5, was especially
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active in improving facilities: better sleeping arrangements; more
frequent post; and greater entertainments. In July 1943, Lieutenant-
Colonel Black could say of Camberley, ‘The camp is in good order and
calls for no remarks; the messing of both officers and men is better than
I have known in any camp.’228 In December that year, he once again
remarked on the ‘very good order’ of Old Dean Camp, ‘a very different
state of affairs to formerly’, and commented on how the 1,000 or so
men were rapidly dispersing to elsewhere in the country, presumably in
readiness for the invasion of Europe, thus necessitating the running
down of the site.229
Conclusions
Ironically, the poor behaviour of service personnel awaiting repatria-
tion had favoured the Free French, although it is certain de Gaulle
would have preferred more recruits. These were never forthcoming.
The overwhelming majority of French servicemen stranded in Britain
at the time of the Armistice and Mers-el-Kébir always wanted to return
home, regardless of the discomforts that awaited them on their arrival,
and it is not difficult to ascertain why. Gaullist and British propaganda
had been inept; the influence of the Pétainist officers had been discon-
certing; conditions in the camps had been demoralising; boredom had
set in; there was a desire to reunite with lost families; the war was
considered lost; money was in short supply; de Gaulle himself seemed
a dangerous element; Britain appeared untrustworthy, especially after
Oran; there was peer pressure to avoid enlisting with ‘perfidious
Albion’; and the manner of their original round-up still rankled. Yet
whatever the rights and wrongs of these matters, it is hard not to feel a
certain smidgen of pity for the exiled servicemen. They had not chosen
to be in Britain, they endured a hard life in the camps, and knew little
of the wider events of the war. If they had been able to forecast events,
it is possible that more would have remained. For their part, the British
had little wish that they should stay for any longer than was necessary
and, to a point, sympathised with their plight, although little was done
to improve matters within the camps themselves. When, in early
August 1940, unfavourable reports of life in the Liverpool region
reached Downing Street, they did not concern Cabinet long; this
instead was a matter for French Welfare.230 Although de Gaulle
thought differently, during that autumn Britain had more pressing
worries than the concerns of stranded French sailors and seamen.
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As a postscript, it is worth noting here the insubstantiality of the
claims, peddled by Je Suis Partout, that Britain was behind the assassi-
nation of Darlan in December 1942 in an act of revenge for the failure
to recruit among French personnel in 1940.231 Such allegations say
more about the desperate and fabulous nature of collaborationist prop-
aganda. Nonetheless, this Anglophobia was very real and was to be
replicated among the French consulates still present in London and
elsewhere in the period 1940–42.
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4
The surveillance of exile:
the Vichy consulates
Whom have you come here to insult? England in her people or France in
her exile? Leave freedom in peace!
(Victor Hugo on Napoleon III’s visit to England)1
The history of Vichy at London is usually told as the secretive and
mysterious negotiations conducted in late 1940 between Churchill and
Pétain, a line of communication manned by such self-appointed inter-
mediaries as the Canadian diplomat Jean Dupuy and the enigmatic
Professor Louis Rougier. This is the so-called ‘double game’ strategy,
the notion that Pétain hoodwinked the Germans by professing his
genuine interest in collaboration while persuading Britain to ease its
blockade on France and so allow General de Gaulle to carry the torch
of resistance overseas. Contrary to what is sometimes thought, the
double-game theory was not an invention unveiled at the marshal’s
trial in 1945 by his defence lawyer Jacques Isorni; instead it originated
in the minds of those Pétainists of the first hour who refused to believe
that their hero was consorting with the Germans unless he possessed
some ulterior motive, especially when he met Hitler at the hitherto
unknown railway station of Montoire-sur-Loir on 24 October 1940,
their railway carriage parked conveniently near a tunnel so it could be
shunted to safety should the RAF appear on the horizon. Jules Roy
remembers being informed, ‘trust the old fox, he’s going to con
Adolf’.2 While chastising Pétain for his government’s anti-Semitism, as
late as 1942 the right-wing Resistance journal Défense de la France,
founded in the cellars of the Sorbonne, acknowledged that in his
foreign policy the marshal was ‘resisting’ and that this was ‘too shrewd
a game to be played in public’.3 It was, though, those unreconstructed
Pétainists such as Isorni, Rougier and Louis-Dominique Girard who, in
the aftermath of the marshal’s disgrace of 1945, resuscitated the
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mythology of a double game. Girard, a former member of Pétain’s
entourage and later the author of a sensationalist biography of his hero,
disclosing details of the marshal’s many mistresses,4 encapsulated the
sense of this supposed diplomacy in the title of his 1947 publication,
Montoire. Verdun diplomatique?5 a work that so scandalised the
Ministry of the Interior that it was classified alongside works of
pornography and thus banned from being displayed in shop windows.6
It is tempting to believe that had it really contained erotica rather than
dreary, and forged, annexes about Franco-British relations then the
senile old man, held prisoner on the Île d’Yeu, and suffering from
visions of naked women, would have bothered to read it. When
presented with a copy by his wife, he put it to one side complaining that
it was far too long; only later did he enthuse about its contents, and
even then it is unclear whether he had actually read the thing. After all,
reading had never been his forte, unless it was the romantic tales of Sir
Walter Scott.
The sterling endeavours of diplomatic historians, notably R. T.
Thomas, Jean-Baptiste Duroselle and Robert Frank, have since exposed
the double-game theory as pure fantasy, something dreamt up in the
febrile minds of purblind maréchalistes.7 While it is certain that
London maintained a dialogue with Vichy during 1940, this was in the
forlorn hope, entertained most especially by the Foreign Office, which
despaired of de Gaulle, that the marshal’s regime might reconstitute
itself in Algeria, taking the sizeable French navy with it. Pétain would
have none of this. In unconscious imitation of Lord Nelson, another
warrior keen to thwart Anglo-French understanding who placed his
blind eye to the telescope and declared ‘I see no ships’, in December
1940 the Vichy leader immediately denied having received proposals
from Churchill stating that Britain would assist France militarily so
long as it re-entered the fight from North Africa.8
There remains an underside to this London–Vichy dialogue, a story
that has never been told and which has been previously dismissed as
unimportant, namely the life of those Vichy consuls, both in London
and other major cities, who remained in Britain after the severing of
diplomatic relations in July 1940. Certainly de Gaulle was wary of their
presence. While the soot-stained brick frontage of the Vichy consulate
in Bedford Square could not compare with the Regency grandeur of the
white-marbled Carlton Gardens, the very presence of these officials was
a source of discomfort and a reminder of his own parlous position.
That few volunteers, whether expatriates or the marooned sailors of
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Narvik and Dunkirk, enlisted in the Free French was frequently blamed
on these consuls, notably those at London, Liverpool and Newcastle,
who were believed to be illegally assisting refugees and service person-
nel with repatriation. With hindsight, it is easy to scoff at such
paranoia, but it was perfectly understandable, given the general’s
precarious footing, and was to some extent justified. It should be
further stressed that the British, too, kept a close watch on the consular
staff, fearful lest they constituted a fifth column and instigated discon-
tent among the many French communities.
This is the history of that potential fifth column. Rather than being
the story of secretive, double-talk conversations between London and
Vichy conducted by shady emissaries, it is an illustration of how the
remorseless wheels of petty bureaucracy – form-filling, passport appli-
cations and personal references – kept turning despite the breakdown
of diplomatic relations. The history of the consuls is also that of unin-
spiring men, caught up in bewildering circumstances, who had to
please two masters, Vichy and the British, and who inevitably ended up
satisfying neither. It is, moreover, a tale of subterfuge, a deliberate
attempt to promote Pétainist sentiment among the French in Britain
and, indeed, on occasion, to assist with repatriation. Whether the
Vichy consuls were engaged in more nefarious activities – the compil-
ing of lists of Gaullist and Allied sympathisers in order that retaliatory
action could be taken against their families in France, and the passing
on of military and political intelligence – remains a moot point. 
The diplomatic community in London: adieu
On 26 June 1940, a day after the terms of the Franco-German Armistice
had been broadcast, a po-faced Charles Corbin, French ambassador to
Britain and a veteran advocate of Anglo-French friendship, made his
way to the Foreign Office. There he was received by the Foreign
Secretary Lord Halifax, to whom he made known both his resignation,
a ‘sad decision’, and the urgent need for ‘new representation in
London’.9 The embassy, he continued, would for the time being be
placed in the capable hands of Roger Cambon, the descendant of a long
line of Cambons who had worked for the entente cordiale, although it
was not long before he too had resigned.10 Both men had quickly
understood what the new Pétain administration augured. For his part,
Cambon remained in London throughout the war, never missing an air
raid even at the height of the Blitz.11 Corbin persevered in Britain until
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July 1940, when he made his ‘tender farewell’ to diplomatic friends and
colleagues.12 Believing it undiplomatic to remain in a nation that had
repeatedly attacked his own country – both on the airwaves and on the
sea where the Royal Navy imposed a strict blockade – he eventually
resurfaced in Rio de Janeiro in mid-August 1940. It is sometimes
claimed, notably by de Gaulle’s biographer Jean Lacouture, that he
remained in South America for the duration of the war.13 This was not
the case.14 Increasingly despondent at the situation in France, in late
1940 he published a statement from Brazil, which in private he denied,
claiming that he was awaiting instructions from Pétain to serve in some
capacity at Vichy.15 February 1941 found Corbin in Lisbon en route to
France, a journey that dismayed Daniel Roché, the Anglophile second
secretary of the French legation in Dublin, who feared the former
ambassador would be arrested by the Germans on trumped-up charges
pounded out of his one-time London colleagues.16 In a meeting with
Sir Ronald Campbell, British ambassador at Lisbon, Corbin consti-
tuted a sorrowful picture: ‘he struck me as rather bitter and distinctly
flabby . . . There is no fight in him and he gives the impression of a
broken man.’17 Haunted by Mers-el-Kébir and Dakar, he harped on
about ‘the ghastly spectacle of starving children’, their condition a
direct result of Britain’s blockade. A month later, in Madrid, he like-
wise struck Sir Samuel Hoare, ambassador to Spain, as ‘defeatist’,
arguing that while Britain might not be beaten, Germany was ‘invinci-
ble’.18 Once in France, it was believed his ‘black mood’ lifted and in
1942 it was rumoured that he had the good sense to turn down an offer
from Pétain to become Vichy’s representative in Washington, prefer-
ring retirement in the south of France where in his private
correspondence, which seems to have been read by the British, he
readily criticised the marshal’s policies.19
With Corbin, an open admirer of British tradition and culture,
unwilling to make a categorical stand against Vichy, what hope was
there for the other French representatives in London, the several
hundred or so staff of the embassy (typists, clerks as well as professional
diplomats), and the predominantly military contingent, some seven to
eight hundred strong, who belonged to the naval, air and military
missions that had arrived with the outbreak of war, and who had often
mobilised members of the existing French colony ‘en place’?20
Disturbing reports of anti-British behaviour, especially on the part of
the military missions, many of whom were not full-fledged diplomats
but still enjoyed diplomatic immunity, arrived on the desks of govern-
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ment officials thick and fast in June/July 1940. In the lull between the
creation of the Pétain government and the declaration of the Armistice,
Sir Desmond Morton was visited by John Miller, a chartered account-
ant attached to the French Military Purchasing Commission, who
reported how two members of that body, a Colonel M— and A—
W— , had been making ‘the most bitter remarks about this country’
and were looking to leave as quickly and ‘as unobtrusively as possi-
ble’.21 Together, these men had asked Miller to draw cheques to the
value of 4,200 sterling, all in one-pound notes, valuable foreign
currency for the French government, and had requested lists of all
purchases made by the French Armaments Commission in this
country, sensitive information that disclosed the whereabouts of war
industries. The prime minister himself had been alarmed by these
developments, and was personally convinced that members of the
missions ‘were actively working against our interests’.22 Further
evidence was soon at hand. On 6 July, the French chargé d’affaires
complained about the treatment of one diplomat who, on the initiative
of MI5, had been stopped while embarking for France and questioned
at length about the materials he was carrying in his diplomatic bag, and
at Vichy there were complaints that personnel of the naval mission had
been arrested for speaking in Breton to sailors.23 While cases of poten-
tial spies were relatively few, the possibility of French representatives
distributing anti-de Gaulle propaganda remained ever present. In late
July 1940, the Foreign Office flatly turned down a request from the
French consul for five non-commissioned officers from the missions to
visit troops at White City to handle the distribution of wages lest they
peddled anti-Allied sentiments.24
At least on this occasion, the proper diplomatic channels had been
deployed. On 4 July, a day after Mers-el-Kébir, Corporal Boyle of the
Field Security Police filed a report on a recent incident at Olympia
where de Gaulle was recruiting.25 Three suspects had been held after
breaking into the barracks. They claimed to belong to the French naval
mission, but it transpired they were clerks attached to the French naval
attaché, living at the nearby Maison of the Institut Français. While
none of the men had national registration cards, they were all carrying
diplomatic passes issued by the embassy. The ringleader, a thirty-four
year old, who claimed to have been living in England for seven years,
said their task had simply been to contact a particular officer, whose
name he refused to surrender. It soon transpired, however, that their
real job was to discover the number of ratings there and to distribute
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‘seditious propaganda’. Witnesses reported how the men had claimed
that it was unpatriotic to fight for de Gaulle; he was not their leader; the
English had let them down. One even had the temerity to quiz an
English sergeant on the whereabouts of British regiments. The three
men also possessed considerable quantities of cash for purposes they
would not disclose. They were detained overnight, apparently in the
lavatories. When police called on one of the men’s wives, she was quite
unsurprised that her husband had been arrested. His release, and that
of the others, was secured by two senior officers of the naval attaché,
although this did not prevent a furious exchange of words with a Free
French colonel who questioned the diplomatic immunity of the naval
mission.
It is highly possible the above men were in the employ of Capitaine
de Vaisseau de Rivoyre, former naval attaché to the French embassy,
who quickly decided against joining de Gaulle, placing his trust instead
in French civilisation, which he hoped would ultimately defeat the
barbarian.26 It is more likely that such talk hid a defeatist attitude,
which was revealed in a leaflet he designed for Olympia.27 In this, he
claimed that men were being persuaded to support the Allied cause by
‘false representation’, that de Gaulle was under warrant of arrest, and
that war would shortly commence between Britain and France; so it
was that Frenchmen who had enlisted in de Gaulle’s forces, despite
their ships having been seized by the British, would soon be fighting
their brothers. As Maurice Hankey wryly observed, ‘Olympia seems to
have been fairly lively.’28 In a similar vein, another high-ranking
member of the naval mission was belatedly discovered to have been
distributing a letter among sailors at Southampton warning that they
would be treated as francs-tireurs if they joined de Gaulle.29 None of
these propagandists quite managed to live up to the sinister image of
one ‘little fellow with a bandage on his head’, originally a native of
Jersey, perhaps a member of the naval mission, working as interpreter
among French sailors at Euston station where he also dished out
defeatist opinions to anyone who would listen.30
Given these anecdotes, it is little surprise that few among the diplo-
matic staff and the missions volunteered for either de Gaulle or the
British. On 10 July 1940, an ad hoc meeting of the Vansittart
Committee noted that a mere ‘eight members of the French
Armaments Mission had placed their services unconditionally at the
disposal of His Majesty’s Government’.31 A similar number had
requested permission to leave for the USA. Nor is it any surprise that
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their numbers should have been so low. The example of Corbin was
hardly inspiring. As François Coulet observed, there was also a strong
sense of collective discipline among the diplomatic staff: it was their
professional responsibility to obey their government’s orders, even if
they were uncomfortable with them.32 Walking along the corridors of
the French embassy on 17 June 1940, shortly after the broadcast of
Pétain’s speech, Robert Mengin overheard one military attaché remark,
‘In wartime, a man can’t just resign. Resignation equals desertion. One
receives an order, one carries it out, and no nonsense.’33 Mengin
himself sought a return to France in order to be reunited with his baby
in Brittany, but on arriving at Plymouth in early July 1940 he could not
find a single French sailor in sight as ‘they were all behind bars – prison
bars’.34 More British-based diplomats might have broken ranks and
put aside family worries had their colleagues within France come to
Britain. This was not to be. Lacouture cites the example of Roland de
Margerie, a professional civil servant, an associate of Reynaud and an
early admirer of de Gaulle, who ultimately considered it his duty to
serve his country in France not in London, much the same decision
that was reached by the famous resister Jean Moulin who stayed at his
prefectoral post at Chartres only to be ousted by Vichy in October
1940.35 Nor did de Gaulle – the ‘rebel’, the ‘dissident’, the ‘unknown
quantity’ – cut much ice with a body of men accustomed to following
orders, and who had not figured explicitly in his appeal of 18 June
when he called on ‘soldiers, engineers and skilled workers of the arma-
ments industries’ to join his cause.36 Lacouture suggests that it was
unfortunate that the general cancelled a dinner party with leading
diplomats in early July.37 Yet given de Gaulle’s failure to recruit when
he visited the servicemen’s camps, this remains a dubious argument.
His autocratic and high-minded attitude might further have damaged
his cause. It was partially this that alienated Aléxis de Léger, secretary-
general of the Quai d’Orsay, who met with de Gaulle on 22 June, and
who quickly decided his destiny lay in the USA. Léger was courageous
in his decision. Other diplomats were fearful for their families in
France. Miller, the accountant who spoke with Morton, mentioned
that those officials with relatives in southern and central France were
keen to be reunited as soon as possible so as to safeguard their collec-
tive futures.38 Those with kin in occupied France apparently believed
they could ensure their families’ safety by trading information about
Britain to the Gestapo. Such anxieties were also noted by other British
observers, Noel Baker wondering whether the missions should be
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outwardly ‘interned’, yet privately allowed to go about their business
and help the Allied cause, so as to give these men and their families the
necessary ‘cover’.39
There remains a further reason why a majority of the diplomatic and
mission staff were unwilling to rally to the Allied cause, that is a latent
anti-British sentiment. This might seem strange emanating from a
body of men led by such eminent Anglophiles as Corbin and Cambon,
and which included such characters as Paul Morand, a member of the
Economic Mission, and a man fascinated by the Anglo-Saxon world,
having written eloquently about London and his travels in the USA.40
Mengin recalls how none of the senior embassy staff wanted to be the
one who had to hand over the papers breaking off relations with the
UK.41 Moreover, several of these officials had been selected precisely
because of their command of the English language and knowledge of
English customs. Perhaps the answer to this question is again supplied
by Mengin, who stayed in London throughout the war, without joining
de Gaulle.42 When, in September 1939, he travelled to Britain from
France he was struck by the contrast between the mournful atmosphere
he had observed in Paris and the gaiety in London. His diplomatic
colleagues had an answer: ‘The English did not have 6 million men
mobilized; and anyway they are insensitive, a stolid lot.’43 Such views
were replicated in a document authored by Morand in July 1940 and
intended for his Pétainist masters, but which was known to the British.
Set in the context of the explosive events of that summer, this painted
‘a most disparaging report about the French embassy in London’.44
If members of the diplomatic staff and the missions were eager to
leave, the British were only too glad to assist them in this whenever
possible. Vichy was also anxious to help with resettlement, at least in
the case of the diplomatic personnel, contrasting with the lethargic
manner in which the regime approached the question of repatriating
servicemen, suggesting that those stranded soldiers and sailors made
good anti-British propaganda. So it was in later July that the diplomatic
staff, accompanied by their families, congregated at Addison Road
station in North London, significantly not one of the main termini
where they might have become the target for public hostility, to catch
a train for Liverpool docks.45 All in all, some 600 or so embassy person-
nel quit in total, sailing on the Orduna on 19 July and arriving at Lisbon
four days later.46 The missions were, however, another matter, largely
because many of them were in possession of sensitive military intelli-
gence.47 Thanks to this, in early July 1940 the War Cabinet discussed
148 The forgotten French
2499 Chap4  7/4/03  2:44 pm  Page 148
the possibility of segregating elements of the missions, some to be
accommodated in Cheltenham Ladies’ College where they could cause
no mischief; the girls, it should be added, had already been evacuated
preventing mischief of another nature.48 It was appreciated, however,
that the numbers to be isolated should stay small so as not to alienate
any French who might wish to join the Allied cause.49 When news of
possible segregation reached the French chargé d’affaires, he vigorously
protested, pointing out that these individuals could ‘hardly swim
across the Channel’.50 It may well have unsettled members of the
missions themselves. Spears drew a graph of the mood of these men for
the period 27 June to 19 July plotting how their morale passed through
‘unshakeable resolve’, ‘determination’, ‘prudent mood’, ‘dolce’,
‘procrastination’, ‘flaccid’, and ‘complete negation of all action’;
appended is a handwritten cartoon of two particularly fortunate
members of the mission, granted permission to leave in July, sailing
away from Angleterre cocking a snook at their former home.51 News of
segregation also seemed to have caused consternation among ‘well-
disposed elements’ of the London-based colony, giving rise to
unfounded fears about general internment.52 In the event, British
action was not draconian. A small number, ten altogether, who had
been engaged in subversive activities, such as Capitaine de Vaisseau de
Rivoyre, were to be detained for the duration of the war,53 although it
seems that most of these were repatriated at the close of the year. Those
pertaining to ‘the Food, Textiles, Oil, Timber, Coal, Economic Warfare
and Sea Transport Missions, together with the French Representatives
of the Air and Shipping Executive Committees’ were free to leave
immediately if they so desired.54 Non-commissioned officers, other
ranks and civilian personnel of the military, naval, air and armaments
missions were also given grace to depart. Officers and senior personnel
belonging to these bodies were, however, to be detained, at least for the
time being. It was proposed to repatriate these officials after a three-
month time lag by when the information they possessed would be out
of date.
Interestingly, Vichy happily colluded in British plans. In 1940, the
regime was not prepared to surrender everything to the Germans, and
appreciated that knowledge about Anglo-French military capabilities
best remained out of harm’s way across the Channel. So it was that
several months elapsed before these individuals pertaining to the
missions were repatriated, via a boat to Marseilles, although by this
stage, December 1940, some had clearly developed cold feet about
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returning, opting instead to stay in London.55 Those kept indefinitely
belonged to the air mission, and included technical experts such as
Professor D— who deployed argument after argument to be allowed to
go home: to look after his ‘ophaned nephews’, to cater for his
students,56 and to tend for his wife.57 It was understood his real reason
was to take up a prestigious post at the Sorbonne, proving that the
unpropitious circumstances of enemy occupation are no bar to
academic ambition. All these complaints cut little ice with the Foreign
Office, and D— stayed. It should also be pointed out that the British
were eager to hold a small number of French back to trade them off for
the repatriation of British officials held in France.
With the departure of the embassy staff and the subsequent with-
drawal of the missions, Vichy no longer possessed any diplomatic
representation in London.58 This partially explains why those curious
London–Vichy dialogues were conducted through semi-official emis-
saries and the Spanish government. There remained, however, the UK
French consulates, which were designated to look after ‘various non-
political matters on behalf of Vichy’.59 Thought had been given to
expelling these straightaway given that British consular staff had been
ousted from French colonies in North and West Africa, as well as in the
unoccupied zone. Their stay of execution rested on the needs of those
large numbers of French who were based in the British Isles. In 1941,
the Foreign Office recorded that consulates were open in London,
Liverpool, Newcastle-on-Tyne, Cardiff, Swansea and Edinburgh,
together with representation in other large towns, some 15 consular
offices in total.60 The numbers of consular officials and their staff are
hard to assess, but may have amounted to over 200, most concentrated
in London. Some of the representatives were merely consular agents
who doubled up their day jobs with looking after immigration
enquiries and trading arrangements; the remainder were professional
diplomats, often well travelled around the globe. Additionally, a small
number of staff were retained in the liquidation missions appointed to
tidy up the financial aftermath of the Franco-British war effort: the
financial mission (8 people); the armaments mission (2); the sea trans-
port mission (7); the textiles mission (7); the food purchasing mission
(1); the petroleum mission (3); the coal and minerals mission (4); the
Liquidation des Services de l’Attaché Naval (2); and the Services de
l’Attaché de l’Air (1).61 What is extraordinary is that such a paltry
number of men and women were to cause so much trouble, and so
greatly agitate both the British and Free French.
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Map 3 The principal Vichy consular offices in 1940
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Agents consulaires or agents provocateurs?
With the breaking off of diplomatic relations, the British had antici-
pated that the consular staff would be headed by Paul Morand who
possessed the cumbersome title of Agent pour la liquidation des affaires
économiques et commerciales du gouvernement français en Grande
Bretagne.62 He, though, left for France on 19 July 1940 with the other
embassy staff.63 This was to the relief of the Germans who viewed him
as a ‘propagandiste anglophile’.64 It was also to the relief of the British
who had been perturbed by rumours that he was thinking of joining de
Gaulle.65 In British eyes, he was a defeatist, a ‘weak character’, who had
never concealed his pessimism from his staff.66 His leaving was ulti-
mately credited to the fact that he was a friend of Pierre Laval and was
in possession of property in both the German and Italian occupied
areas of France. Paradoxically for a man who, in 1940, had been
deemed self-interested and weak willed, a year later he would publish
Chroniques de l’homme maigre, a eulogy to self-discipline and a critique
of the indolence and lack of spirit among his fellow countrymen.
Morand’s place was taken by Jacques Chartier, a career civil servant,
and a conseiller in the French Diplomatic Service. He introduced
himself to the Foreign Office on 19 July 1940 where he cut a poor
impression, his initial concerns largely revolving around himself.
While he possessed a diplomatic passport and his British identification
papers were in order, he had lost his valued yellow pass as secretary-
general to Morand’s economic mission. Having purchased the car of
the ill-fated Captain de Rivoyre, who before his detention had taken to
inviting officers ‘of very good standing and family’ to his house where
he had put pressure on them to return to France,67 he was also anxious
for petrol coupons. He further wished his official title to be the same as
Morand’s, so that technically he was only acting head of the liquidation
missions, rather than acting head consul and thus Vichy’s chief diplo-
matic representative in Britain. Knowing what we do about the
pusillanimous nature of his character, which will become increasingly
clear in the ensuing pages, this might well have been because he wanted
an ambiguity to surround his position, enabling him to wriggle out of
any embarrassing situations. This was not easy to do. It was through
Chartier that Vichy quickly made known it would not accept the
accreditation of Neville Bland and W. H. B. Mack as consuls to Vichy,
unless mission staff were released immediately and the British desisted
from dropping propaganda leaflets on Morocco.68 To Vichy itself,
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Chartier feebly reported that London would not allow him to treat
current issues, and he later complained bitterly about his material lot.69
As we shall see, it was events in September 1940 that forced him to
acknowledge his wider responsibilities, although these never extended
to facilitating high-level Anglo-French dialogue as is sometimes
claimed in older histories.70
Initial reports about Chartier’s political attitude were not encourag-
ing. Like Morand, he was described as a defeatist, and the fact that he
had not brought his wife and children to England, despite their being
resident in the Normandy resort town of Trouville, only a short boat
trip across the Channel, counted against him. When asked about their
safety, he replied that the Germans would not harm them.71 It was
further known that he had not assisted those of his staff who wished to
stay in London, leaving them without money, and threatening them
with the prospect of a concentration camp should they ever wish to
return to their homeland. De Gaulle was also quizzed about Chartier.
While he admitted he did not know him, his men had quickly formed
the opinion that he ‘was more than pro-Vichy’.72
Although supposedly only acting head of the liquidation missions,
Chartier quickly conducted his own épuration of diplomatic staff in
Bedford Square. Through Roché in Dublin, who broke with Vichy in
October, it was learned that the new consul was trying to ‘get all the old
regime’ out of the Consulate-General, attention focusing especially on
Bougnet, a consul de carrière, who acted as an archivist.73 According to
Roché, a regular conduit of information about the goings-on among
Vichy consular staff, Bougnet was ‘a sound fellow’, anxious to stay in
London and facilitate Anglo-French relations, whereas Chartier
wanted him off his turf to take up the far-flung consular post in
Newcastle that had recently become vacant. When the Foreign Office
spoke to Chartier about this, he launched into a highly personal attack
on Bougnet, describing him as ‘lazy, obstinate, only intent on keeping
his post, where he drew a disproportionately high salary for doing
nothing’.74 Bougnet, he continued, exercised a destabilising effect on
his staff and refused to take orders. That Roger Cambon was asked to
vouch for the unpopular archivist was perhaps evidence of his pro-
British views, the real reason why Chartier wanted him out of London.
With such a man at the helm, it was inevitable that anti-British and
anti-Free French activities, practised by some of the mission staff,
should have continued. Nonetheless, it should be stressed that not all
consuls were so-minded, maybe because some were well integrated
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into British life; indeed, one or two were, in fact, British and immedi-
ately resigned their posts at the time of the Armistice, for instance a W.
B. D. Shackleton of Bradford who also worked as a solicitor.75 For those
who remained in position, autumn 1940 brought with it frequent visits
by local police officers, acting on the behalf of the Foreign Office. The
officers were encouraged, in general conversation while pretending to
be carrying out other duties, to press their interviewees on political
matters, a task that must have taxed the investigative capabilities of the
ordinary constables involved. Alternatively, intelligence had been gath-
ered by speaking to the consul’s associates and drinking partners.
Through such ham-fisted techniques, and through the tough leather
prose of police reports, it is subsequently possible to identify three
groups of consular officials. The first were those, notably at
Manchester, Birmingham, Swansea, Blyth and Brighton, who had
clearly flagged their pro-Allied sentiments, and who remained in post
merely for financial reasons or out of the belief that this was the best
way of harming Pétain’s cause. A good example is that of the Brighton
official, born in Saint-Sauvant in 1873 and a resident in Britain since
1916, who coupled his consular duties with acting as a minister in the
local French Protestant Church. For many years he had held extreme
Germanophobe views and regularly insulted Germans in the street. At
the time of Dunkirk, he had visited men in hospital and advised them
not to return to France. Although he had not resigned his office, he had
admitted this was only because he could not afford to lose his income,
and readily broadcast his admiration for de Gaulle.76
A second group of consuls were more ambiguous in their allegiance,
although it was clear the British had collated no hard evidence against
them. In North and South Shields, there were no grounds to ‘doubt’ the
consul’s pro-Allied views, maybe to be expected of a man with a Jewish
wife, but it was noted that he was generally uncommunicative and
unpopular with the locals; across in Sunderland, the consul, down on his
luck thanks to the war terminating his business activities and now to be
found working as a chauffeur, had grumbled that ‘England had not given
France all the help it might have done’, but that was it; and in Bristol, the
consul, who doubled up as teacher of French in a nearby secondary
school, had denounced the Pétain regime as a ‘puppet government’,
unrepresentative of the real France, while on other occasions he had been
far less willing to speak in such a manner, something that the police
thought in itself suspicious.77 In Folkestone, the consul himself was
thought to have definite ‘pro-British tendencies’, yet his son, a ‘brave’ boy
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who worked part-time as a messenger for the local air warden, had been
reported for defeatist talk, albeit only on one occasion. He was alleged to
have said that the ‘war was costing 6 millions a day and to save this it
would be better if we gave up and came under Germany as we should
probably be better ruled’.78 The air warden-cum-informant had subse-
quently been pressed to talk to the consul himself, but had been unwilling
to sharpen his investigative abilities further.
The third group of consuls were those known to be openly ‘working
actively against us’, assisting in the repatriation of servicemen and the
distribution of propaganda.79 Significantly, these were all professional,
career diplomats based in Swansea, Liverpool, Newcastle and Glasgow,
port towns and key strategic areas, where sizeable numbers of French
troops were stationed, both Free French and servicemen awaiting their
voyage home. From Newcastle emanated the report that the French
consul, one Jacques Le Serre, was refusing any assistance to sailors
anxious to get in touch with de Gaulle, and that such men were having
to be processed through Customs and Immigration.80 Over in Swansea,
the Consul Guy René Brun, who had been prevented from leaving the
country on account of the technical intelligence in his possession, had
quickly got himself ‘into trouble with the police by working against
General de Gaulle among French sailors at Falmouth’.81 MI5 had also
taken an interest in his case, discovering that he had occupied a
consular position in Saarbrucken, which he had been forced to vacate
because of currency irregularities.82 It was further uncovered that he
spoke good German, was in regular contact with three German women,
frequently spread anti-British views, and had devised pro-Vichy prop-
aganda for French merchant seamen.
Further north in Liverpool, the behaviour of the consul, Jacques
Dufort, was even more brazen. In early September 1940, Lieutenant-
Colonel Macbeth, in charge of Trentham Park, was amazed to be
visited by one of his internees who naively confessed that he had been
given permission by the consul to travel to Liverpool where a berth
awaited him on a steamer of the Yeoward Line along with his papers,
which were all in order.83 Even more naively, the man wanted to leave
immediately for the port in a lorry being used by de Gaulle’s recruiting
agents! Dufort also intervened in the case of one soldier in Carlisle who
had been required to attend the local police station on a weekly basis
where he had allegedly been pressurised into joining de Gaulle’s men.
This behaviour was ‘all the more regrettable’, continued the consul, as
the man in question had no intention of following these suggestions
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and had been declared ‘unfit’ for service.84 Such an intervention was
only one case among several.
The fullest report on consular misdeeds was filed by Glasgow police
in the case of Camille Henry Alfred Parent de Curzon.85 This minor
aristocrat had been in trouble with the authorities before. In 1937, the
police had received a report from the Italian tutor whom he employed
to coach his son. Fearful for his job and personal security should he
later go abroad, the hapless teacher complained that the consul was
making his life unbearable because of his republican and liberal views,
which conflicted with the monarchist politics of de Curzon himself and
his White Russian assistant, who worked as a caretaker in the consular
office. In 1940, the consul had interfered in the activities of the
Glasgow branch of the Franco-Scottish Society, which had organised a
campaign to raise money for French families whose menfolk were
fighting in the army. De Curzon had taken charge of this venture,
appointing a board of trustees, which was described as ‘very ill
selected’. On 10 September, the Executive Committee of the Franco-
Scottish Society, on which the consul sat ex officio, had assembled for
a meeting at which one of the members had suggested to de Curzon
that he should resign on ground of ill health and take a holiday. He had
replied that he was ‘too busy’. ‘Busy doing what?’, he was quizzed.
‘Writing reports’, he replied. ‘Writing reports about what and to
whom? You cannot have any communication with your government at
present.’ ‘I just file my reports for future reference’, adding he could
not afford a holiday. When the meeting got properly under way, it was
suggested that the Society should organise a series of lectures on ‘The
Spirit of France’, maybe inviting the former Popular Front minister,
Pierre Cot, to which the consul objected saying that this would be an
‘insult’ to his government, as would any lecture about the defeat of
France. To cool tempers, de Curzon had been asked to leave the room
temporarily while the Committee could take stock, but he had misin-
terpreted this request as one to depart permanently and had gone off in
a huff, only to reappear at a further meeting where he disputed a
recommendation that the Society should recognise only ‘de Gaulle’s
party’ as the true representation of France. Refusing to assist at further
sessions, he had nonetheless attended a lecture by Denis Saurat, held at
the Royal Philosophical Society, in which he sat silently at the back of
the hall making notes. A devout Catholic, a staunch monarchist and
rather ‘German in appearance and outlook’, de Curzon was generally
unpopular with the French community in the city, the police
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concluded, but was too ‘stupid’ to involve himself in espionage, merely
contenting himself with the diffusion of Pétainist sentiments
Whether Chartier personally involved himself in such skulduggery
remains unclear. It was believed that if he did exercise any influence it
was when interviewing servicemen and other nationals over passport
applications in the privacy of his own office, and it appears that he was
concerned chiefly with men of status.86 When, in late 1940, the jour-
nalist Bret visited the consulate to obtain a visa for North Africa, where
he felt he could be of more value to the war effort, he kept a close watch
on what he said on interrogation by Chartier; in Bret’s own words, this
was the first time in his life when he knew to keep his mouth shut.87
Others, too, were wary of Vichy’s man in London. On bumping into
Chartier at the Foreign Office, Palewski, one of de Gaulle’s closest asso-
ciates, timidly asked, ‘Am I condemned to death?’88
That Chartier’s immediate officials were involved in subterfuge
seems less contentious. From Crystal Palace, where a contingent of
French sailors was housed, came complaints from the Ministry of
Shipping that one of the London French consular staff had been
distributing unfavourable propaganda about de Gaulle although, to be
fair, the Foreign Office noted that this complaint might have emanated
from Admiral Muselier who had been bitterly disappointed because of
his own failure to recruit.89 Meanwhile, the attention of Special Branch
had centred on two officials belonging to Bedford Square who were
known to be carrying large amounts of money and circulating among
members of de Gaulle’s forces, where they readily spread disturbing
rumours.90 The two individuals had yet to be identified, probably
because they kept their associations with the consulate from view, but
clearly a sojourn at Pentonville awaited them when they were appre-
hended.
At this point, the question must be asked whether Chartier and his
cronies were involved in more sinister practices, notably in collecting
military intelligence and in collating lists of de Gaulle’s volunteers to be
relayed to Vichy for subsequent action to be taken against the men’s
families in France. After all, consulate offices had been used for spying
purposes in the past. Robert Graves recalls how, before 1914, the
German consulate had been a regular conduit of information for
Berlin.91 The prudence of Bret when interviewed by Chartier will also
be recalled, as will the behaviour of the French missions. Nevertheless,
evidence of the consuls as spies is not convincing. There is nothing in
the German Foreign Ministry Archives to suggest that the consulate at
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Bedford Square was relaying intelligence to Berlin via Vichy or Paris.92
Admittedly, it is unlikely that Vichy, anxious to cling on to whatever
authority it possessed, would have shared such information with Berlin
in the first place; whatever the case, surmise suggests that little of value
came out of Pétain’s London base. As we have seen, Vichy provincial
consuls were clumsy and under constant surveillance. They also lacked
the necessary equipment to communicate with their government. This
was even true of Chartier, the only consul who had regular contact with
his government. In August 1940, he requested use of the cypher facili-
ties within Bedford Square.93 The head of MI6, known merely as ‘C’,
who undoubtedly possessed a mole inside the Consulate-General, was
keen that this wish be granted so that any communication with Vichy
could be monitored, although it was admitted that Chartier was
unlikely to send out any sensitive information as his cypher was so
primitive it was probable the Germans had already decoded it, as
indeed the British appear to have done. The Foreign Office, however,
was opposed as reciprocal arrangements had not been granted to
British consuls who had recently been allowed to return to Lyon and
Pau. Clearly British secret dispatches out of France were of a superior
sort. So it was that Chartier was forced to telegramme en clair, meaning
that his contacts with Vichy were open for all to read and were thus
largely confined to run-of-the-mill information. As he himself
acknowledged to his Vichy masters, in a telegram of 22 August, the
cypher had been denied him for fear that he would report on the activ-
ities of French political refugees in the United Kingdom.94 In a later
telegram of 12 September, Baudouin, Vichy’s Anglophobe Foreign
Minister, expressed his sympathy to Chartier, acknowledging that he
had a difficult job on his hands having to deal with the British.95
While it remains almost certain that Chartier secreted intelligence
through diplomatic bags, these took an eternity to arrive in France,
going first through the Spanish embassy in London and then via
Madrid; the material must have been long in the tooth when it reached
the hotels of Vichy. Suggestions, probably made by Spears, that
Chartier was responsible for spreading news of the Dakar expedition,
and was thus responsible for its failure, are risible given what we know
about the lack of security cover in the preparations for this ill-fated
adventure.96 Similar allegations that Chartier was writing to the
Germans, via the Dublin legation, using secret ink should also be
treated with a pinch of salt, especially as the Dublin officials had mostly
defected from Vichy;97 nor is there anything in the German archives to
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verify such stories.98 As we shall see, the value of Chartier’s reports was
questionable in other respects, often echoing what he believed his
government wanted to hear. In this situation, it is probable that the
consuls, and then only some, restricted themselves to assisting in repa-
triation, the diffusion of propaganda and the distribution of monies,
intended as bribes to dissuade servicemen from enlisting with either de
Gaulle or the British.
Such activity was damaging and destabilising enough, and Chartier
only avoided expulsion thanks to the inability of the British to pin
anything definite on him and because of his worth to ‘C’. This did
not stop British Intelligence making life difficult for him by convey-
ing to Vichy rumours about his duplicitous behaviour.99 Indulgence
was not, however, accorded to the consuls at Liverpool, Swansea and
Newcastle. On 29 September Chartier was invited to an interview at
the Foreign Office where he was informed that the government was
withdrawing the ‘exequaturs’ (effectively an expulsion order) for
consuls involved in ‘anti-allied activities’.100 At this, Chartier’s face
apparently ‘grew longer’, perhaps because he feared his name was in
the frame, or that some of his London agents had been rumbled.
When told the identities of Brun, Dufort and Le Serre, he ‘almost
clapped his hands in glee’. He said Brun was ‘a ridiculous creature’,
and he ‘was very glad that he had got into trouble’. Le Serre was ‘a
lunatic’, and was already to be recalled by Vichy. As to Dufort, he
had retired, but had then obstinately stuck to his post. Once Chartier
had lunch with him and his Jewish wife along with her two sisters,
and ‘he had felt that he was sitting in the Warsaw ghetto’. If only the
British had forewarned him, he continued, arrangements would have
been made through Vichy for their withdrawal. Yet as he was only in
charge of the liquidation missions, a reference to the title he had
assumed in July, he disingenuously added that he could have done
little. Maybe he later regretted this remark, as soon after the Foreign
Office pressed him to clarify his position, thus forcing Chartier to
acknowledge the wider remit he had always possessed as Vichy’s chief
representative in Britain.
There ensued negotiations as to who should fill the vacancies at
Liverpool, Newcastle and Swansea, Chartier putting his own names
forward, no doubt again to increase the scope of his patronage and
cement his own position (the case of Bougnet will be recalled), and the
British eagerly weighing up the probity of the suggestions. Meanwhile,
the chief consul behaved disloyally to his dismissed colleagues, partic-
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ularly Dufort and his family who, on their withdrawal from Liverpool,
had taken up residence in suburban Wembley, expressing a strong wish
to stay in England, unlike all those sailors the consul had helped reset-
tle in France. Maybe in a misguided attempt to please the British, or
more probably in an attempt to assert his own command, Chartier
would have none of this, refusing to give the family money and divest-
ing himself of any responsibility in their regard, something that they
interpreted as a threat.101 In the event, they were repatriated at the close
of the year. Chartier ‘has gone from bad to worse’, noted one Foreign
Office official at the close of 1940.102 Little did he know what 1941 was
to bring.
La conduite consulaire: conduct unbecoming
Through his pro-Vichy views, his sanctioning of anti-Gaullist propa-
ganda and his ready willingness to abandon his colleagues when it
suited him, Chartier had made few friends among his British hosts who
saw through his double-talk, yet the Foreign Office was prepared to
tolerate him because of the help he gave to refugees, and his willingness
to help out with the passports of Free French volunteers who were
arriving in large numbers at the start of 1941. No doubt his indirect
value to MI6 also played a part in their calculations. Yet Chartier had
made dangerous enemies in the shape of Carlton Gardens and the
Spears Mission which, at this point, was often willing to act as the
porte-parole of de Gaulle’s organisation, often parroting the same
complaints, usually about supposed snubs to the general himself, and
adopting similar causes. So it was that, in February 1941, their line of
fire centred on Bedford Square, and Chartier in particular, who was
said to be ‘aiding and abetting deserters from the Free French forces’.103
While it will be recalled that the French soldiers and sailors belonging
to the camps in northern England had by then been sent home, some
stragglers were still at large in Liverpool and Manchester. Ultimately,
however, it was the outside developments of the war, notably in Syria,
that brought about Chartier’s forced withdrawal.
Suggestions that Bedford Square was facilitating the repatriation of
Free French deserters were to lead to an almighty row within British
circles. When, on 25 February 1941, the Spears Mission made these
allegations, it did not mince its words: ‘Under our very noses the Vichy
Consulate is doing deadly harm to the FFF.’104 Our own army, contin-
ued the general, would not accept a situation where a soldier could visit
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the offices of the ILP (Independent Labour Party) and obtain money,
demobilisation papers and a railway ticket. So it was that ‘the French
Consulate constitutes fifth-column activities of a most dangerous sort
since they tend to undermine the moral and efficiency of an allied
force’. Berating the MI5 for adopting a theological attitude to Bedford
Square’s responsibilities, Spears suggested the intelligence agency
should adopt as a motto, ‘See no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil’. The
general also warned French Welfare not to have any further dealings
with Bedford Square, and urged Bessborough’s organisation to launch
an enquiry into how such repatriations could be stopped in future.
Behind this complaint undoubtedly lay an attempt to spike the guns of
the CEAF whose dealings with French refugees, often through the
consulate, caused continued outrage in Carlton Gardens. Reading
between the lines, it may also be that Spears and the Free French had
deliberately attempted to set up the consulate by sending two rather
dubious individuals as agents provocateurs to Bedford Square to ask
delicate questions.105
This somewhat maladroit piece of diplomacy, worthy of de Gaulle
himself in its brusqueness, went down badly in Whitehall where it
caused ‘alarm and despondency’.106 Copies were quickly withdrawn
except from one or two people. Bessborough was clearly still a recipi-
ent as he denounced the memorandum as ‘tantamount to an
accusation against us of treason’.107 He then went on to explain why
French Welfare, and for that matter Chartier, could not possibly help
with any desertions, men who were apparently dressing up as refugees
and obtaining forged papers. Betraying a somewhat naive faith in
bureaucratic procedures, Bessborough explained that this would be
impossible as ‘by arrangement with the Home Office and MI5 any civil-
ian refugee who wishes to be repatriated must fill in an Exit Permit
form supplied to him by the French Consulate General’.108 This docu-
ment, together with the refugee’s registration card, was then forwarded
to Passport Office, which processed the necessary paperwork under the
vigilant eye of MI5. The upshot, claimed Bessborough, was that the
emigration authorities at the quayside were armed with a list of all
refugees granted authority to quit the British Isles, and only those on
the list were given permission to embark. Meanwhile, Carlton Gardens
supplied to MI5 and local police forces the names of all deserters.
Bessborough drew further reassurance from the fact that Chartier
supplied to his own office the names of French sailors and soldiers who
had approached the consulate requesting repatriation. Should any man
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have once belonged to de Gaulle, his case was given extra special atten-
tion. In this way, all possible loopholes had been closed.
To disprove the watertight nature of these procedures, Muselier
brought to the attention of the Foreign Office the case of one F—
B— , an Alsatian sailor, who had recently been discharged from the
Free French Navy on the grounds of ill health.109 While in the waiting
room of the CEAF, there to collect charitable handouts, B— had been
joined by another man, a former member of the crew of the Courbet,
who had refused to enlist in the Free French. While in conversation,
they had been approached by a third man from the same ship who
confessed ‘that he was a deserter’. This individual then ‘volunteered the
information’ that the CEAF regularly helped fugitives such as him by
supplying them with the identity papers and false documents of
refugees who had already left the country. Thanks to these papers, the
deserters had then been able to avoid the attentions of the police,
although quite how they circumvented the system described above by
Bessborough remains unclear. Failing to address this point, Muselier
claimed the leadership of the CEAF was behind this scheme, especially
the Baron de P— , formerly secretary-general of French Teachers in
Great Britain. While there was no direct evidence linking Chartier to
the scam, this was attributed to his ‘cunning’ rather than his ‘innocence
in the matter’.
Whether the CEAF was truly behind this particular bolt-hole
remains doubtful. As already implied, this appears to have been yet
another attempt to smear a rival, and non-Gaullist, organisation. As to
whether Chartier and his associates were more generally facilitating
repatriation, the answer is probably yes, but not in the numbers the
Free French alleged. ‘What sort of proof will be required to convince
you that Chartier’s activities are dangerous?’, thundered Spears in a
letter to Bessborough of 4 March 1941.110 While it cannot be
discounted that this proof might have since disappeared, little further
evidence was forthcoming, other than vague allegations, notably that
an Italian waiter with fascist sympathies overheard officers’ conversa-
tions at the Savoy, subsequently passing on his information to
Chartier.111 As to Muselier, his complaint may well have been a reflec-
tion of the precarious footing of Free French Forces at the start of 1941.
Many of the volunteers for de Gaulle had signed six-month engage-
ment forms in June/July 1940, contracts that were now coming to a
close. It was widely known that morale and overall discipline within the
general’s forces was not good, especially after the fiasco that was the
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Dakar expedition and the return of those stranded sailors at the close
of the year. Reports about the poor organisation within the general’s
forces were legion, and caused the Foreign Office some concern.
Among many disturbing tales was that of a young Frenchman, an
escaped POW, who had smuggled himself out of France to enlist with
de Gaulle.112 When he arrived at the recruiting depot, he found this
‘dirty’ and ‘generally unattractive’. Nor was life in the garrisons at
Camberley and Aldershot especially appealing. While the military
discipline of these sites was judged to have improved, the social life and
amenities were virtually non-existent, partially thanks to the attitude of
the British themselves who, it will be recalled, had failed to distinguish
between Free French and servicemen awaiting repatriation. As
Lieutenant-Colonel Claud Black of the War Office reported to French
Welfare, ‘the local population, both military and civil, tend to be very
preoccupied with the various problems which the war brings in its
train, and the question of entertaining the French does not occur to
most people’.113 Spears made similar observations, and was especially
struck by an interview with a Breton boy who said he was ‘quite all right
in London, but in Camberley, Aldershot etc, the reception he and his
companions get from the British troops and civilians in restaurants and
especially “dancings” is anything but cordial’.114 Acknowledging that
the Bretons ‘are not the most adaptable of people’, Spears considered it
a pity not more could be done to improve levels of hospitality, if only
to stop the ‘bagarres’ that frequently broke out with the locals. For his
part, Black knew of only one scuffle, an unseemly argument in a
Reading canteen.115 It will be recalled from the previous chapter that it
was only in 1941, when most non-Free French servicemen had been
repatriated, that real efforts were made to improve life in these
barracks.
Thus it may well have been that, in his complaints about Chartier,
Muselier was exercising a more general frustration about recruitment.
This did not stop yet another round of enquiries into the activities of
the consuls, although once again this produced little incriminating
evidence. For instance, in January 1941 the Cardiff police filed a report
on Pierre Chesnais, the local attaché in the city.116 A professional diplo-
mat, he had first served in Wales in 1931–32, before being transferred
to Montréal, Philadelphia and Vienna. At the outbreak of war, he was
stationed at Warsaw; he had subsequently escaped to France, via the
Balkans, and was posted to Amsterdam, only for the German invasion
to necessitate another transfer, first to London and then to Cardiff. A
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known Anglophile, Chesnais had, on several occasions, made known
his fervent desire for a British victory and had not been caught up in
any murky business; his pro-Allied views were even noted in Vichy
where they were brought to the attention of Laval.117 As before,
Liverpool was the real trouble spot, despite the appointment of a new
consul. The Home Office and Admiralty complained of ‘constant inter-
ference’ and thundered that it was ‘a scandal that the French Consular
Officials should be allowed to exercise anything like the powers they
have got’.118 Meanwhile, in Glasgow, de Curzon continued to aggravate
the natives. Having been invited to the board of the Allied Seaman’s
Reception Centre, he had proved a real nuisance and had to be ‘frozen
out’,119 proof that the city’s elders had not taken stock of his earlier
comportment.
To cauterise an open wound, in early 1941 the Foreign Office took
long overdue action against the troublesome consular offices. Complex
negotiations were conducted with Chartier for the removal of the
Liverpool consulate to nearby Newcastle-under-Lyme and the Glasgow
office to Edinburgh, where they would be less troublesome. Aware that
these moves amounted to a loss of face, in a telegram to his masters,
Chartier attempted to put the best possible gloss on the situation, a
gloss that was applauded by the Foreign Office, which was fearful that
any action might provoke retaliation against the remaining British
consuls in France.120 So it was that Chartier explained to Vichy that
Liverpool was in a ‘forbidden zone’, denied to aliens; the move
mattered little, however, as Newcastle-under-Lyme was only 50 kilo-
metres away.121 The French representative, a Monsieur Delessart, could
still visit the Liverpool area, although Chartier made no mention of the
fact that he would need the permission of the local police, and a special
permit should he ever wish to visit the docks themselves. Turning to
Glasgow, Chartier again pointed out that this city lay in a ‘forbidden
zone’, and remarked that the consul there had often spoken of the
advantages of being based in Edinburgh. At Swansea, Chartier
concluded, another consulate had moved, this time to the city
outskirts, because the consular buildings had recently been destroyed
(presumably by bombing).
Time was also running out for Chartier himself. What appears to
have been the cause of his downfall was not the complaints of the
Spears Mission or the Free French, nor the alleged repatriation of
Gaullist deserters. Instead, it was matters abroad. Under the command
of the Anglophobe Admiral Darlan, Vichy had become ever more unre-
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liable in the eyes of the Foreign Office, which now saw little point in
trying to appease the regime. Within domestic affairs, Darlan had taken
Vichy down an authoritarian, technocratic route, presiding over the
persecution of Jews, Communists and others. More importantly, in his
foreign policy Darlan had sidled up to Germany in a way Laval would
never have done, hoping that a tough anti-British position would
persuade Germany into making concessions to France, in particular by
granting it a colonial and naval role in the New Order that Hitler was
building. So it was that Darlan ordered British consuls out of France
and warned Chartier’s colleagues in London to have as little to do with
the British as possible.122 When, in May 1941, Darlan met Hitler at
Berchtesgaden to do a deal over the supply of Rommel’s Afrika Korps
through Syria, Britain and France were, in the words of Robert Paxton,
virtually engaged in an undeclared ‘naval war’.123 Significantly, such
developments deeply troubled British public opinion, which was more
anti-Vichy than ever before.124 ‘They’re beyond words’, remarked one
respondent to Mass-Observation about the marshal’s men, ‘I can’t say
anything bad enough to describe them.’125 ‘There’s only one word for
them – traitors. They’re worse than Hitler’, was the reply of another. 
It was in this context that, on 21 April 1941, the consul was warned
that his position was tenuous;126 on 6 May he was requested to quit
London, arriving at Lisbon three days later. Once in Portugal, Vichy
immediately requested information as to what he was doing there, the
regime’s ignorance of his fate further evidence of the consul’s difficul-
ties in communicating with his masters.127 Nonetheless, before his
departure, he had apparently agreed to present to Vichy ‘a faithful
account of his position in this country’,128 in effect a bland statement
of protocol authored by the Foreign Office. He chose instead to write
his own document, which was intercepted by the British. If this was the
type of intelligence that Chartier had been returning to France on a
regular basis, then it was of dubious value. Even allowing for the
natural indignation of the Foreign Office, it was described as ‘grossly
biassed [sic]’ and ‘highly inaccurate’. Speaight was under no illusions;
‘This is just what one would have expected of M. Chartier.’129 ‘It is what
he thinks Darlan would like to hear’, he continued, ‘. . . the intention is
evidently to give the impression that we are rotten with the same lack
of public spirit, industrial discontent and disorganisation, and abuse of
privilege as wrecked the Third Republic.’ It was ‘the work of a clumsy
and pedestrian propagandist’, but was not something to be forgotten.
‘We must remember this against Chartier’, concluded Speaight, ‘when
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he comes fawning up to us again at the Peace Conference.’
What had Chartier said to cause such offence?130 Clearly written with
the technocratic Cabinet of Darlan in mind, the document comprised
a damning indictment of the British war effort. The events of June
1940, began Chartier, had brought the English face to face with reality,
and the recognition that it would require ‘un effort colossal’ to over-
come German power. Convinced that the Franco-British alliance,
together with the contribution of its air force and navy, would suffice
to ensure naval supplies and effect a blockade of enemy ports, the
English had dangerously neglected their military preparations. Chartier
recalled how the Labour government had foreseen how disarmament
would give an example to the rest of the world and how the City, recog-
nising the advantages of this, immediately gave its approval. Everything
the British had done in the military arena, up to the day war was
declared, was ‘futile’, designed to fool the French who demanded
serious preparations. Hore-Belisha might have introduced work
conscription, but this had been riddled with exemptions so as to render
it useless. Everything relating to equipment, arms, munitions, war
factories, was still to be created and organised. Amazingly, as soon as
the French signed the Armistice, these factories doubled and tripled
their efforts, food supplies were overhauled and put on a different
footing. Warming to his theme, Chartier claimed conscription had
been ‘un faux’; the British had preferred to rely instead on the French
army. Moving on to politics, he spoke of how the replacement of
Chamberlain by Churchill had been well received, but how an impor-
tant opposition was now brewing among intellectuals, parliamentary
circles and elements of the middle classes. It was important not to
underestimate this opposition, claimed Chartier, as elections gave little
indication as to popular feelings. The three main political parties had
come to an agreement not to contest seats that became vacant.
Churchill could thus count on the support of parliament and effect
ministerial reshuffles without worry. Decrying the prime minister for
his autocratic tendencies, Chartier claimed that the Cabinet was not of
the quality of yesteryear, lacking a Lloyd George, although praise was
heaped on Lord Beaverbrook for his efforts in promoting war produc-
tion.
Praise was also extended to the working classes for their goodwill
and hard work. This Churchill had achieved by bringing socialists into
his government such as Attlee, Alexander, Morrison and Dalton. Secret
deals between capital and labour had further reduced the possibility of
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strikes and industrial unrest. Even so, among socialists there was an
unease about the way in which industrial relations were being
managed: organisation was still slipshod; hours were far too long;
specialists were not well distributed among factories; and frequently
the workforce was left idle because important machine tools had been
torpedoed en route from the USA. As in 1914–19, women had been
drafted in to replace those men conscripted to fight.
The final paragraphs of Chartier’s letter concerned everyday life in
wartime: censorship; rationing; the black market. It concluded with
another swipe at government and the manner in which it kept news of
all dissent quiet. Recently, claimed Chartier, prominent politicians had
been overtaken by a scandal concerning Czech bonds. A commission of
enquiry had been set up, comprising MPs, and one member had been
found guilty of behaving ‘indiscrètement’, although this had not
prevented him from occupying an administrative post in the air force.
So it was that this growing number of scandals was hushed up, ended
Chartier.
Small wonder that the Foreign Office was outraged. ‘The perni-
ciously hostile flavour which colours every sentence of this horrible
document’, remarked Hankey, ‘confirms more fully than it was possi-
ble to expect the duplicity of M. Chartier.’131 Indeed, Chartier’s wish to
have it all ways became evident in his subsequent actions. On quitting
Britain, he expressed a wish to be sent to Australia ‘since he professed
to be anxious to keep up his connections with the Empire,’ although it
is more likely he knew the uninviting state of affairs in occupied and
unoccupied France.132 Should there be any possibility of Canberra
agreeing to this, both the Foreign Office and Downing Street decided
that the Commonwealth authorities should know about the ‘unpleas-
ant document’ found among his papers at the time of his expulsion. As
Downing Street remarked, ‘it was typical of Chartier that he should
produce such stuff to please his masters at Vichy while at the same time
assuring us of his devotion to the allied cause. We now hear through
the United States Embassy that he has been speaking well of us at
Vichy, but it is quite consistent that he should do so in conversation
with persons known to be anglophile while taking a very different line
with the others.’133 Chartier, it was announced, will always say ‘what he
thinks will please his listener, especially if the listener is in a position to
help his career’. Although evidence is fragmentary, it seems that the
Foreign Office line was correct. At the end 1941, Chartier was making
trouble for Jalenques, his successor at Bedford Square.134
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Further dirt on Chartier was subsequently produced by the Trading
with the Enemy Branch.135 Before his expulsion, he had apparently
been ‘collecting patent fees in this country due to Frenchmen’: ‘He had
no authority from this branch to do so and thus became, at any rate
technically, liable to proceedings under the Trading with the Enemy
Act.’ More significantly, it transpired that the liquidation missions had
been collating information ‘to which they were not entitled’, but which
had then been communicated across the Channel by none other than
Chartier himself. How valuable such information really was remains
questionable. Overall, Vichy’s senior representative in Britain had been
more of a nuisance, an obsequious Uriah Heep figure rather than an
accomplished spy or, indeed, diplomat. 
Endgame
Chartier’s replacement was Jalenques, another career diplomat in
Bedford Square. When he introduced himself to the Foreign Office, he
was courtesy personified, yet he too did not give a favourable impres-
sion. In a report of 25 May 1941, he was described as a ‘poor creature,
completely lacking in character’, who lived on patent medicines and
suffered from perpetual colds.136 At the close of the year, it was even
speculated whether the developments in Syria had led him to consider
switching sides. In a minute of 28 November 1941, Speaight reflected,
‘I imagined that his conscience was at last compelling him to break with
Vichy on political grounds, but it now appears he is only concerned
with his personal position.’137 Promises of better pay and promotion
had apparently bought off any possibility of defection. Nonetheless, the
Foreign Office was prepared to be indulgent towards him as ‘whatever
his shortcomings, he is on the whole as helpful to us as his position
allows and his sympathies are, so far as I can judge, genuinely pro-
British’. Indeed, he performed his consular duties with panache,
happily renewing passports for Frenchmen in Britain, even when he
knew they were supporters of de Gaulle. In the eyes of the Foreign
Office, far more important was that he granted travel visas for British
officials wishing to cross occupied France on their way to Switzerland,
not even bothering to inform his Vichy masters. ‘He could easily be less
obliging’, concluded Speaight, ‘and it seems worth while to keep him
sweet by allowing him occasional favours which cost us nothing.’ 
While permitting such indulgence, in the aftermath of Chartier, a
close check was kept on Jalenques to ensure that he was not abusing his
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position. Still allowed to telegram merely en clair, he was quickly told
in no uncertain terms that he could report matters only in an objective,
as opposed to an interpretative, sense.138 This inevitably led to conflict.
When in 1942 Britain accepted refugees from the newly liberated
colony of Madagascar, Jalenques intended to send his government
several lengthy telegrams, which related ‘in immense and redundant
detail’ the problems encountered by civilian officials and officers on
their arrival.139 These further alleged that there had been a ‘breach of
faith’ on the part of the British in the interpretation of the Protocol of
Surrender, and it was feared that they might amount to a propaganda
gift to the Germans. Jalenques was thus forced to rewrite his commu-
niqués which were read by the British before being deposited in the
diplomatic bags for Lisbon.
By that stage, however, Jalenques could do little damage as most of
his officials had already been returned to France, leaving him to preside
over a skeleton staff at Bedford Square. With Britain and Vichy at
daggers drawn in Syria, a Foreign Office memorandum of 10 June 1941
had asked ‘whether the time has come to expel the remaining French
consuls in the United Kingdom and the members of the various liqui-
dation missions’.140 It also appears that the transfer of the consuls at
Liverpool and Glasgow had not done the trick. In a letter to Jock
McEwen MP, the Foreign Office confessed that the regional consuls,
especially in the ports, could still report ‘on important aspects of our
war effort’.141
Preparations for expulsion were accordingly put in place. Before
this, however, various government departments were asked whether
they still considered the liquidation missions fulfilled a useful function.
The Treasury replied that it was
anxious to retain the Financial Mission since, without it, it would be diffi-
cult, if not impossible to work the Reciprocal Advances account whereby
Vichy provides francs for payments to British subjects in unoccupied
France (we are spending over a million pounds a year under this head
which would otherwise have to be found by converting dollars into
francs), while any British creditors of the French government whose
claims are being met through this account would have to go unpaid.142
For its part, the Ministry of Supply considered that the armaments
and textiles missions were performing a useful service; some contrac-
tors might be adversely affected if these liquidation offices were thus
shut down.143 As to the Mines Department, it felt that the coal and
minerals mission could carry on, but that its staff should be cut from
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four to two. The Ministry of Food also wanted the food purchasing
mission to remain.144 In its reply, the Ministry of War Transport still
regarded the sea transport mission as helpful, although it was not
thought essential for it to stay.145 The Admiralty, likewise, no longer
thought there a need for the Liquidation des Services de l’Attaché Naval
while the Ministry of Air reached the same conclusion about the
Liquidation des Services de l’Attaché de l’Air, although it was hoped
that its one member, with whom it had established cordial relations,
would not be expelled.
Having canvassed the opinions of the above departments, the
Foreign Office outlined three possible courses of action:
(a) to expel all the consuls and members of the liquidation missions;
(b) to expel all the consuls but leave the missions;
(c) to expel the provincial consuls leaving only the Consulate-General in
London with its staff and the missions that are normally attached
to it.146
Point ‘a’, continued Speaight, had ‘little to recommend it’ since there
was little point in initiating action against the missions, some of which
still served a useful function. Point ‘b’, he continued, was ‘the course
recommended by MI5’. While the security services acknowledged that
most of the consuls were individually harmless, their offices inevitably
provided a focal point for disaffected Frenchmen who might otherwise
join de Gaulle. If the consuls were not by now assisting with repatria-
tion, they were certainly distributing money to French refugees whose
financial insecurity might otherwise have led them to sign up with
either the British or the Free French. The drawback of option ‘b’ was
that Vichy might, in any case, withdraw the liquidation missions, and
retaliate ‘by expelling our Consuls in Indo-China’. This would make
the whole business of passport procedures a real nightmare.
Considering point ‘c’, Speaight argued that this would avoid the pitfalls
of point ‘b’, but reiterated the fact that the London consulate was the
‘most dangerous from a security point of view’ and the one most likely
to do harm to de Gaulle’s cause.
Given the complicated pros and cons of these arguments, it was
wondered whether a decision should be postponed, pending the
conclusion of events in Syria.147 Ultimately, however, in mid-to-late
June an announcement was made that largely followed the course of
action outlined in point ‘c’. This declared ‘all the French Consulates,
including Honorary Consulates, in the United Kingdom and in
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Northern Ireland, apart from the French Consulate General in London,
are to be closed forthwith’.148 The liquidation missions would stay.
When Jalenques was informed of the decision, he manifested a
greater loyalty to his colleagues than had Chartier and looked for ways
and means by which he could hang on to at least some of his staff. Now
that the provincial consulates were to be closed down, he pointed out,
not unreasonably, that his office in London would have expanded
functions. It was thus necessary that he should be allowed to employ
more administrators, perhaps members of the London colony, or
maybe some of the provincial consuls.149 In the event, he plumped for
this latter option, employing the services of Chesnais, the ex-French
consul at Swansea, and the ex-consular agent at Folkestone.150
Although the Foreign Office had no wish that Bedford Square should
become a rest home for redundant consuls, in the eyes of the police and
MI5 Jalenques’s two recommendations were acceptable: both wanted
to remain in England and both had strong ties with the British, the
latter being married to an Englishwoman. It will be recalled that earlier
police enquiries had found nothing amiss about the two men. At one
point in these negotiations, Jalenques appears to have been fearful how
Vichy would react to the expulsions, fearing personal retribution.
When he sought advice from the Foreign Office as to how he should
present the British actions,151 he discovered officials less than sympa-
thetic. ‘I told him’, wrote Mack, ‘that from our point of view we had no
objection to the Post Master, or anyone else at Vichy, knowing what we
thought of the Vichy Government’s collaboration with Germany.’
With such exchanges out of the way, the Home Office and MI5 got
on with the task of counting how many French consular officials were
on British soil, in readiness for expulsion. Given the brouhaha that had
surrounded their actions, it might have been expected that this would
have been an easy task. Yet, as is the case of nearly all the ‘forgotten
French’, their numbers were elusive. Being diplomatic staff, they were
often exempted from the requirement to register with police.152 The
ensuing enquiries thus produced numerous anomalies, discrepancies
in the spelling of names, and discoveries that officials had come and
gone without proper authorisation.153 By mid-July 1941, the Foreign
Office still lacked ‘confidence in the accuracy of the list’ of consular
officials, despite several updates and revisions.154 As soon as one list
appeared, it was supplanted with another, replete with spelling correc-
tions and pencilled additions.155
Just as it had proved difficult to repatriate French soldiers and sailors
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in the autumn of 1940, so too was it difficult to relocate the consular
officials. On 14 July 1941, the Foreign Office wrote to Jalenques to
inform him that it was intending to ferry the consular party across to
New York; Vichy could then arrange the subsequent return crossing to
France.156 As no neutral ship would be available for some time, it was
suggested the group might wish to sail on board an English boat leaving
in August. There was, however, no hurry in getting the various parties
away and, if they so wished, they could remain in London, where
accommodation would be arranged for them, until a neutral ship was
eventually found. 
Vichy had other ideas. Whether desirous to assert its autonomy,
whether genuinely concerned for the safety of French officials sailing
under the British ensign in U-boat-infested waters, or whether just
bloody-minded, the Pétain government made known to Jalenques that
it was seeking its own solution to the problem.157 Ever eager to save on
hotel bills, the British were happy to listen to these proposals, although
they soon articulated objections to the two suggestions that emerged.
The first, favoured by Jalenques, was for the consular party to be trans-
ferred by air, from Britain to Lisbon, and then to France. As the Foreign
Office objected to British aircraft being used for this purpose, the possi-
bility arose of Vichy planes coming over, and the views of Air Ministry
officials were sought.158 Unsurprisingly, they were intensely hostile to
the idea. As a Foreign Office note records, ‘The Air Ministry has strong
objections, both because the Vichy pilots could not be prevented from
seeing things, and because it is undesirable that the party should reach
enemy-controlled territory a few hours after leaving the UK, possibly
bringing scraps of red-hot info about targets with them.’159
The other proposal was for Vichy to send a ship over. This sugges-
tion was far more to the liking of the Foreign Office. Such a ship might
even carry on board UK citizens stranded in the south of France.
Arrangements had been made for the return of these unfortunates the
previous winter, but the Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden had not
been able to guarantee a safe passage.160
With so many possibilities being canvassed, deadlock ensued.
Because there was no guarantee of a safe transfer, Vichy was unhappy
at the shipping of the consular party to New York on board a British
ship, and again demanded a neutral vessel.161 In response, the Foreign
Office told Jalenques flatly that ‘as the Germans torpedoed ships of all
nationalities indiscriminately, the party would be no less safe under a
British than under a neutral flag’. Perhaps betraying his Pétainist
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colours, the Consul-General disagreed, insisting once again on a
neutral passage to New York or an airlift to Lisbon. This latter option
was given some thought. As places did occasionally become available
on the Lisbon air service, run by BOAC, it was speculated whether the
consuls could be repatriated in dribs and drabs, although it was admit-
ted that those with children could not be expected to travel in this
manner as it was important to keep the families together.
So it was that repatriation became dependent on standby air tickets
to Lisbon becoming available through the travel agents, Thomas Cook.
This hare-brained scheme soon ran into difficulties. While the Foreign
Office insisted that it was ‘most unsatisfactory’ that these people should
be ‘hanging about indefinitely’,162 the Ministry of Air responded that
Vichy staff came low on its list of priorities:163 ‘we simply cannot have
these people occupying precious seats on the UK–Lisbon Service in the
place of priority passengers who are advancing the war effort. We also
are reluctant to take these people at the expense of our own people on
our compassionate standby list.’164
As the search for a neutral ship continued, the frustrations of the
French diplomatic staff awaiting repatriation can only be guessed at. It
seems likely that they shared the sentiments of their colleagues belong-
ing to the missions who had experienced lengthy delays following their
expulsion in July 1940. As one of this party had lamented at the time,
‘I am in a foreign country in a false situation, unable to work or to
move from where I am, and almost without friends.’165
For this individual, both the British and the French were to blame
for the hold-up, yet then, as in late 1941, the real problem was
Germany. In October, there emerged a further possibility that the
stranded French diplomats could sail on a British ship to Lisbon,
alongside a Finnish diplomatic party, safe conduct arrangement having
being secured from the Germans through Swedish channels, even
though the Germans had not been told that French personnel would be
on board;166 indeed, the Germans were under the impression that all
consular staff had left immediately after the Syria affair in June.167 It
was hoped that Jalenques would leap at this chance as he was now
known to be the unhappy recipient of numerous letters of complaint
from his colleagues demanding an explanation for the delay. It tran-
spired, however, that the safe passage assured by the Germans was not
as watertight as previously imagined; they had merely agreed to take
‘certain precautions’, demanding in turn a welter of information about
the vessel, to be supplied ‘in good time’ to Berlin.168 Because of the
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delay, the Ministry of War Transport declared that the vessel could no
longer be kept waiting, and deployed her for other work ‘from which
she cannot be released in less than a month’.169
Repatriation was further held up as various of the consular staff
asked to remain in Britain. Some did so for principled reasons. One
such was Saffroy. Employed at the French Consulate General in
London before the Armistice, he had then been ‘loaned out on a
temporary basis to the French Legation at Dublin about the time when
Vichy broke off diplomatic relations’.170 While he was strongly
opposed to Vichy, he thought he could still do a useful service by
remaining in post and relaying information to the Foreign Office
‘where he has many friends’. He had eventually decided Vichy was
‘beyond hope’ and resigned, ensuring that his letter of resignation to
Darlan reached the British press. He now wished to cooperate with the
Free French, but wanted to do so on his own terms and was not anxious
‘to give immediate and unconditional allegiance to General de Gaulle’.
The Foreign Office fully sympathised with this attitude and agreed he
could ‘fill a useful role’. It was thus thought helpful that Saffroy should
not be subject to the full rigours of the Aliens Restrictions Act, and he
was allowed to move freely between his house in London and country
cottage in Essex. Similar leniency was also extended to Roché, second
secretary to the Dublin legation, who had resigned in similar circum-
stances, and who had since returned to England after his temporary
spell in Ireland. 
Others appear to have got cold feet at the last minute. Such was C—
A—.171 Born in 1913 at Moulins, he was a vet in civil life, but at the
outbreak of war had become a second-lieutenant in the French army
attached to the Direction de la cavalerie et du train.172 In this capacity,
he had assisted in the conveyance of horses from Canada to France.
When France fell, he was en route home from Canada on board the SS
Nevada. The ship docked instead at Glasgow and, along with members
of the crew, he was sent to White City to await repatriation. He had
subsequently been released and had taken up residence in the Royal
Hotel, alongside other French officers. He had only stayed there a
matter of days before he was employed by the French consulate,
although he still maintained he was an officer in the French army and
was not a diplomatic official. Working with Lieutenant Vacher, tidying
up the financial affairs of those soldiers who were leaving for France, he
had initially demanded to be repatriated among their number, but had
a last-minute change of heart. Without informing his Vichy superiors,
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in early December 1940, he applied to join the Free French and
demanded that his name be taken off the repatriation list.
While A— may have been genuinely attracted to de Gaulle, in other
cases it appears that family and job interests came before politics. This
was the case of M— who had replaced Chesnais as the vice-consul in
Cardiff. He had initially been suspected of anti-British feeling, but
subsequent police enquiries had revealed that he had close contact with
a French family in the city who testified to his trustworthiness: ‘The
members of this family are all very pro-British and enthusiastic
supporters of the Free French movement. It is thought that if this
family had the slightest reason to suspect M— of having any feeling
hostile to this country the existing friendship would at once end.’173
Nonetheless, such feelings did not stop M— from wanting to return to
France: ‘As he depends upon his post in the French Consular Service
for his livelihood . . . he feels that his early return to France may be the
means of his obtaining any vacant post existing in the service.’ He was
thus fearful that a ‘delay in return’ might mean any vacancy in the
French Diplomatic Service being filled by someone else. Ultimately,
however, he decided that his professional interests would be best
looked after by Carlton Gardens. As a Foreign Office note of 10
September 1941 reads: ‘With a wife and family to support M. M— has
evidently felt bound to hedge before committing himself finally to the
Free French.’174 Hedging his bets he clearly was. He said nothing of his
intentions to Jalenques, who was doing his utmost to help his family,
and it remains unclear whether ultimately he stayed or was repatri-
ated.175
Far more blatant in the protecting of his own interests was de
Curzon, French consul in Edinburgh, who it will be recalled had been
an object of intense suspicion in 1940. In a letter to the Foreign Office
of June 1941, he requested that he should be allowed to stay, at least
until August. Having lived in Britain since 1919, with only a four-year
break when he was attached to the French embassy in Brussels, he
protested his pro-British views. Moreover, he made known that all of
his children had been born here: ‘It is very hard for me to be told to go
by my friends – particularly at a time when two of my children are to
pass examinations in July and risk losing a full year of studies and
preparation if they are not here to sit for these examinations.’176 Such
plaintive letters were treated with scorn by the British. As one official
remarked, ‘It is clear from this that M. de Curzon is a rather stupid
individual who was not doing much harm even when he was Consul at
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Glasgow.’177 Nonetheless, de Curzon’s case was not treated unsympa-
thetically. As he was no longer considered to be a security threat, and
as it was not easy to find safe passages for repatriation, he was permit-
ted to stay in the capacity of a private individual, expressly forbidden to
engage in any further consular duties. As a postscript, 1942 found de
Curzon back in France where  he filed a report on the French commu-
nity in Scotland to Darlan, although in truth this was more a report of
consular responsibilities in Glasgow and Edinburgh interlarded with
attacks on particular individuals.178
As the archival trail goes cold in late 1941, it is difficult to know how
exactly the repatriation of personnel was conducted. It seems likely,
despite the protests of the Air Ministry, that individuals were found
seats on flights to Lisbon, or were transported by boat to the USA and
then back to France. The eventual fate of the consular staff in Bedford
Square, however, is known. Betraying their lack of political prescience
to the very end, in November 1942 they all opted to rally to the ill-fated
General Giraud, whom the Americans hoped they could use to win
over French forces in North Africa.179 Maybe this was not a surprising
decision. Having refused to side with de Gaulle, and recognising the
hopelessness of the Vichy position in late 1942, this at least offered
some prospect of saving face, although it seems unlikely that it guaran-
teed them a future in the French diplomatic service. From November
1942, therefore, Vichy had no representation whatsoever in London.
Although in the following year it requested that the Swiss government
should act as a protecting power for those French nationals in the
British isles, this request was flatly turned down.
Conclusions
As with so many of the groups making up the ‘forgotten French’, the
Vichy consuls did not have a particularly happy time in Britain. They
were under suspicion from the outset, and were always personae non
gratae in the eyes of the Free French, the Spears Mission and MI5 who
worked tirelessly for their expulsion. Whether they truly constituted a
threat to national security remains doubtful, otherwise they would
surely have been expelled sooner. The greatest danger was posed in the
summer of 1940 when there were numerous mission staff who had the
financial wherewithal and propaganda facilities to undermine the
morale of Gaullist volunteers. Such activities were abruptly halted,
however, and only a limited number of individuals were involved.
176 The forgotten French
2499 Chap4  7/4/03  2:44 pm  Page 176
Thereafter, some consuls, especially in Liverpool, Newcastle, Cardiff
and London, clearly assisted with the repatriation of soldiers, forging
papers and circumventing immigration procedures. They may also
have collated intelligence, but it must have been difficult to have
communicated this to their government. The figure of de Curzon
writing his reports and making notes of a lecture springs to mind. Only
the Consulate-General in Bedford Square had the ability to speak
directly to Vichy, but even its potential was seriously limited, forced to
telegram en clair and make use of diplomatic bags. Given the contents
of Chartier’s letter on his expulsion, the value of his intelligence must
also be doubted. Yet whatever the case, there was certainly no inten-
tion, on the part of either Chartier or his government, to pass on any
information to the Germans. The fact that Vichy still had some diplo-
matic presence in London was always a source of unease in Berlin lest
this became a channel of communication for high-level Anglo-French
dialogue, especially after Syria.
Whether Chartier and his cronies could ever have coped with such
dialogue must be doubted. These were not, by and large, thoughtful,
intelligent or far-sighted men. The cream of the diplomatic staff had
gone in July 1940, leaving those whose ambitions were clearly of a
different level. They were not cut out for spying, for complex diplo-
matic exchanges or for political decision-making. They were at their
best when form-filling and stamping passports. Ultimately, it was what
they represented that caused so much offence. Whether Bedford
Square possessed a portrait of Marshal Pétain on its walls is not known,
and on many occasions it resorted to using notepaper with the mast-
head ‘République française’, either to curry favour or simply because it
was short of stationery.180 But the very fact that Vichy possessed some
symbol of its authority on British soil was always going to create diffi-
culties; and when, in 1941, the spinelessness and immoral character of
the marshal’s regime became transparent, the fate of the consulates was
sealed. 
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5
The tradition of exile:
la colonie Française
I recall an astonishing description of the sounds and smell of a Parisian
working day, the first faint rumblings of the Métro, and the unique odour
of that surrealist underground railway, in the monthly review La France
Libre. (Richard Cobb, Promenades)1
In a three-volume conspectus of London life, published in 1901, several
chapters were devoted to those immigrant communities, Greeks,
Germans and Italians among others, that had made London their
home. In the pages devoted to the French, the following observation
was drawn:
The French in London form a sober, well-behaved, industrious and law-
abiding community. They give very little trouble to the police and law
courts, and it is seldom that the name of a French resident obtains an
unbelievable notoriety in the newspapers. There are about 21,000 French
sojourners in England, and about 11,000 of them in the metropolis.2
Clearly, what appealed to the Victorian values of the English authors
was that the French community largely kept itself to itself yet, at the
same time, integrated well into London life. Colonists were ‘not to be
found loafing in the neighbourhood of Leicester Square and Piccadilly
Circus’, it was observed, ‘They are to be found in City offices and ware-
houses, in workshops and studios, in West End establishments and
shops, in schools and in private families.’3 Another comforting aspect
was their lack of political activity, testimony to the fact that most
Communards had retreated to their homeland after the Amnesty of
1878.
What is remarkable is that this piece could have been written shortly
after the colonial dispute of Fashoda in 1898 when Britain and France
nearly went to war, and when the French in Britain were under intense
2499 Chap5  7/4/03  2:44 pm  Page 185
suspicion. What is even more remarkable is that the French are
described as ‘passive’ precisely when their country was engulfed in the
Dreyfus Affair. We know that Zola, in exile in Weybridge, was able to
follow developments in the Standard and the Daily Telegraph, with an
English grammar by his side, as well as a set of Nelson’s Royal Readers
for children, to assist with his English.4 London press headlines had
featured little other than the goings-on of the Paris courts, and
inveighed against the miscarriage of justice, just as French newspapers
had earlier attacked Britain over Fashoda.5 It is inevitable, then, that
Dreyfus was discussed among French exiles but the overriding impres-
sion is that this remained a private quarrel that never spilled out into
the public arena, maybe because such men and women had no wish to
draw attention to themselves. Perhaps the only tangible way in which
the British public was aware of the ways in which this scandal had split
French opinion was the arrival of religious orders – for instance the
Benedictines of the Abbey of Solesmes, who resettled on the Isle of
Wight until 1922,6 and the Jesuits who made a temporary home in
Jersey. These had been expelled after the formation of Radical anti-
clerical Cabinets, which were determined to protect the Republic from
the perceived clerico-military threat, incidentally the same govern-
ments that sealed the Anglo-French entente of 1904, which soothed
recent colonial resentments.
Remarkably much the same observations about the anonymity of the
French colons could be made on the eve of war in 1939. They remained
a silent and unassuming community, doing little to attract outside
publicity, even though they had witnessed yet another dramatic phase
in their country’s history. In the same way that the Dreyfus Affair split
families, so too the election of the Popular Front had polarised
opinion. Yet these divisions were once again kept out of the public
view, an internal matter; it was only during the war years that they
came fleetingly to the surface, prosperous elements of the community
blaming defeat on Blum and being suspicious of de Gaulle lest he
harboured left-wing elements.
This silence might explain why so little has been written about
French expatriates. It is astonishing that the volume of 1901 cited
above was one of the few studies published in the entire twentieth
century that focuses specifically on the French, this despite the fact
that, in 1931, they comprised 9.2 per cent of all foreign nationals living
in England and Wales.7 After the Polish and Russian communities, the
French constituted the third largest European group of émigrés, their
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numbers even greater than those from Italy, a land whose overcrowded
southern territories had witnessed a steady drip of European emigra-
tion.8 For the first half of the twentieth century, the French continued
to number around 30,000 inhabitants, yet the outbreak of war in 1939
reduced this figure to just over 10,000.9 The irony was that, at this
moment of contraction, it became increasingly difficult for them to
retain their anonymity. Not only did the new arrivals from France seek
out their countrymen and women as a point of reference in a foreign
land, but Gaullists and others were eager to recruit among their ranks
while, in the background, the British government kept a close watch on
their activities, ensuring that any pro-Vichy sympathies did not get out
of hand. Wartime was thus an uncomfortable experience for those who
had long settled in Britain for whatever reason: economic, political,
religious or otherwise. No longer would they be able to play out their
quarrels in private.
The pre-war French community: a statistical overview
It was, of course, Britain’s proximity to France, together with its tradi-
tion as a haven, that attracted French exiles over the centuries. In this
sense, de Gaulle’s flight on 17 June was little different to that of earlier
émigrés, although it might be objected that the scale of the violence and
repression that Hitler and Vichy were to visit upon France was much
greater than that inflicted on the Huguenots, ancien régime nobility and
Communards, however barbaric their own particular experiences of
persecution. De Gaulle was also similar to other exiles in that his stay
in Britain was intended to be temporary; in 1943, he left for Algiers in
the belief that the North African capital was closer to his homeland
than was London. With the exception of the seventeenth-century
Huguenots and those regular orders expelled in the early 1900s, signif-
icantly both the subject of religious discrimination, other groups of
predominantly political refugees, most notably the Communards, had
returned to their homeland as soon as it was thought safe to do so.
In the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it
appears that most of the French who came to British shores did so for
commercial interests, or in search of employment, an indicator of
London’s pulling power as a hub of enterprise, and maybe a sign of the
slowdown in the French economy during the 1880s. It is telling that the
French Chamber of Commerce in Britain, a lively supporter of free
trade, was founded in 1883;10 La Chronique de Londres, a gazette
La colonie Française 187
2499 Chap5  7/4/03  2:44 pm  Page 187
devoted to French businesses and social gatherings, was established at
more or less the same time. Traditionally, French businesses in Britain
had been ‘merchants, wholesalers or retailers dealing in predominantly
fresh food and luxury goods, such as wine, champagne, chocolate, silk,
lace, glassware and clothing’.11 As Fraser Reavell has demonstrated,
during the belle époque these were joined by several others. Four major
commercial banks – Comptoir National d’Escompte de Paris, Crédit
Lyonnais, Société Générale du Crédit Industriel et Commercial and
Société Générale de Paris – established themselves in London. These
were accompanied, adds Reavell, by key industrial concerns such as
Saint-Gobain, Duchesne, Michelin and Peugeot, firms that would
receive a boost during the First World War. Advertising (Agence
Havas), travel accessories (Louis Vuitton), fashion houses (Worth) and
news agencies (Pathé) were not far behind, an example of the way in
which commercial life was expanding at this time. 
It is against this background that the French lived and worked, and
thanks to the 1931 census we know a good deal about their social
profile, although it must be remembered that such statistical material
is open to question: human error; an unwillingness to register; and the
fact that the census is only a snapshot taken every ten years. It is fortu-
nate that the trends perceived in 1931 reflect those of the pre-1914
period; the 1921 figures are distorted by the First World War.
This continuity is immediately seen in the numbers of French men
and women in England and Wales for 1931: 29,175 in total, of whom
2,062 were classed as ‘visitors’, for instance sailors in port, travelling
salesmen and other itinerant workers.12 This overall figure was roughly
the same as in 1911 and 1901 and, as already noted, ensured that the
French were the third largest European group after the Poles (43,912)
and the Russians (36,133), both displaced by the tumultuous events in
Eastern Europe. Incidentally, the Germans (28,048), counted a group
whose size was to increase as Jews and others fled Nazi persecution. Of
the French total, there was a clear gender divide: 9,979 men and 19,196
women. Significantly, for a people proud of their national traditions,
only 13,547, some 46.4 per cent, possessed British citizenship: 2,889
men and 3,852 women were British subjects by birth; 1,020 men and
5,786 women were British by naturalisation, the latter figure suggesting
that many females had found British husbands. 
In terms of occupation, five key categories stand out among males.
The largest proportion were employed in ‘personal services’ (classified
as ‘domestic servants, restaurant keepers, lodging/boarding house
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keepers, publicans, waiters, hall/hotel porters, laundry workers, and
hairdressers/manicurists and chiropodists’): 1,377 in total, 22.7 per
cent of all those 6,070 Frenchmen working in England and Wales.13
The second category comprised those involved in ‘commercial, finance
and insurance occupations’ (proprietors and managers of retail/whole-
sale businesses, brokers/agents, commercial travellers, salesmen,
costermongers/hawkers, bankers and officials): 588 (9.7 per cent). The
third group belonged to ‘professional occupations’ (clergymen,
doctors, dentists, teachers, music tutors, engineers, articled pupils,
authors and painters): 456 (7.5 per cent). The fourth section were ‘in
transport and communication’ (haulage contractors, drivers, ship
owners, ship officers, pursers, stevedores, dock labourers, managers
and porters): 333 (5.5 per cent). A final contingent were
‘clerks/draughtsmen’: 314 (5.2 per cent). After these categories, the
remainder were scattered among a variety of trades, notably metal
workers 170, 2.8 per cent), textiles (182, 3.0 per cent), wood and furni-
ture businesses (94, 1.5 per cent) and entertainment and sport (62, 1.02
per cent), to name but a few.
Figures for female labour largely reflect those of men, and again
point to the underlying economic factors determining French emigra-
tion to England and Wales. Strikingly, the same five categories stand
out, although it was those involved in ‘professional occupations’ (nuns,
mission workers, nurses, schoolteachers, teachers of music, articled
pupils, authors and painters) that dominated: 1,866, 19.5 per cent of
the 9,558 total French female workforce (all ages).14 Those in ‘personal
services’ (domestic servants, waitresses etc.), were the next largest
group: 1,428 (14.9 per cent). Third came ‘Makers of textile goods/arti-
cles of dress’: 647 (6.8 per cent). ‘Commercial, finance and insurance’
constituted the fourth group: 214 (2.2 per cent). As with men, the final
principal grouping was ‘clerks/draughtsmen’ although, in a reflection
of the gendered nature of working conditions, typists were also
included: 232 (2.4 per cent). The remainder were engaged in a wide
variety of occupations, while a sizeable figure, 3,711, were classified as
‘unoccupied or retired’. No doubt a good proportion of this latter
figure were married women who no longer actively pursued a career.
Prostitutes might also have been among their number, especially as
Soho retained its reputation as a red-light district. As the writer
Thomas Burke remarked in 1915, ‘Soho – magic syllables! For when the
respectable Londoner wants to feel devilish he goes to Soho, where
every street is a song. He walks through Old Compton Street, and,
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instinctively, he swaggers; he is abroad; he is a dog.’15
If the occupational profile of the French could have been antici-
pated, given the underlying economic nature of their immigration,
their geographical concentration also holds few surprises. In 1931, the
overwhelming proportion were located in London and the surround-
ing districts. In itself, the South-East region, including the capital and
the Home Counties, counted 7,219 men and 14,165 women, 73.3 per
cent of the entire French population in England and Wales.16
Elsewhere, the Northern Region contained 1,023 men, 1,828 women
(9.8 per cent of the total French population); the Midlands, 684 men,
1,466 women (7.4 per cent); the East Region, 193 men, 404 women
(2.05 per cent); the South-West Region, 448 men, 904 women (4.6 per
cent); and Wales, 413 men, 429 women (2.9 per cent). Within the
London Administrative County alone, there were 3,795 men and 6,730
women. Among those metropolitan boroughs making up this unit, the
majority were located in fashionable districts, notably in the west of the
city, and areas of cheap housing, both south of the river and around the
great railway termini of Paddington and King’s Cross-Saint Pancras:
Chelsea (86 men, 192 females); Hampstead (162 men, 365 females);
Kensington, a traditional French heartland, being the home of both the
embassy and the cultural centre, the Institut Français (320 men, 769
females); Lambeth (359 men, 432 females); Paddington (220 men, 590
females); Saint Marylebone (191 men, 487 females); Saint Pancras (383
men, 555 females); Wandsworth (283 men, 589 females); and
Westminster (543 men, 745 females), comprising Soho still known as
the ‘French quarter’.17 Although Soho had traditionally been a
favourite residence for exiles of all nationalities thanks to its plentiful
supply of cheap hotels, and although by the interwar years it had come
to be dominated by Italians, in the 1930s it was said that Old Compton
Street, with its array of butchers, greengrocers and patisseries was ‘as
French as the rue St Honoré’.18 Away from central London, figures for
Middlesex Administrative County contained 958 men and 1,769
women, the highest proportion concentrated in suburban Hendon
(131 men, 283 women). At the end of the Underground’s Central Line,
Essex was the home to 297 men and 616 females. Among the commuter
belts of Surrey, and its associated boroughs, dwelled 638 men and 1,196
females. Croydon had always housed a small colony of French City
workers,19 while in Kent, only a short steamboat ride from Calais, lived
405 men and 1,122 women.20
Most of the figures for individual boroughs in London, Middlesex and
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the Home Counties outweighed those of entire towns, cities and admin-
istrative districts elsewhere.21 Here, the biggest groups tended to live in
densely populated and built-up areas, no doubt again because of employ-
ment opportunities: Lancaster Administrative County with Associated
Boroughs, including Manchester and Liverpool (403 men, 722 females);
Southampton Administrative County (315 males, 729 females); Stafford
Administrative County (112 men, 224 females); Warwick Administrative
County with Associated Boroughs, notably Birmingham (171 men, 246
females); York/West Riding Administrative County and Associated
County Boroughs (277 men, 438 females); Glamorgan Administrative
County with Associated County Boroughs (294 men, 163 females); and
Devon Administrative County with Associated County Boroughs (154
men, 300 females). In far-flung parts of the country, French residents
were negligible: Carlisle (2 males, 13 females), Cumberland (7 males, 17
females), Barrow-in Furness (7 males, 11 females), to cite but three exam-
ples. As will be seen, in 1941 police forces in such districts reacted with
some bemusement when asked to comment on the political attitudes of
their local French communities, which often numbered no more than a
dozen people.
Although the disruption of the war prevented a census from being
conducted in 1941, internal Home Office statistics reveal that the onset
of fighting involved change and continuity in the lives of French men
and women in Britain: change in that their numbers contracted
sharply, and continuity in that those who remained were concentrated
in London and the Home Counties. On 25 May 1940, French aliens in
the United Kingdom registered with the police amounted to 4,910 men
and 6,825 women, making a total of 11,735, 5.1 per cent of the 228,072
total of all registered aliens. The French were now the fourth largest
European group overtaken, not surprisingly, by Germans (55,023),
Italians (18,374) and Russians (44,704).22 Given the future problems
with facilitating repatriation, nor is it any surprise that this figure
remained more or less constant for the duration of the war: 12,794 in
1941;23 13,639 in 1942;24 and 13,348 in 1943.25 It should be stressed,
however, that these figures were not foolproof. The Home Office
readily acknowledged that the Central Register of Aliens did not include
children below the age of 16, British-born wives who might have taken
French citizenship, temporary visitors and those recently granted
certificates of naturalisation.26 Whereas in the past naturalisations had
been officially announced in the London Gazette, this practice was
stopped on security grounds.
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Explaining the sudden drop in the French population is not difficult.
It was well known that London would be a target for the Luftwaffe,
prompting both better-off British and foreign residents to find alterna-
tive accommodation in the countryside or overseas. The call-up of
reservists for Gamelin’s army also cut a swathe among French exiles; all
male children born to French couples in Britain were still ‘registered in
Paris for military service’.27 Such was the case of Monsieur Vila, whom
we encountered in an earlier chapter with his regiment in Montreuil in
June 1940, having worked previously at the French Railways Office in
Piccadilly.28 Small wonder, that the number of males in England and
Wales dropped from 9,979 in 1931 to 4,910 in 1940. That the number
of women also plummeted from a total of 19,126 to 6,825 is perhaps to
be explained by the fact that many were engaged in temporary employ-
ment, for instance nursing, teaching and waitressing, and may well
have been eager to rejoin their families in France.
As already observed, those that did stay remained concentrated in
London and surrounding areas. In 1941, 6,476 French (3,252 men and
3,224 women) resided in the Metropolitan Police District; 4,784 (1,697
men and 3,087 women) in provinces of England and Wales; 273 (113
men and 160 women) in Scotland; and 43 (17 men and 26 women) in
Northern Ireland.29 As in the early 1930s, outside London, the French
gathered in heavily populated areas, such as Manchester and
Birmingham, and the Home Counties: 154 in Berkshire; 141 in
Buckinghamshire; 143 in Hertfordshire; 127 in Kent; and 183 for
Surrey.30 Within London itself, the French continued to huddle
together in such obvious districts as Soho and Kensington.
Who stayed in Britain? Almost inevitably, we know most about the
wealthy and articulate, men and women who had extensive interests in
Britain and who were to play a leading role in organising the French
community in London.31 Businessmen feature prominently: Monsieur
Petit, ex-president of the French Chamber of Commerce; the elderly
Monsieur Guéritte, formerly head of the Society of Engineers, and a
leading advocate of a Channel Tunnel;32 Monsieur de Malglaive,
managing director of the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique;
Monsieur Boucher, another eminent light of the Chamber of
Commerce; Monsieur Espinasse, a member of the United Associations
of Great Britain and France; Etienne Bellanger, head of Cartier
jewellers, who famously offered his Bentley and services as a chauffeur
to de Gaulle; Comte de Sibour, a graduate of Trinity College,
Cambridge, who had established himself in the City of London; and
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Captain Métadier, director of a large pharmaceutical company, who
lent de Gaulle a sum of a thousand pounds to cover initial expenses.33
Lawyers were another prominent community, including Monsieur
Picarda, a member of the Middle Temple, as were journalists: Paul-
Louis Bret, an English-based reporter for the Havas agency;34 Monsieur
Massip, the London correspondent of Le Petit Parisien; Emile
Delavenay, a correspondent for the BBC;35 Paul Gordeaux, writer for
Paris-Soir;36 Pierre Maillaud who, in 1942, authored an elegy to the
France he had known before it was distorted by Vichy;37 and Elie J.
Bois, the former editor of Massip’s paper who published a scathing
account of the defeatism of Laval and those other parliamentary
Munichois, having spent time observing the goings-on at Bordeaux in
June 1940, and who later wrote weekly columns for the Sunday Times.38
Then there were prominent figures in charge of long-established
French organisations, notably Mme de Lapanousse, head of the French
Red Cross, who commuted from her home in Belgrave Square to
Windsor where her husband was in hospital and her son at school.39
On her death in 1942, her place at the head of the Red Cross was taken
up by her daughter, the Comtesse de Salis.40
Aside from such prominent figures, three other groups made up the
French community. First, there were the less prosperous: governesses,
schoolteachers, au pairs, waiters and waitresses, and those the Census
would have classified as being involved in ‘personal services’. It is likely
that several of these people were working in Britain on short-term
contracts, only to be cut off in June 1940. This appears to have been the
case of Mlle Touchard, whose family was in Le Mans, and who was
teaching conversational French at the University of Glasgow.41 A friend
of the Personalist philosopher Emmanuel Mounier, she was so angered
by Vichy’s foreign policy that she opted to stay in Scotland where she
married and raised a family. Second, figures indicate that women still
dominated the colony, even though their numbers had dropped
sharply, leading to the plausible supposition that many of those who
remained were married to British men. Such women frequently offered
their services to those French charitable organisations operating in
England and Wales, and were commonly pointed by government in the
direction of the Corps Féminin. Typical of such volunteers was Marie
Antoinette Thompson, from West London, who had been married for
twenty-six years to an English doctor. Her son having been killed with
the RAF, she was now keen to do welfare work among her compatri-
ots.42 And, finally, there were a significant number of children,
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although exactly how many remains unknown as those under sixteen
years of age were excluded from government statistics on aliens.
Within London, several of these children had attended the Lycée
Français in Kensington, which had operated under the aegis of the
Institut Français. It will be recalled that to escape the bombing, this
prestigious school had been transferred, via either Cambridge or
Reading Universities, to the Waterfoot Hotel, near Penrith in
Cumberland, where it was assisted by the British Council, and had
opened a kindergarten and elementary school.43 Other boys, as we have
seen, went to Rake Manor. It is further known that some 75 boys, aged
between 14 and 18, had been pursuing their studies in Britain on an
exchange programme, only for their stay to prove longer than antici-
pated; their education continued in camps on the Welsh hillside.44
Astonishingly, educational authorities in both England and France
were still organising such exchanges as late as June 1940,45 just as they
were encouraging schools to designate parts of their classrooms a ‘coin
de la France’, full of French maps and things French, an initiative that
foundered because of the defeat.46
Although the British government would not have admitted it,
Whitehall, or at any rate MI5, would probably have preferred the whole
of the French community to have been based in Wales, diligently
working for the war effort, distant from security-sensitive areas in
London, and hidden from public view. As it was, the attitudes of the
French colons were a key concern for the first two years of the war; after
that point, when it became apparent that Vichy was little more than a
malleable tool of Hitler’s empire, such anxieties largely disappeared.
How, then, did the French colony respond to the events of June-July
1940? And how did the government react to the presence of some
11,000 colons on British soil? 
The colonist response to defeat: organising, rallying and integrating
On 10 July 1940, the very same day that the deputies were convening in
Vichy’s Casino to vote full powers to Marshal Pétain, the War Cabinet
gathered at Downing Street to consider what action, if any, should be
taken against French men and women present in Britain.47 It was a
many-sided question. To whom would these colonists owe their
loyalty? Could they still be counted as allies in view of the Armistice
and Vichy’s early forays into collaboration? Would the marshal’s
personal charisma and magnetism extend beyond the Channel? Would
194 The forgotten French
2499 Chap5  7/4/03  2:44 pm  Page 194
Map 4 The London of the forgotten French: outer areas
Map 5 The London of the forgotten French: inner areas
2499 Chap5  7/4/03  2:44 pm  Page 195
the colonists follow the lead of the London consulate, as they were
known to have done in the past?48 Could the colonists be relied upon
instead to rally to de Gaulle, a man whom the British themselves did
not even trust? What would happen if France declared war on Britain,
not such an unlikely prospect after the sinking of the fleet at Mers-el-
Kébir and with the presence of such well known Anglophobes as Paul
Baudouin, Admiral Darlan, Doctor Ménétrel and Raphäel Alibert in
the marshal’s personal entourage? Would a general internment of all
the French thus become a necessity?
Reading government files, especially surviving Home Office and MI5
reports, it is clear that government anxieties stemmed from the fact
that it did not have a clear picture of the colonist response to events
across the Channel, only occasional snapshots that did not convey the
whole picture. This was hardly surprising. The present study has
repeatedly stressed that the French were a self-contained and well inte-
grated community who kept themselves to themselves, doing little to
antagonise their British hosts. This ability to keep their heads down was
much in evidence in 1940. Indeed, during the widespread fifth-colum-
nist scare of May 1940, when anyone with a foreign accent was
distrusted, the French were not singled out in the same fashion as were
the Belgians and Dutch. Thereafter, it appears to have been newcomers
from abroad, especially Jews, that most agitated commentators, espe-
cially within right-wing circles. As late as May 1941, the Tory MP
Major Sir Ralph Glyn, in the language of Private Eye’s Sir Hufton
Tufton, was complaining to government about the large numbers of
aliens, ‘especially the Jews’, who had targeted property and British jobs
in Buckinghamshire, Berkshire, Surrey and parts of Oxfordshire,
anywhere within ‘an easy train journey of London’.49 It would be
better, he concluded, if these people were ‘further afield’ where they
could no longer come down ‘by motor car or other hired conveyances’.
As Herbert Morrison replied, in the eleven counties surrounding
London such foreigners counted less than one-ninth of the entire alien
population of the UK.50
That the French colonists were largely able to escape such intemper-
ate outbursts is further evidenced in the fact that they are invisible in
the English press at the time. Instead, newspapers concentrated their
attentions on those exiled communities of soldiers and sailors, people
who could immediately assist with the war effort. For much of the
summer/early autumn, The Times ran a series of ‘Will they?’ or ‘Won’t
they?’ articles about whether these reluctant exiles would rally to de
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Gaulle, in retrospect hardly the type of journalism to bolster public
morale.51 No doubt colonists also benefited from the growing tendency
of both the press and public opinion to identify all the French, outside
those renegade servicemen, with the general’s movement, a trend also
picked up in Mass-Observation surveys.52 Nor did the community
possess its own newspaper to make clear its views, La Gazette de
Londres, the successor of La Chronique de Londres, being little more
than a diary of social activities, although it is hard to believe that the
censors would have permitted the publication of pro-Pétainist opin-
ions. When French journals did begin to appear, notably France and La
France Libre, they were either government-run, or led by exiles of 1940
implacably opposed to the marshal’s regime. The same is true of those
French broadcasts on the BBC, which, in any case, were directed at
metropolitan France, not the French colony.
So it is, that the colony’s response to the defeat remains obscure and
impressionistic. MI5 agents took to dressing up as refugees and going
among French circles in Soho where they eavesdropped on conversa-
tions. From such evidence, however piecemeal, one overriding
characteristic nonetheless stands out. While there was general dismay
at the rapid collapse of their homeland, there was little initial enthusi-
asm for de Gaulle who was looked upon with either scorn or
indifference. As Lady Astor’s son David explained in an interview with
Jean Lacouture, one of the general’s most famous biographers:
The English people admired de Gaulle, their companion of the darkest
days, and they respected his courage. In political circles it was neither his
ideas nor his character that was criticized but rather the want of sympa-
thy that he showed for Great Britain . . .
Yet the most surprising aspect of the relations between de Gaulle and
other people was the attitude of the French. We were constantly being
surprised by the ill-will of those who could have been called intellectuals,
of almost all the politicians and of many soldiers. This distrust that he
aroused among the most outstanding members of the French community
in London could not fail to strike us. In our country it was not with the
British but chiefly with the French that he had trouble. And the reason
these quarrels did not become more public is the pressure brought to bear
by the British to restore calm.53
Whether the British were really successful in keeping these squabbles
from public view is open to doubt. The many organisations that
quickly sprang up among the French community could only give the
impression of a people uncomfortable with one another. In her study
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of wartime London, Susan Briggs relates how Londoners considered
that the French had brought France (including its quarrels) across the
Channel with them.54
How do we explain this attitude to de Gaulle? The answer is that the
colons shared the same concerns as many of those other groups making
up the ‘forgotten French’. To begin with, he was ‘an unknown’. What
the French community knew about de Gaulle was much the same as
what the British public knew, information gleaned from the sporadic
newspaper coverage of his early days in London. As much of this
publicity was controlled by Whitehall, and given that the general
depended largely on Churchill’s goodwill, a feeling quickly spread that
this soldier was not his own agent. Even to untrained eyes, it was clear
that Carlton Gardens did not equate a government-in-exile, something
recognised by the prime minister himself when, on 28 June, he
acknowledged de Gaulle merely as the head of the Free French, and not
the head of the French state. So it was that during his early months, de
Gaulle was often slightingly referred to in colonist circles as a
‘puppet’,55 an impression strengthened by the abortive Dakar mission,
which was severely criticised in the press.
It further appears that de Gaulle’s pre-war career, when eventually
revealed to the public, had little to distinguish it, particularly when
placed alongside the military accomplishments of Marshal Pétain,
whose curriculum vitae hardly needed publicising. In this respect, it
seems that British and French colonist perceptions of his past were
determined by their own particular circumstances. The British, aware
that they were on their own and facing imminent invasion, were
anxious to nurture any flicker of resistance, however small. So it was
that de Gaulle’s pre-war views on tank warfare were widely circulated,
his victory at Abbeville extensively publicised, and his famous 1934
volume The Army of the Future printed in translation.56 As one feature
in the Listener of August 1940 declared, ‘this is something of a man, this
de Gaulle, believe me. He was wounded three times in the last war, the
last time at the inferno of Douaumont, where he was captured by the
Germans.’57 Even his misfortunes at Dakar only momentarily dented
this enthusiasm.
For the French colonists, however, these factors counted for little.
Having already seen their nation fall and their army routed, they
believed that de Gaulle had few things to offer. One prominent
Frenchwoman, who was actively involved in charitable work for
refugees, caught this mood accurately when she described de Gaulle as
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a ‘chocolate soldier’.58 According to another source, who frequented a
French circle within London, ‘the general and his staff are referred to
in tones of condescension, amounting almost to scorn. A visitor could
not fail to get the impression that the movement is of little account.’59
Rumours also grew up that de Gaulle had surrounded himself with
some dubious personalities whose politics reflected his own. The accu-
sations that de Gaulle was a Bonapartist or Boulanger figure are, of
course, well known, and stemmed from those exiled intellectuals such
as the Gombault brothers, André Labarthe and Raymond Aron. The
paradox is that, at the time of his arrival, colonists, especially business
elements who had deeply resented the Popular Front,60 often perceived
him as a man of the left; it was reported, in particular, that Pierre Cot,
the former minister of air in the Popular Front Cabinet of 1936, was
among his entourage. This might have been because Cot was one of the
few politicians of note to have fled France in 1940, thus avoiding the
farcical Riom trials in which Vichy attempted to lay blame for defeat on
the politicians and soldiers of the Third Republic. For this very reason,
de Gaulle kept his distance from Cot. The general might also have been
conscious of British suspicions. There was a good deal of sniping at Cot
on the part of British politicians, principally Conservative MPs, some-
thing that Eden and Noel Baker came to deplore.61 Such sniping was
also apparent among British-based French circles reflecting the socially
conservative nature of the chief representatives of the French colony in
London who, as we have seen, did not look back on the Blum experi-
ment with any nostalgia. Although de Gaulle’s early supporters usually
came from right-wing officer circles, and although Cot himself quickly
left for the USA, the stigma remained. The Comte de Sibour, for
example, described as ‘entirely pro-British and anti-Vichy’, only joined
the Free French when he reassured himself about the general’s support-
ers.62
De Gaulle might have helped his cause if he had made a greater effort
to broaden his appeal. Yet his aversion to publicity was profound, iron-
ical given the way that he would later play the media in the Fifth
Republic. Not only did he want to protect his handicapped daughter
Anne from unwanted attention, he had no wish to be manipulated by
the British. Yet this reluctance also stemmed from his belief that, in
taking his stand, he had adopted the only position possible, and thus
commanded the moral high ground. Because of this, he needed to do
little further to explain his actions. As Crémieux-Brilhac relates, this
was why he behaved as though Rome was no longer in Rome; it was in
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London instead.63 As Julian Jackson adds, de Gaulle’s notorious rude-
ness might further have originated from the belief that he had to show
that his movement, however small, possessed teeth.64 Certainly
colonists were witnesses to this sharp behaviour. One recalled to
Churchill his experiences of Carlton Gardens, where he discovered that
‘many Frenchmen who have offered themselves to the general were
received and interviewed in such a way that they came out with their
confidence shattered’.65 After one distinguished gentleman, a veteran
of the First World War, emerged from his interview, he quipped, ‘I
understand now why we have been beaten.’66 Emile Delavenay relates
the story of Jean-Jacques Mayoux, a naval officer attached to the
Admiralty, who was so put off by his reception by de Courcel that he
rejoined his family in France, eventually becoming a prominent figure
in Ceux de la Résistance.67 All this was ultimately of little concern to
Carlton Gardens. If de Gaulle was convinced he was right in his deci-
sions and was indeed the embodiment of France, he was certainly not
going to moderate his demeanour for the sake of men who had
forsworn their country for long-term exile, a concept he himself could
not comprehend.
Above all, de Gaulle appears to have alienated colonist support
because he was a ‘rebel’. Many colonists, used to obeying the injunction
of the consulate, no doubt feared that retaliation might be meted out
against their families in France, as did those servicemen stranded after
the Armistice, and indeed members of the Free French themselves who
adopted pseudonyms. Delavenay cites the case of Pierre Isoré,
employed as an interpreter in the navy, who was unfortunate enough
to be interned in one of the sailors’ camps, and who chose to return to
his home in the Corrèze.68 Fear, however, was not the only factor that
led many to see de Gaulle as a rebel. This notion originated from the
widely held view that Vichy was the legitimate government of France,
whatever the general himself might say. This viewpoint was most
vividly expressed in a letter of July 1940, intercepted and read by the
British, from a prominent leather merchant to Semet, a leading light of
the FGB:
I consider, and I still consider that it is quite possible for Frenchmen to be
devoted to the English cause, obedient to the laws of England, and at the
same time loyal to the French government and its representatives. I do
not know any French government other than that called the Government
of Vichy.69
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In early 1941, MI5 could report that this view was still prevalent among
well placed colonist circles, notably in the CEAF: ‘Vichy remains the
true government.’70
It was appreciated, however, that such opinions did not make such
men necessarily ‘anti-British or pro-German’,71 although it was likely
that they were Pétainist. Delavenay despaired at such maréchaliste
sympathies among fellow expatriates who were only too glad the Third
Republic was gone and that the hated figures of Daladier and Blum
would stand accused of its failings.72 Sensibly, they kept these opinions
to themselves; and, to be fair, their Pétainism was generally of a
‘passive’ kind. Apart from those Vichy consular figures and senior offi-
cers we encountered in earlier chapters, few French men and women
were what could be best described as ‘active’ Pétainists, in that they
were committed wholeheartedly to the reactionary values of the
marshal and his National Revolution.73 The exception was those
catholiques avant tout, whom we will meet later, and whose influence
was quickly curbed. As in metropolitan France, the admiration that
existed for Pétain was of a ‘passive’ nature, a belief that he constituted
a symbol of enduring France, a protector of his people, a bulwark
against the decadence that had led to the collapse of the nation. The
notion that the marshal was playing a double game with the Germans
also did the rounds, and in early 1941 there were rumours that de
Gaulle himself was in contact with Vichy, although this gossip might
also have been an attempt on the part of the general’s many enemies to
slur his name.74 Whether an underlying sympathy for Pétain endured
much beyond 1941 is hard to know, testimony again to the ability of
French colonists to keep their views to themselves, yet it seems likely; it
is not difficult to believe that expatriates convinced themselves that de
Gaulle was the sword of France while the marshal acted as its shield.
Organising
If French exiles had carried one national characteristic across the
Channel with them, it was an ability to organise, combined with an
extraordinary inability to settle mutual concerns. Before 1940, there
existed a myriad of such groupings, often representing business inter-
ests, which were often at loggerheads with one another. In 1939, in an
attempt to patch up outstanding differences, they were assembled
together under the aegis of the Comité Central Permanent de la
Colonie Française,75 a committee comprising delegates from sixteen
different societies, who worked together in the prosecution of the war
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effort, the exiles’ own attempt to emulate the Union Sacrée of 1914
when competing political and religious factions within metropolitan
France had agreed to bury the hatchet for the duration of hostilities
with Germany.76 Among the sixteen were the following: the
Association Culinaire Française,77 the Chambre de Commerce, the
Société des Anciens Combattants (founded 1927), the Société de
Bienfaisance, the Alliance Française (1907), the British Section of the
French Red Cross, the Assistance aux Familles des Soldats Français, and
the Hôpital Français (1867). The unity provided by the Comité
Permanent proved fragile, however, and in the immediate aftermath of
the defeat, a series of new organisations began to emerge, much to the
dismay of Bessbrough’s French Welfare, which had, of course, been set
up to keep the peace.
The most prominent of these new bodies were: the Union des
Français d’Outre Mer (UFOM), anti-Vichy but not pro-de Gaulle; the
CEAF, which we have encountered already and which retained
Pétainist ties; the FGB, the so-called civil wing of the Free French; and
the Amis des Volontaires Français, an Anglo-French inspiration, which
assisted de Gaulle’s troops.
The UFOM was the first new organisation to emerge, having been
founded sometime during the phoney war. The brains behind it were
Métadier, who had earlier helped de Gaulle, Dr Pierre Picarda, and de
Bellaing. The last of these, in the words of French Welfare, was of
‘French parentage, but educated in England’ and spoke ‘perfect
English’.78 More is known about his fellow countryman, Picarda.79
Born on 7 August 1897, he was the son of a French barrister and was
himself a member of the Paris Bar. He also possessed a distinguished
service record. He had fought in the First World War with the 25th
Battalion of Chasseurs, and had volunteered for the Corps Francs.
Wounded in 1918, he had been awarded both the Croix de Guerre and
the Légion d’honneur. In 1926, he had married an Englishwoman,
Winifred Laura Kemp, by whom he had four children, all born and
raised in England. In 1937, he had been called to the Middle Temple
and established a practice in London; on the eve of war, he was the legal
adviser to the French consulate. Interestingly, he had also worked as a
lawyer in Germany where he had witnessed first-hand the rise of the
Nazi party.
Enjoying the patronage of Sir Thomas Moore, the new head of
Hatchard’s bookshop in Piccadilly,80 and the Duke of Westminster, the
UFOM had been granted the use of 33 Upper Brook Street at a nominal
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rent of £2 per annum. It was there that the organisation developed its
statutes, which made manifest the organisation’s opposition to Pétain
and Vichy, but also its distance from de Gaulle, who was already viewed
as a Boulanger-in-waiting.81 With the motto ‘Loyauté nous lie’, the
UFOM’s purpose was to coordinate ‘on civil lines the efforts of all free
Frenchmen in Great Britain as well as the rest of the world’. It thus
welcomed all Frenchmen into its ranks so long as they acknowledged
‘their attachment to France and their desire to see her freed’, ‘their
continued friendship with Great Britain whose allies they remain’, and
‘their will to pursue, by all possible means, the struggle against the
German and Italian aggression and their confidence in the final victory
of the Allies’. The UFOM further set up a fellow movement, Amis de
France, to collect together British supporters who were dedicated to the
preservation of French culture and the liberation of Europe.82 This
never got off the ground, merely attracting the curiosity of a handful of
intellectuals.
Warming to its task, the UFOM established a French club in London
with a reading room, a French mutual aid society, a canteen, a legal
advice centre and a series of leisure activities (film shows, lending
library and lectures). It also formed an Information Department to
keep the French people, wherever they might be, up to date with the
progress of the war. Detailing its support of the Allied war effort, the
UFOM promised to cooperate with the British official services by
providing propaganda, especially for the BBC. It even aspired to the
use, via the British authorities, ‘of a broadcasting station for several
hours daily which on a wave-length of our own, would permit us to
speak directly to our compatriots as independent Frenchmen and to
convince a whole section of French opinion which is at present on
guard against all exclusively British information but which is, however,
far from accepting enemy propaganda’.
This remained a pipe dream, as did plans to set up a newspaper, a
scheme endorsed by Sir Thomas Moore.83 Nonetheless, the UFOM was
active in producing its own propaganda under the direction of Bret, for
many years the London correspondent of the Havas agency, who, on
the eve of war, was press attaché to the French embassy. Elie J. Bois,
formerly of the Petit Parisien, also contributed to this propaganda
drive. Thanks to the involvement of Bois, the UFOM initially enjoyed
a good relationship with Massip, the London correspondent of Le Petit
Parisien, who had recently become press director under de Gaulle.84
Whether this camaraderie survived is open to doubt. It was in the
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basement of Upper Brook Street that the Ministry of Information
newspaper France, the successor to the Journal du Camp, was edited by
the Gombault brothers, Charles and Georges, two socialist exiles from
France who became prominent in their denunciations of de Gaulle’s
dictatorial tendencies, reflecting the left’s traditional mistrust of mili-
tary figures. When Georges Gombault was introduced to de Gaulle on
4 July 1940, he later quipped that he had never expected to meet
General Boulanger himself.85 Although the Gombaults gravitated to
the left-wing Groupe Jean-Jaurès, founded in August 1940 by Louis
Lévy, himself a severe critic of the general, they still devoted a consid-
erable column space to the Free French in the pages of France, and did
not openly attack the movement.86 It was this evenhandedness that
contributed to the paper’s success, ensuring a circulation of 25,000 per
copy, many of its readers being congregated among the colonist
community.87 This success also owed much to the Ministry of
Information, which insisted on a high measure of editorial impartial-
ity, pointing out that the initial intention had never been for the
newspaper to be edited in UFOM’s headquarters. This had become
necessary merely because the original building had ‘been partially
wrecked’.88 Indeed, on reading the many articles about the conduct of
the war and events within occupied Europe, the untrained eye might
have difficulty in spotting the left-wing bias of France, and the implied
criticism of de Gaulle. This is to underestimate the extreme sensitivity
of Carlton Gardens, and its allies, to reproach, real or imagined, and
their fear of the left. It did not go unnoticed that the Gombaults
employed other socialist sympathisers, for instance Gustave Moutet,
the son of the Popular Front Minister for Colonies.89 In November
1940, the Spears Mission denounced the alleged left-wing leanings of
France, questioning in particular a recent review of the defeat of
France, which had been attributed to a misguided sense of ‘militarism’,
something interpreted as a veiled attack on de Gaulle.90 In the words of
Lady Spears, France ‘speaks with the voice of Blum and the Front
Populaire’. Taking heart from these criticisms and upset at recent
coverage of King Leopold of the Belgians,91 the FGB also had its
twopenn’orth, Massip making known that he was personally prepared
to put up money to expand the newsheet to eight pages so long as the
Free French had a hand in editorial policy.92 Maybe more offensive was
an article crafted by Robert Mengin, entitled ‘Les Priviligiés’ of October
1940, in which he accused French exiles of living it up in high-class
restaurants in Soho,93 a claim vehemently denied by de Gaulle’s
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supporters, and maybe an explanation why so many exiles mention
their eating habits in their memoirs,94 either that or they simply could
not get over their first experience of British food.95
When none of these grumblings was taken seriously, one Foreign
Office official remarking that ‘both the French and Belgians should be
treated like the schoolboys most of them are’,96 in 1941 Carlton
Gardens made a direct approach to the Ministry of Information offer-
ing to share in editorial responsibilities, but only on the condition that
the Gombaults, Lévy and Pierre Comert were removed.97 This gesture
was declined on the grounds that the paper would then become
nothing more than an expression of ‘right-wing’ opinions fashionable
in Free French circles.98 The quarrel thus rumbled on, even when, in
1942, the Free French were given the go-ahead to print their own
paper, La Marseillaise, which quickly alienated the Foreign Office
because of its ‘extreme de Gaullist line’.99
Meanwhile, without its own newspaper, in early September 1940 the
UFOM, through the intermediaries de Bellaing and a Mlle van de Berg,
approached the British Council for an annual grant of 3,200 francs.100
When French Welfare was subsequently told of the request, its
response was lukewarm: ‘We should certainly not give our blessing to
any proposal to grant a large sum of money to the suggested French
centre at 33 Upper Brook Street.’101 Although Bessborough’s organisa-
tion did promise to look further into the matter, requesting a ‘line’
from the French Division of the Ministry of Information, it is clear that
its hesitation arose from the problems of already having to deal with
the FGB and the CEAF.102 After all, French Welfare had been set up
specifically to promote unity among French exiles, and there was little
desire to work with a third organisation that contained members from
the FGB and the CEAF. As to a ‘line’ on the UFOM, the Ministry of
Information gave the same response as it did to a telegram from a
British diplomatic official in Tokyo where, presumably, Picarda’s
agents had also been active:
Union referred to is small organisation which, while not owing allegiance
to General de Gaulle, is in favour of resistance. At present, our only crit-
icism of it is that it pretends to be something more than it is.103
Internally, however, the Ministry was especially critical of Picarda, who
was regarded as ‘an ambitious politician’.104 Suspicion also centred on
some of the UFOM’s supporters, in particular a certain American busi-
nessman who, it was believed, had involved himself in the movement
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simply to recover investments in France at the end of the war.105
Without friends in either French Welfare or the Ministry of
Information, UFOM was also held in doubt by the Foreign Office,
which harboured a particular dislike of Métadier who was described by
one official as ‘a little mad . . . and [someone who] from a kind of mega-
lomania produces schemes’ that were impractical.106 The fact that the
UFOM was also opposed to the FGB further irritated the Foreign
Office, which, like French Welfare, despaired of the rivalries and
factionalism that characterised the French communities in exile.
The Gaullists also did their bit to sabotage their rivals. When a
French resident in Putney Hill, probably put up to the task by a UFOM
supporter, deluged the Foreign Office with letters asking whether His
Majesty’s Government supported the movement and whether there
was official approval of its aims,107 the full extent and nature of Free
French hostility became apparent. In an internal note, the Foreign
Office observed that ‘de Gaulle’s people regard it with extreme
disfavour; it has no connexion with them . . . and they disapprove of the
people who organise it, not so much because they are not perfectly
loyal to the cause of free France, but because they will not join up defi-
nitely on the side of de Gaulle’.108
The reluctance of the British to lend support, the internal rivalries,
the growing magnetism of de Gaulle and the superior organising abili-
ties of the FGB, ensured that, at the close of 1940, the UFOM was on its
last legs.109 As early as September that year, Foreign Office officials
noted that it did not enjoy any ‘wide support among Frenchmen in this
country’.110 It subsequently became the Union des Français under the
direction of André Labarthe, the leading physicist, who, together with
the philosopher Raymond Aron, had arrived in London in the summer
of 1940. Initially, Labarthe had helped de Gaulle, working at Carlton
Gardens, organising supply, but personality differences led him to
leave in August. He had further felt alienated in that he was the sole
civilian at the headquarters and was ‘treated with scant respect’ by the
military.111 For their part, de Gaulle’s men had seen Labarthe as a
hindrance as his presence lent credence to claims that the general was a
man of the Popular Front, Labarthe having earlier acted as an adviser
to Cot when he was minister in the Popular Front.112
A free agent, Labarthe approached the Ministry of Information for
support of a publication, described as being of ‘a somewhat highbrow
and scientific nature’, Labarthe himself being characterised as ‘a sincere
patriot’ but ‘somewhat of a fanatic, very intolerant and therefore prob-
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ably intolerable’.113 Aware that he had been an associate of Cot, the
Ministry asked the Foreign Office whether anything was known against
Labarthe as it did not wish to be associated with anyone who might be
‘shot in the Tower!’114 Certainly MI5 reports, based on Gaullist black
propaganda, were not favourable: Labarthe was accused of surround-
ing himself with Communists, notably his secretary, a Pole who was
alleged to be a Soviet spy, and was held responsible for the leaking of
the Dakar mission, a somewhat wild charge given that de Gaulle’s men
had openly kitted themselves out in colonial outfits at Simpson’s in the
Strand and had been spotted at Liverpool Street station with maps of
West Africa.115 Wisely, the Ministry of Information recognised that
Labarthe was victim of ‘an Anglo-French Blimp offensive’;116 and, on
15 November 1940, he founded the journal La France Libre.
This soon became the leading intellectual journal of the French
community in Britain, the New Statesman and Nation describing the
editorial skills of Labarthe as nothing short of ‘genius’.117 Devoted to
culture as much as to politics and propaganda, it regularly published
articles by a wide range of contributors, among them Raymond
Mortimer, Alexander Werth, Eve Curie, Camille Husmans and Charles
Morgan, and in its first edition drew the support of such heavyweights
as G. M. Trevelyan and Somerset Maugham.118 Thanks to the high
quality of its journalism, it was this journal, rather than the rump of the
UFOM, that became the more important. Ten thousand copies of the
first edition of La France Libre quickly sold out, and a further 8,000 had
to be published. It proved popular with all sections of the exiled
community, and regularly published articles about English customs,
yet whether it truly reflected the concerns of the London-based colons
remains open to doubt. Labarthe, who edited articles by Robert
Marjolin on economic planning, bemoaned the fact that he regularly
received pieces from French hairdressers, chefs and waiters, about their
experiences of London life.119 The experiences of la vie quotidienne
were left in the capable hands and artistry of Jean Oberlé.120
Whether La France Libre met with the approval of de Gaulle’s
supporters, given their earlier doubts about Labarthe, also remains
questionable, although Carlton Gardens was initially an enthusiastic
subscriber. By 1942, however, Labarthe had completely lost patience
with de Gaulle, and championed the cause of Admiral Muselier who
had been dismissed by the general that year.121 Labarthe later took up
the case of Maurice Dufour, training his journalistic sights on the
alleged Cagoulard connections of Colonel Passy. For his part, Aron was
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more restrained in his anti-Gaullism and, on only one occasion, wrote
on the subject, an article of August 1943 entitled, ‘The Shadow of
Bonaparte’.122 Indeed, spotting the anti-Gaullist stance of La France
Libre requires a trained eye, and an awareness of the hair-trigger sensi-
bilities of Carlton Gardens. In 1942, an editorial crafted by Labarthe,
introducing an article by Camille Rougeron on tank warfare, was seen
as a criticism of de Gaulle’s military views; the result was that Carlton
Gardens refused to take that particular issue, lodging a protest with the
Foreign Office for good measure.123
While La France Libre became an irritant to de Gaulle, it did not
incur the same wrath as did the CEAF. We have come across this organ-
isation on several occasions already, and it will be remembered that its
function was primarily to assist ‘refugees and all necessitous French
nationals’.124 What grated with Carlton Gardens was that this organi-
sation, under the patronage of Lady Warwick, had particular links with
the Vichy consulate; indeed, its first president was Bardot, an official of
Bedford Square. Its other principal representatives were prominent
businessmen who had shown a deep mistrust of de Gaulle, and an early
admiration for Pétain: the then president of the Chambre de
Commerce; the leather merchant whom we met earlier; and H— , a
‘distinguished chef’. It should be stressed, however, that there were
limits to their Vichyite sympathies and that, in many ways, they
reflected the right-wing tendencies that could be identified among
Resistance movements in metropolitan France, especially La Défense
de la France, founded in the cellars of the Sorbonne. As French Welfare
made clear to the CFR in February 1941, these individuals were not
pro-Nazi but ‘belong to that category of right-wing Frenchmen, whose
hatred of the Germans has been watered down by the perpetual fear
that the only alternative to good relations with the Nazis is a
Communist revolution in France’.125 All that mattered to them was
that Blum was out and that Pétain was in; and it was in these circles that
the rumours of de Gaulle’s left-wing leanings freely circled. Moreover,
they considered that the marshal had legally attained power, whatever
the Free French said to the contrary. Yet, as already noted, this suspi-
cion towards the Free French did not necessarily equate outright
hostility. E— had a nephew living with him who was a member of the
Free French Air Force, and the CEAF regularly assisted Free French
troops. Nor was there any evidence, concluded Bessborough’s
Committee, that ‘these non-supporters of de Gaulle have ever
attempted openly to disrupt the movement’.126 Their quarrel was not
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with those who wished to continue the struggle but with their compa-
triots who adopted a ‘rebel’ attitude to Pétain.
As well as incurring the wrath of the Free French, the CEAF also
earned the disapproval of the FGB. Overlooked in virtually every book
on the French in London, this had begun life in June 1940, and was not
inspired by the general’s appel of that month. With the decision of the
Bordeaux government to cease fighting and request an armistice,
prominent members of the French colony in London were frightened
that Franco-British relations would deteriorate in such a way that there
would be no organisation left to represent their future interests.127 In a
letter of 15 July, Semet, the FGB vice-president, explained to Sir
Alexander Maxwell of the Home Office, how ‘the catastrophic events’
in the first fortnight in July had confirmed these fears leaving the
community ‘bewildered’. The closure of the embassy had further
compounded the issue, and had meant the colons were ‘in need of a
lead’.128 Thus, on 5 July, Semet and his associates had decided to
marshal the French colony in Great Britain into an organisation, the
Association des Français de Grande Bretagne (FGB). The chairman was
the engineer, M. Guéritte, and, in the words of Semet, ‘one of the best
known and respected Frenchmen in England’. Its vice-presidents
included de Malglaive, managing director of the Cie Générale
Transatlantique and A. Boucher, formerly head of the French Chamber
of Commerce. Two meetings had already been conducted; and, at the
second of these, held on 9 July, a letter was sent to Churchill, assuring
him of ‘the complete devotion of the French Colony in England to all
war efforts until victory and placing our services unreservedly at the
disposal of the British authorities’. Thanked by Bevin on behalf of the
prime minister, the FGB had also drawn praise from de Gaulle who,
related Semet, took ‘complete satisfaction’ that the FGB should deal
with civilian affairs, although, as we shall see, whether this approval
was wholehearted remains doubtful. Promising to work in ‘complete
cooperation with the British authorities’, Semet concluded that the
FGB would include practically all Frenchmen who were permanent
residents in Britain, and requested that it be recognised by the Home
Office as the ‘liaison’ between the British government and those French
residing in this country.
Alongside this request, Semet enclosed the statutes of his new organ-
isation.129 These reiterated the following aims: the desire to act as a
liaison between the British government and the French colony; the
support for a British victory; and the desire for the liberation of France.
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The second statute expressed the FGB’s intention to become an associ-
ation of individual members, not merely a federation of existing French
societies and organisations, an early sign of the movement’s ambitions.
After subsequent articles listed its twenty-seven founding members and
the responsibilities of executive posts, there followed a rousing appeal
to the French colony:
Nous ne nous soumettons pas, parce que nous avons partagé avec
l’Angleterre, les mauvais et terribles jours de la guerre, parce que, unis à
elle, nous avons échangé nos secrets les plus intimes, parce que sur les
champs de bataille nous avons combattu et souffert à côté de nos frères
anglais et parce que nous sommes engagés, sur l’honneur, à continuer
ensemble la lutte jusqu’au bout.130
While sympathetic to the aims of the FGB, the Home Office was
already on its guard, fearful to entrust any sensitive intelligence to this
embryonic movement, which had yet to prove its bona fides. When, on
15 July, leading lights of the FGB, Guéritte, de Malglaive and Boucher,
visited Newsam at the Home Office, they were reminded ‘that any
scheme or proposal for obtaining and placing at the disposal of the
British government the names of French citizens in this country who
were prepared to assist actively in the prosecution of the war would be
a matter for Departments other than the Home Office to consider’.131
The function of the Home Office in respect to aliens, continued
Newsam, was ‘primarily the preservation of the security of the
country’. The ways in which the FGB could help the Home Office
would be to supply the names of French citizens ‘who were engaging in
anti-British propaganda or other activity likely to impede the prosecu-
tion of the war’. Although they agreed energetically to this request, the
French visitors were no doubt disappointed that Whitehall had not
readily volunteered information of its own, especially in regard to the
names and addresses of the colons in Britain. As would later become
clear, this was the information they treasured above all else.
For the moment, the FGB developed an impetus of its own. On 27
July 1940, over six hundred people assembled for a general meeting
held at the YMCA in Tottenham Court Road.132 Here, Guéritte quoted
a declaration of support from Churchill, before hinting at the develop-
ing relationship with Carlton Gardens:
Notre Association ne dépend d’aucun gouvernement; elle ne dépend pas,
non plus, du Général de Gaulle. Mais indépendance n’empêche pas
collaboration avec ceux qui ont en vue le même but que nous: la victoire
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britannique qui amènera la libération de la France. L’Association a donc
pris contact avec le Général de Gaulle, pour voir de quelle façon nos deux
actions parallèles peuvent se coordonner en ce qui concerne l’élément
civil, tout en maintenant notre indépendance. 133
Not long after, the FGB claimed to have become the civil wing of the
Free French. The movement was especially excited when de Gaulle
instructed the Technical Department at Carlton Gardens to contact
the FGB with a view to launching a recruitment drive, targeting tech-
nicians and engineers in particular.134 After further contact between
Passy and Guéritte,135 on 14 September 1940 Pierre Fontaine of the
FFL apparently explained that de Gaulle had studied with care the
statutes of the FGB, and was pleased to recognise the organisation as
the ‘partie civile’ of La France Libre.136 It was further claimed that
the general had urged his compatriots in Britain to join the FGB, and
had appealed to all existing French organisations to fuse with
Guéritte’s body. On 26 October 1940, René Cassin delivered a speech
at Westminster House in which he described the organisation’s
mission as ‘particulièrement belle’.137 On 21 February 1941, de
Gaulle personally addressed a letter to Semet in which he reiterated
his hope that the FGB would recruit for his cause.138 The FGB took
special pride when in November 1941 it helped organise a public
meeting for de Gaulle in the Albert Hall, where it was able to display
its 4,000 members.139
Whether the FGB ever officially became the civil wing of the Free
French is debatable. Carlton Gardens never made any public statement
to such effect; rather these claims always emanated from inside the FGB
itself, maybe explaining why the organisation is usually invisible in
histories of the Free French. It is further significant that the Spears
Mission, an organisation very much in tune with the Free French,
insisted in October 1940 that the FGB change its statutes so as to make
its support for de Gaulle unequivocal.140 Moreover, it will be remem-
bered that the general had little time for the wider question of the
colonists, other than to win recruits. Their allegiance he expected as a
matter of course, and it is significant that de Gaulle never made
approaches to the FGB other than to help him uncover technicians and
engineers among the exiled community. The Gaullist line on the FGB
was best put in January 1942 by Tissier who, like British officials,
clearly saw it as a jumped-up organisation. In conversation with
Foreign Office representatives, he alluded to it as essentially ‘oppor-
tunist and commercial’ in nature, and was disconcerted that it took
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under its wing movements that accepted Vichy money such as the
Comité d’Assistance aux Familles des Soldats Français.141
While the FGB might never have officially become the civil wing of
the Free French, it nonetheless became the most prominent organisa-
tion among French colonists, muscling in on the activities of others.
On 12 December 1940, the Comité Central Permanent de la Colonie
Française voted itself out of existence handing over its functions to the
FGB; the Société de Bienfaisance also agreed to affiliate with the
FGB,142 probably because it realised that this was the surest way of
guaranteeing its financial survival, having been refused a British grant
and with all of its French assets, mainly invested in the railways,
rendered worthless by the war.143 Another long-standing organisation
of the French community in Britain shortly followed suit: the Vichy-
funded Comité d’Assistance aux Familles des Soldats Français. In
January 1941, Lady Warwick complained that the FGB was attempting
to take over the French Chamber of Commerce, putting up new
conseillers for election.144 These new people were a ‘dangerous lot’, she
added, and might attempt to oust our own people in important trading
centres abroad.
Whether the FGB was successful in this démarche remains unclear,
but it certainly had aspirations overseas. Having assembled prominent
businessmen into a colonial committee, the FGB dispatched a series of
letters to those governors in the empire who had rallied to de Gaulle.145
The FGB scored a particular hit when the Fédération Britannique de
l’Alliance Française (FBAF), the British branch of the French overseas
cultural body, decided that Vichy was a government operating under
duress, and so gave its support to de Gaulle, and by proxy to the
FGB.146 This was much to the disgust of E— of the CEAF who declined
an invitation to become part of the Council of the Alliance as it meant
sitting alongside such prominent Gaullists as Guéritte. Requests
quickly followed that the FBAF should receive British government
subsidies, requests that were sympathetically received in the knowledge
that most other branches of this worldwide organisation, especially in
South America, were sympathetic to Vichy.147
One cultural outpost remained outside of the growing tentacles of
the FGB: the Institut Français in South Kensington, originally founded
in 1910.148 In July 1940, the future of this distinguished body was in
doubt as its source of funds from the University of Lille had been
severed, and its chairman, Lord Askwith, in the words of a British
Council representative, suffered from the ‘twin infirmities of old age
212 The forgotten French
2499 Chap5  7/4/03  2:44 pm  Page 212
and deafness’, and was thus unable to exercise ‘those qualities of active
and skilful leadership’.149 Tellingly, it was the Free French, rather than
the FGB, that made the first initiatives, another indication that the two
bodies were not necessarily hand in glove. In his capacity as
Commissaire National à l’Instruction Publique, René Cassin explained
to the British Council that the Institut, ‘could be of the highest useful-
ness to the Free French movement’, both in producing propaganda and
in awarding degrees, ‘subject to eventual ratification by appropriate
universities’, especially to engineers and those who had passed their
exams in France and were keen to fight alongside de Gaulle.150 As to the
creation of a Maison Française in Trafalgar Square, he continued, this
was an FGB proposal, and was intended principally as a social club, not
as a rival to the Maison Française that was associated with the Institut
Français. For its part, the Foreign Office, increasingly pro-de Gaulle by
late 1941, was sympathetic to Cassin’s request, but the plans faltered on
two rocks of opposition. The first was Professor Saurat, the director,
and professor of French Literature at the University of London since
1926. Not only had he fallen out with Cassin and other Free French
personalities, he was determined that the Institut should continue its
specialised cultural work, and disliked the notion that it should be
deployed as a propaganda tool. No doubt his later likening of de Gaulle
to Napoleon stemmed from the general’s intention to turn his founda-
tion into a finishing school for technicians, a project that smacked of
the utilitarianism of Bonapartist educational policy. It is also likely that
Saurat garnered support from several residents at the Maison of the
Institut: Mengin, Labarthe, Aron and Etienne Dennery.151 Yet whether
Saurat would have been able to stand his ground, given the Foreign
Office’s desire to see him transferred to Bristol, which acted as the
University of London’s wartime home,152 remains doubtful. The latter
was fortunate that there emerged a second, far more formidable, rock
of opposition, in the shape of Lord Bessborough. He was alarmed to
hear that the Free French had interested themselves in the affairs of the
Institut. The establishment, he argued, belonged properly to the French
government, and was only temporarily in British hands. No doubt in
the back of his mind was the fear that if it was entrusted to the Free
French, de Gaulle would be able to make yet stronger claims to be the
legitimate government of France. 
Quite how the arguments played out remains unclear as the archival
trail goes cold. In any case, it is likely that the Institut became less of a
prize catch for either the FGB or the Free French as, in 1942, the
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Maison was the victim of a severe bombing raid. Tellingly, however,
Saurat remained the director, and in 1943 was prominent in agitating
against the ‘Cagoulard’ Passy.153
Having colonised many of the existing French societies and cultural
outposts in London, the FGB sought to boost membership. This was to
be achieved by fair means or foul. Among the business community in
London, it was learned that Guéritte had spread ‘threats that if they do
not join de Gaulle the British authorities will throw them into concen-
tration camps’,154 maybe an exaggerated rumour as Guéritte was
profoundly deaf. What caused the Foreign Office greater anxiety was
the news that the FGB intended to organise a ‘manifestation of Allied
civilians in Great Britain, and that this manifestation should pass a
resolution of gratitude to Great Britain and faith in the future’.155
Bessborough immediately recognised that this was a ‘self-advertising
stunt’, but in an interview with de Malglaive chose more diplomatic
language, pointing out that such an event would do little good and
much harm as inter-Allied affairs ‘were rather tricky and delicate’. De
Malglaive agreed, but claimed he was being strongly pressed by
members of the FGB who had been heartened by an earlier meeting of
Inter-Allied representatives at St James’s Palace and by the fact that the
royal family had recently received Allied heads of state. The Foreign
Office remained unimpressed and sided with French Welfare. It was
understood that such a manifestation would create resentment on the
part of other Allied citizens many of whom might refuse to partake in
the event. The example of the Norwegians was cited. They were so
angered by the self-aggrandising instincts of the FGB that they refused
to have anything to do with the organisation. Accordingly,
Bessborough thanked the FGB for its endeavours but declined the
request, pointing out that ‘in the present circumstances’ it would ‘serve
no useful purpose’. Further alarm bells rang in autumn 1941 when it
was learned that FGB representatives had been speaking to TUC offi-
cials over the possibility of creating a British association, drawn from
trade union members.156 Given the conservative nature of the FGB’s
leadership, this was truly a remarkable move, yet it does not seem to
have originated from any Pauline conversion to collectivism. Rather,
the FGB was looking to replace the ailing UAGBF and, ‘puffed up’ by
the success of organising de Gaulle’s speech at the Albert Hall in
November 1941, approached the unions probably because they had a
lengthy membership list that could be easily contacted. Membership
lists were everything to the FGB, as we shall see.
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Increasingly agitated by the behaviour of the FGB, in autumn 1941
the Foreign Office hoped that it would be able to control the direction
of the movement, and contain its many initiatives. With the AGM close
at hand, it was naturally expected that Guéritte would stand down as
president as he was ‘practically stone deaf’.157 Semet, the vice-presi-
dent, was thought an unlikely contender as replacement as he was
widely perceived to be, in the distinctly non-Gallic phrase, ‘not much
of a chap’.158 This, then, was the ideal moment to put forward Roger
Cambon, the living embodiment of the entente cordiale, as the new
leader. At a recent lunch, Cambon had been heard to utter some
favourable remarks about de Gaulle, and it was said his dining
companion the Vicomtesse de la Panousse, who in December 1940 had
backed General Catroux against de Gaulle, now kept photographs of
Free French soldiers in her oeuvroir [sic]. Cambon’s appointment
would not only make the FGB easier to control, it would also lend pres-
tige to the movement, encouraging the remaining two thousand or so
London colonists to sign up. Needless to say, neither Cambon nor the
FGB were susceptible to these intrigues, and Guéritte, deaf as a post,
remained in post.
Unable to influence the FGB, Whitehall had to field several of its
requests. The first of these, presented immediately after the meeting of
27 July 1940, was that its members should enjoy the privileges of allies
that they had been enjoying up to 17 June; since the Armistice, they had
become the subject of Aliens Restrictions Orders, limiting their
freedom of movement and compelling their registration with the
police.159 In July, it was thought far too early to concede this kind of
privilege. Later, in October, while the CFR acknowledged that there
could be no relaxation of this restrictive provision, it was recom-
mended that FGB members should receive ‘lenient treatment’.160 How
far this operated in practice remains uncertain, although it is known
that it was not until the closing months of the war that overall restric-
tions were lifted.
Next, the FGB sought from the Home Office ‘a complete list of
French residents’, something it had been too shy to request explicitly
when its representatives met Newsam in July,161 so that it could mount
a recruitment drive. ‘We will leave it to the British authorities’,
remarked the FGB, ‘to decide what is best to be done with those of our
compatriots who, for whatever reasons, have decided or will decide not
to join our Association of Free Frenchmen [sic].’ Such a move would
enable the association to issue a membership card, stamped by both the
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Home Office and police, which would then confer on its holder the
privileges of an ally, another move designed to get round the Aliens
Restrictions Act. The FGB even suggested that MI5 should assist them
in the vetting of members, something that was rejected out of hand as
a government security agency could not be placed at the disposal of a
private organisation. 
This quest for the names of French residents never ceased, yet
government was naturally cautious about handing over such material
as it ran counter to the general policy of not disclosing ‘to any third
party names of aliens in this country without their consent’.162 In prac-
tice, the Home Office was prepared for police forces to disclose ‘for the
benefit of the Belgian, Czech, Dutch and Norwegian authorities infor-
mation regarding respectability of persons offering hospitality to
soldiers of these foreign countries’.163 Such information was not for the
French. The government was disturbed that the CEAF had also
requested a full list of French residents,164 and there remained the
perennial fear of Vichy reprisals. When, in February 1941, MI5’s
regional officer in Reading reported that he was certain that police
forces were in fact giving information to the Free French, chief consta-
bles were warned once again of the dangers of this action.165
The final request of the FGB was to receive a similar type of blessing
to that that had been granted to de Gaulle’s movement on 28 June. This
received a sympathetic hearing, especially after Bessborough outlined
the situation of the French colony in London. In his view, this
comprised two communities, the first in complete support of de
Gaulle, the second consisting ‘of persons who have been here for years
and who proclaimed themselves to be just as loyal to our cause as the
first group’. Bessborough further added both groups frequently
‘abused one another’. It was thus agreed that there was an urgent need
to clear up the existing situation and so encourage all those sitting on
the fence to come out openly in support of the Allied cause. If there was
a single society that could facilitate this union, then it was deserving of
support, suggested Bessborough. Whether he would have made the
same recommendation knowing the troubles the FGB would bring him
in 1941 is doubtful. In any case, the Foreign and Home Office both held
that ‘HMG could not give official recognition to a private body.’166 In
this situation, all government was prepared to do was to endorse de
Gaulle’s support of the movement and inform other departments,
notably the Treasury, which could provide financial aid, that the FGB
constituted the only grouping ‘deserving of our support’.167
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There remained one organisation that the FGB was less eager to
colonise, partly because it was an Anglo-French creation, partly
because it was already Gaullist in orientation, partly because it included
FGB members on its committee, and partly because its intentions were
very different from its own. This was the Amis des Voluntaries Français
(AVF) which held its first meeting on 6 September 1940. Here, an exec-
utive was formed comprising the following: Earl de la Warr
(president); de Malglaive (vice-chairman); Lord Ivor Spencer
Churchill and Captain Hesse (honorary secretaries); Bellenger
(honorary treasurer); and committee members the Marchioness of
Crewe, Lady Peel, the Hon. Crawshay and M. Morhange.168 The objec-
tives of the organisation were laid out thus:
The Association, exclusively authorised by General de Gaulle, has been set
up in London to coordinate all offers of help and to centralise all gifts
emanating from Great Britain and abroad sent to him for the welfare of
the volunteers. The aim of the Association is to establish a link between
organisations and individuals, whatever their nationality, who wish to
extend moral and material help to the French volunteers.169
As a later AVF letter to The Times of 7 October 1943 pointed out, in its
three years of existence, the organisation had managed to establish 57
branch committees throughout the British Isles ‘grouping over 30,000
associate members of whom the great majority are British’.170 As well
as raising the impressive sum of £53,542 15s 0d in 1943 compared to
£19,239 4s 7d in 1941,171 the AVF had set up canteens, clubs and foyers
for the use of de Gaulle’s troops, including a Maison des Ailes at
Ditchley Park for personnel of the Armée de l’Air.172 Enjoying the
patronage of the British Council and French Welfare, with which it
enjoyed cordial relations,173 the AVF in 1943, was prompted by the
creation of the Committee of National Liberation in Algiers, to assist all
French forces fighting for the Allied cause ‘irrespective of their past
affiliations’.174 At the close of August 1944, membership of the AVF
had swelled to 40,000, but it aimed for 100,000 by the close of the
year.175 Paradoxically, as Allied troops swept across France and, as
many French in Britain prepared to return to their homeland, the AVF
busily promoted its film Born in Britain portraying the lives of those
babies that had been delivered in exile.176 A further paradox was that it
was only at the Liberation that squabbling over the AVF became open,
although it is apparent that Carlton Gardens had assiduously moni-
tored the attitudes of its committee, alleging in March 1941 that Ivor
Churchill had let drop pro-Vichy remarks.177 In 1944, arguments
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largely revolved around what honours should be distributed to its
leading acolytes, and what should be done with its remaining monies,
some £30,000 in total, together with a considerable amount of
goods.178 Exasperated by the continuing struggles within the French
community, Bessborough offered simple advice: wind the organisation
up.179
Les catholiques avant tout
There remained one group of French colonists, bolstered by new
arrivals from their homeland, who generally remained outside any
organisation but who nevertheless retained a distinct identity in that
they were united in their faith and were eager to see the institution-
alised secularism of the French state vanquished once and for all: les
catholiques avant tout.
Religious intolerance had, of course, always been a spur to French
emigration to Britain: the Massacre of Saint Bartholomew and Louis
XIV’s Revocation of the Edict of Nantes had displaced thousands of
Huguenots who had since settled in England, especially in London’s
East End. Over the centuries, however, they had largely assimilated
English culture and were no longer the prominent religious force
among French colonists. This distinction had passed to those religious
orders that had been expelled at the start of twentieth century when, in
the fall-out of the Dreyfus Affair, the state had denied such men and
women the right of association (law of 1901) and had subsequently
banned them from teaching altogether (law of 1904). Although many
religious defied this legislation, several had settled elsewhere: in
Belgium, where de Gaulle himself had attended the school of an exiled
order, travelling across the border each day to school, and in Britain.
The 1931 Census recorded 133 French priests and monks, along with
765 nuns and Sisters of Charity.
In June 1940, these men and women were joined by several of their
co-religionaries. It will be recalled that, among the refugee population,
there came some fifty priests and novices, together with nuns displaced
from the coastal towns of Dunkirk and Calais. It was further recognised
that many of the servicemen trapped in England were extremely
devout. This was especially true of the officer class. It was noted that
officers held in Blackpool, deliberately segregated from their men, were
‘intensely Catholic’, and believed Pétain was the only means of restor-
ing ‘the spiritual greatness of France’.180 The same observation could be
made about several of the naval ratings, despite the fact that Admiral
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Darlan, a non-believer, was at their head. French Welfare officers
frequently commented that a majority of the sailors held in the camps
of north-west England were ‘intensely religious’ Bretons.181
Furthermore, it is well documented that Action Française supporters,
their hatred of the Boche greater than their admiration of Pétainist
principles, were among early recruits for de Gaulle. As one early volun-
teer complained to Morton, such men were already attempting to
resurrect ‘la vieille France’ within the general’s movement, even though
this was responsible for the defeat.182 Tereska Torrès, a Jewish convert
to Catholicism, met some of these Action Française adherents on her
voyage to Britain, the first time she had ever encountered this political
group face to face.183 Appreciative of their courage, patriotism and
enthusiasm, she was nonetheless alienated by their anti-Semitism,
snobbish attitude and pretentious airs.
In 1940, fears about these catholiques avant tout were essentially
threefold. First, how would they respond to the overtly pro-clerical
policies that Pétain was pursuing?184 Within the first six months of his
regime, he abolished freemasonry, the scourge of clericals; sacked
allegedly secularist schoolteachers; provided minor financial palliatives
to Catholic schools; removed the ban stopping religious orders from
teaching; and, for a brief moment in January 1941, restored the cate-
chism into the timetable of the state primary school, an institution
hitherto strictly neutral in religious matters. Such measures had, in
turn, given great delight both to the Vatican, whose newspaper
L’Osservatore Romano called the creation of Vichy ‘the dawn of a new
radiant day’,185 and to members of the French episcopacy who fell over
themselves to praise Pétain, the ‘man of the moment’. It is now known
that the French Church was deeply divided in its attitude to Vichy, and
that the rank-and-file clergy, youth movements and laity quickly lost
their initial enthusiasm for the regime, especially when it began its
merciless persecution of Jews and other minorities. Nonetheless, this
early enthusiasm gave rise to a second fear. Would the presence of
catholiques avant tout in Britain disturb other members of the French
colony, turning them into fifth columnists? In this regard, the govern-
ment had at hand regular reports of the High Commissioner in Canada
who had spoken of how French Canadians openly admired the marshal
whom they cheered whenever he appeared on newsreels. While they
did not like Laval, whom they viewed as a traitor, they applauded him
as a good Catholic, something he clearly was not, whenever Protestants
in the audience hissed him.186
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From such reports emerged a third fear, reminiscent of the anxieties
of British governments in the 1790s when there had been another great
influx of devout Catholics.187 Might catholiques avant tout pollute the
loyalties of their British co-religionaries? Not only were such men and
women traditionally viewed as ‘outsiders’, in the 1930s it had not gone
unremarked that leading Catholic intellectuals, men such as Douglas
Jerrold, John Strachey Barnes, Michael de la Bedoyère and Robert
Sancourt, had displayed an unhealthy interest in fascism.188 In the six
months immediately after the French defeat, the leading Catholic
journal the Tablet devoted no fewer than twelve major articles to
France, which were bitterly critical of the Third Republic, and even
uncovered a connection between the French Revolution of 1789 and
the Nazi takeover of 1933.189 There was also talk of a Latin bloc,
comprising France, Italy and Spain, which would act as a deterrent to
Bolshevism. As Horsfall Carter bemoaned in the pages of New
Statesman and Nation, ‘A careful scrutiny of the Catholic press in this
country since the downfall of France is highly instructive. The “line”
may be summed up as a pathetic attempt to reconcile an attitude of
faith, hope and charity with regard to the new France – which has
broken with the pernicious liberal, rationalist and secularist tenets of
the Third Republic – with the patent fact that Marshal Pétain and co
are entirely under Nazi domination.’190 This provocative article
sparked off a running correspondence between Catholic and non-
Catholic intellectuals in the New Statesman and Nation that continued
until the end of the year. 
The reasons why British Catholics ultimately remained loyal to the
Allied cause have since been amply explored.191 Apart from the influ-
ence of the Ministry of Information and BBC, which were keen to rein
in any overly pro-Pétain sentiment, historians have stressed the ability
of British Catholics to put their own house in order. Particular credit
has been attached to Cardinal Hinsley who deftly handled the media,
both Catholic and otherwise, and the success of the Sword of the Spirit,
a Catholic movement inspired by, among others, Christopher Dawson,
A. C. F. Beales and Manya Harari, which campaigned tirelessly for the
victory of the Allies. It is also questionable whether the presence of a
small number of French catholiques avant tout would have had any
impact on British Catholics who had their own structures and hierar-
chies. In this respect, it was perhaps fortunate that their number did
not include any significant intellectual figure such as Emmanuel
Mounier, the Personalist philosopher, whose early sympathy for the
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values of the National Revolution led him to establish the leadership
school at Uriage. Other leading voices, such as Jacques Maritain and
Georges Bernanos, chose exile in the USA and South America respec-
tively, where they quickly made known their distaste for Vichy’s
authoritarian leanings and compliance with Nazi Germany.192
The absence of a domineering intellectual presence also goes some
way in explaining why catholiques avant tout were not to influence
French Catholics in Britain, yet several other reasons also present
themselves. To begin with, the Ministry of Information once again had
an impact. Having warned such leading publications as the Catholic
Herald against adopting an overly sympathetic line on Pétain,193 it also
ensured that its own publication France included plenty of anti-Vichy
ammunition directed by prominent Catholic writers and politicians.194
This included Cardinal Villeneuve’s speech at Quebec in which he
praised the Free French, a broadcast from Bernanos, an article by
Thierry d’Argenlieu, and Cardinal Hinsley’s speech at the Foyles
luncheon in honour of de Gaulle. Bernanos himself volunteered to
publish propaganda in Britain, approaching the British ambassador in
Brazil as early as July 1940, an offer that was taken very seriously.195
The Ministry also helped with the publication of the monthly Catholic
newspaper La Volontaire pour une Cité Chrétienne, which in 1943
achieved an annual circulation of 15,500.196 Edited by the prominent
émigré Francis-Louis Closon, ably assisted by Guy Hattu, a
commando, René de Nauvois, a priest and another commando, and
Andrée Desloyers, a doctor, this publication was largely distributed in
the Middle East and African colonies, rather than the London commu-
nity, but stressed the anti-totalitarian tendencies of the Free French and
helped counter the impression that the French Catholic press was
entirely pro-Vichy. Closon was especially pleased by the paper’s title,
which was designed to be a deliberate snub to Vichy which portrayed
all overseas resisters as adventurers without faith nor a sense of law.197
Outside the Ministry’s publications, La France Libre also did its bit,
printing the ‘message’ from Jacques Maritain,198 and publishing an
extremely perceptive article by Jacques Rochelle highlighting the splin-
tered opinions within the French Church, especially the resistance
shown by Mgr Saliège, archbishop of Toulouse.199
Hinsley himself was just as significant in containing the Pétanist
sympathies of the French community as he was in controlling British
Catholics. In August 1940, following the pronouncements of
L’Osservatore Romano on Vichy, he announced that these had been
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‘quoted in this country to create a wrong impression’.200 ‘We must
make it clear’, he stressed, ‘that Catholics are and will remain loyal to
their country’s cause while they are also trustfully devoted to the Holy
See.’ Hinsley also took practical measures, interviewing priests destined
to tend to the men at White City to ensure that they were suitable.201
He also reined in the Marist priest at the French Church in Leicester
Place, near Leicester Square, recognising the importance of this insti-
tution to the expatriate community. Founded in 1865, it had become
just as central to expatriate life as was the consulate in Bedford
Square,202 and was often the first port of call for many new arrivals in
1940, including Tereska Torrès.203 All the more disturbing, then, that
in July the priest delivered a series of ambiguous sermons on the fall of
France. He was severely rebuked by his superior. In a letter of apology
to Hinsley of 28 August, he admitted that he had used the pulpit to
make ‘veiled’ references to politics, and claimed that these must have
been ‘misunderstood’ by the congregation.204 It is not known exactly
what was contained in his addresses, but it appears to have been criti-
cism of the Third Republic. Nonetheless, he promised that there would
be no further cause for complaint and agreed with the cardinal’s ruling
that ‘the pulpit should be used only for purely religious matters’.
Shortly afterwards, his church was destroyed by a German bomb, and
the Ministry of Works and Buildings questioned whether it should be
rebuilt, despite its status as ‘the official and only church of the French
colony in London’, as reconstruction meant ‘the use of scarce materi-
als and of still scarcer labour’.205 Both the Foreign Office and Ministry
of Information backed the application,206 despite the fact that the priest
remained Vichy in instinct.207 In the words of one government report,
he was a fifth columnist of the ‘worst sort’.208 Yet, like many other
French institutions in London, because his church was colonised by a
whole range of French – FGB and the Free French members as well as
Vichy consular officials – something of the priest’s Vichy sympathies
were diluted.209 After the war, the Church became a meeting place for
Free French veterans, especially on Armistice Day when they commem-
orated fallen colleagues.210
Apart from Hinsley, other leading members of the Catholic hierar-
chy did their bit to contain any Vichyite sympathies, both at home and
abroad. In September 1940, Postal Censorship intercepted a letter from
the Catholic writer Robert Speaight, then in New York distributing
pro-British propaganda, to Bishop Mathew at Westminster
Cathedral.211 There in America he had met with Maritain, and together
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they had agreed that a Pontifical High Mass, attended at Westminister
by de Gaulle, members of the British government and the French
community, would go some way in countering Pétainist propaganda
both in Britain and the USA, particularly the unfounded claims that de
Gaulle was anti-clerical; as in the case of his supposed left-wing lean-
ings, it appears that the lack of information about the general gave rise
to some wild rumours about his religious position. The scheme for a
mass had, however, been frowned upon by a Spanish priest in their
company, a representative of the papacy, who remarked that, ‘Le
Vatican n’entend que des menaces.’ While acknowledging Churchill’s
support for Italian and German missions, the same priest had also
denounced the ‘indolent and aristocratic manner of the British govern-
ment’. For its part, the Foreign Office thought such a mass was a good
idea, bringing out the ‘best in Catholic France’,212 although on
approaching Desmond Morton, himself a Catholic, it was learned that
Carlton Gardens was more or less empty thanks to the Dakar mission;
those who remained were ‘super atheists’.213 Nonetheless, such masses
would become a common feature in the life of Westminister Cathedral
during the remainder of the war.
Elsewhere within Britain, the Catholic archbishop of Liverpool, Mgr
Downey, warned the government from employing, in the sailors’
camps, leading officials of the French colony from the city, many of
whom were members of the Catholic Women’s League, as these ladies
were ‘suspect’ in their political outlook.214 Such warnings were espe-
cially apposite as it was among stranded soldiers and sailors that
catholiques avant tout were most active. In July 1940, Castellane, the
French chargé d’affaires, urged that Abbé P— , attached to the
consulate and the French Church in Leicester Square, should be
allowed to visit wounded troops at White City where he would ‘abstain
from any politics’.215 His earlier failure to hold his tongue had led to his
exclusion, and the request was turned down. 
‘Troublesome priests’ were, though, active elsewhere, especially in
the North-West. Particular suspicion was levelled at a Father N—
M— , an Irish priest, an Italian rather than French-speaker and a
member of the Benedictines, who was attached to the camp at
Trentham Park, and who was well known to Georges Blond, the right-
wing naval engineer whom we met earlier.216 In a lengthy letter to Lady
Peel, he vigorously refuted allegations that he was pro-Pétain.217 ‘Vichy
I detest’, he declared. ‘Pétain and Weygand I disapprove of in the
strongest terms. That they are Catholics is none of my business: my
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disapproval of them is based not on religious grounds, but rather on
the fact that they represent a government and country which has
broken faith and treaty with ours.’ He further condemned their associ-
ation with Laval, and was deeply troubled by Pétain’s private morality:
‘I learn on good authority, long before I came here, that Pétain married
a divorcee, so I have no great opinion of his Catholicity, though I
believe the matter of his marriage has been rectified.’ The letter went on
to say that he approved of de Gaulle’s actions, having listened to him
on the radio, something to which his fellow fathers could attest.
Condemning those who wanted to return to France, he cited the many
occasions on which he had recruited for de Gaulle, and spoke of how
he had reported one French officer for helping sailors to escape in civil-
ian clothes to Liverpool, from where they arranged a safe passage
home. Concluding this lengthy rebuttal, he suggested that his reputa-
tion for being anti-Gaullist stemmed from an early reluctance to
distribute pro-British propaganda and an association with a certain
Père B— D— from the Doddington camp who had earlier visited
Trentham Park. When the two men had called in at the de Gaulle
recruiting office in Stoke, a political argument broke out and it had
soon become clear where D— ’s loyalties lay even though ‘he was
soundly whacked by all the others on every point under discussion’.
The letter certainly did the trick. Rear-Admiral Watkins was said to
have considered the continued presence of Father M— at the camp ‘a
matter of “national importance”, as he has had an extremely favourable
good influence on the men’.218
Ultimately, les catholiques avant tout represented a minority group-
ing within the colony. Despite many of them being members of the
clergy, both secular and regular, they lacked organisation and were
easily isolated by Hinsley, French Welfare and others. The fact that, in
1941, de Gaulle’s own spiritual loyalties became apparent might also
have contained their anguish. He might have bemoaned the fact that
‘the synagogue sends me more than the cathedral’, but several promi-
nent Catholics emerged in his entourage, among them Maurice
Schumann, a former editor of L’Aube, René Pleven, the jurist and
former head of the Asociation Catholique de la Jeunesse Française, and
Thierry d’Argenlieu, who along with Muselier is credited with devising
the Cross of Lorraine.219 So it was that catholiques avant tout amounted
to little more than a nuisance.
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The British government and the colons: internment and restrictions
In preparation for war, ‘the Government had decided that there should
be no general internment of aliens in Britain at the outbreak of hostil-
ities’.220 Nonetheless, restrictions were placed on freedom of
movement and, as early as April 1939, it was agreed that general intern-
ment would, at some point, be necessary. Preparations were thus put
into place and lists of foreigners drawn up. Three categories of enemy
aliens (A, B and C), principally Italians, Germans and Austrians, were
distinguished: the first group were the most dangerous and were
earmarked for internment immediately on the outbreak of hostilities.
During the fifth-column scare of May 1940 Category B aliens, initially
subject to restrictions on movement, particularly in coastal and other
security-sensitive areas, were likewise interned. The final C group, who
had not been targeted for either internment or curtailment of their
liberties, men and women about whom the British government had no
real grounds for suspicion, were rounded up the next month.
Being allies, the French of course had not figured in any of these
discussions, but the dramatic events across the Channel quickly
focused government attention. In several regards, Whitehall’s
approach mirrored the general policy it had adopted towards enemy
aliens, and it was a close-run thing that the French colony was not
eventually subject to the same fate that had befallen Italians, Germans
and Austrians.
Early internees
It will be recalled that the question of interning French men and
women figured in Cabinet discussions soon after the Armistice. On 10
July ministers gathered at Downing Street to consider what action
should be taken against French nationals in the event of France declar-
ing war on Britain, seemingly a real prospect after Mers-el-Kébir and
the Vichy retaliatory bombing of Gibraltar.221 Here, a report of the
Aliens Advisory Committee, which recommended no general or
immediate internment of Frenchmen, was endorsed. Nonetheless, lists
were to be made of those special cases who would need rounding up
should the occasion arise. While it was admitted that the numbers were
not likely to be large, confusion arose as to who should be included.
The Home Office believed it should comprise those who would have to
be detained ‘on account of their knowledge of British plans and prepa-
rations or in view of their technical skill’.222 Inevitably, this would
include members of the French missions, who were returned in
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September 1940, leading to discussions as to whether they should be
joined by the remainder of cases filed by the government.223 To clarify
matters, the Home Office acknowledged that should Vichy now declare
war, ‘the whole of the French colony would have to be considered each
on his own merits’, especially as it was rumoured that ‘a fair proportion
of the French Colony is by no means pro-British’.224 It was concluded,
however, that there was nothing ‘to do before the event, but if Vichy
declares war we shall want a Tribunal for the French’.225
Who, then, were interned during these early months? We know their
numbers were not large. In a letter of February 1941, the Foreign Office
explained to Chartier that 64 Frenchmen had been held since July the
previous year.226 Of this figure, 39 had been repatriated; 18 had been
released; only 7 remained in detention. 
Surviving evidence suggests that the majority of internees were not
colonists but awkward members of the missions, such as Captain de
Rivoyre who will be remembered from the preceding chapter, and
servicemen, guilty not so much of fifth-columnist activities but of a
defeatism that threatened to poison their colleagues. Such was the case of
F— G— K— , an officer evacuated from Dunkirk and subsequently held
at Winchester gaol for having said that troops should not join de Gaulle
and that England was on the verge of revolution.227 Another case was that
of commander R— . Before the Armistice, he had been attached to
Bomber Command.228 Because of his strong Pétainist sentiments, Air
Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal had requested he be confined. The
conditions of his internment were not hard. Under house arrest at
Selsdon Park Hotel, Surrey, he was still at liberty to wander round the
surrounding area. MI5 kept a close watch on these movements, but did
not uncover any evidence to prove that he was distributing anti-British or
anti-Gaullist propaganda, as the Spears Mission alleged. It was known,
however, that he was in receipt of funds from Chartier at the Vichy
consulate. In view of his predicament, this charity was not unreasonable.
In the eyes of the Spears Mission and Carlton Gardens it was a sure sign
R— was guilty. René Pleven of the Free French expressed astonishment
that he was permitted such license to roam and urged that he be placed
under closer surveillance, for instance at the hotel in York, the home of
other suspect French officers.229 There, in the provinces, he would not get
up to any mischief, and would not be in contact with the Vichy
consulates. In the event, such draconian action appears to have been
scuppered by the Air Ministry, which thought it improper to treat one of
its former staff in such a manner.230
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R— ’s fate remains uncertain as does that of P— H— C— . On 3
March 1941, Chartier wrote to the Foreign Office requesting that this
man be freed from the camp at Lingfield and allowed to go to Brazil; at
the very least, he should be placed in ‘forced residence’ at a hotel.231 On
investigation, it was discovered that C— had been interned on account
of ‘professional misconduct’, most likely defeatism rather than spying,
while working as a technician in certain ‘war processes’ at Hull. He had
subsequently been placed in a camp to prevent him coming into
contact with others. For this reason, the Foreign Office saw no reason
why he should be allowed to go to Brazil or be given ‘more comfortable
accommodation’.232 Nevertheless, his case came before the Lindley
Committee, dealing with troublesome aliens, where it was recom-
mended that he be released so long as the Free French accepted him for
service.233 C— was subsequently interviewed by de Gaulle’s men but
was found wanting. The result was that he was moved to Mooragh
Camp on the Isle of Man.234
Other cases, for instance that of a man held since August 1940,
because of his knowledge of technical matters and association with a
German agent, and that of a refugee who had spread defeatist views in
the factory in which he worked, also came up for periodic review, but
they appear to have been among the seven unfortunates held for the
duration of the war.235
It was not just suspected Pétainists and defeatists who fell foul of the
British authorities. In early 1941, the British embassy in Washington
forwarded to London a letter that it had received from James Cannon,
National Secretary of the Socialist Workers Party in New York. This
alleged that Robert Frank, ‘a well known French revolutionist’ had
been sentenced by a London police tribunal at Marylebone to six
months hard labour for not having registered properly with the
police.236 At his trial, the defendant protested that this lapse was
through fear that he might be turned over to Vichy who had
condemned him to an unknown penalty in absentia. As we have seen,
this was not an uncommon anxiety among French exiles who fretted
that reprisals might be taken against their relatives back in France. On
hearing the explanation, the judge was unimpressed and denounced
Frank as ‘a subversive person’; copies of The Tragic Situation of the
Workers and Peasants of France and The Imperialist War and the World
had been found among his possessions in College Crescent
Hampstead.237 Cannon was shocked. Having been hounded out of
France by ‘democrats who preferred Hitler to a resurgence of the
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French people’, Frank now found himself in the paradoxical position of
being imprisoned by a country that was opposed to Vichy. ‘Elementary
justice’, concluded Cannon, demanded that Frank be freed. When the
Foreign Office looked into the case, however, it was discovered that
Frank had also been engaged in anti-British activities, and was deemed
‘a danger to the community’.238 The prison term had since been
extended on account of this, although it was determined that Frank
should not be returned to France where he was likely to receive even
less favourable treatment. Instead, he was transferred to the internment
camp on the Isle of Man where, fittingly for a former secretary of
Trotsky, he was quickly mobilising the anti-fascists against others in
the compound, organising a hunger strike and popularising his anti-
Gaullist views.239
How much of a danger Frank truly was remains in doubt. At least he
had done something to attract the attention of the authorities, unlike
the unfortunate J— B— , an engineer who had lived for some time in
the UK dealing in patents for oil-refining machinery.240 He had been
arrested on 16 August 1940 and subsequently held at Pentonville.
Despite both he and his family having close contacts with de Gaulle,
and despite his plight being championed by the MP Dr Leslie Burgin,
B— had been expelled and repatriated in Marseille. The case caused
some embarrassment within Whitehall where no one would take
responsibility and where it was admitted nothing untoward was known
against him. ‘Looks like another MI6 muddle’, scribbled one Foreign
Office official on the file; ‘no doubt MI5 are the niggers in the wood
pile’, wrote another in less diplomatic language.
Justice at least seems to have been served in the case of Mlle Nicole.
On 28 July 1941, the Rabat newspaper La Vigie Marocaine recorded her
story under the headline ‘L’odieux traitement infligé par les
Britanniques à une infirmière française’.241 A member of the automo-
bile section of the French Red Cross, Nicole had served in the First
World War and, in 1940, had again transported the wounded. With the
Armistice, she did not consider her role ended; instead, she travelled to
Britain on 17 September to assist those refugees and soldiers stranded
across the Channel. Having been furnished with the necessary papers
by the British, she was astonished to be arrested eight days after her
arrival. No explanation was given as to her internment, and she subse-
quently spent 279 days in prison, thirteen of which were spent in a
‘cachot’. She was eventually released on 11 June 1941, yet still no reason
was given for her incarceration, which clearly distressed the nurse. In
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early July, British censors intercepted a letter she sent from Portugal,
where she had been deported, to a Mr Griggs of the American Red
Cross in London.242 In this, she recounted her 279 days in jail and the
‘cruel treatment’ she had suffered. She was furious that the British Red
Cross had taken so long to vouch for her, despite the fact Anthony
Eden’s sister had been a member of her motor corps and that de
Gaulle’s own nurses had come to see her. ‘A victim of wilful cruelty’,
she had been sent third class to Liverpool, accompanied by detectives,
and then dumped on a cargo vessel for the 20-days’ voyage to Lisbon,
although ‘anything was better than Holloway’.
Perturbed by the story, the British consulate at Tangier requested
from the Foreign Office the full facts of this ‘exaggerated case’ so it
could put these to the French authorities and quash the propaganda of
the two local French newspapers, which were becoming ‘ever more
virulent’.243 Worryingly, the German press was also publicising the
case, the Völkischer Beobachter claiming that 1,200 women were being
tortured in London.244 So it was that the Foreign Office looked into the
matter. As a note of 13 January 1941 revealed, Nicole had come to
Britain, alongside a colleague, Mlle Terré, whom we met earlier. Both
had been arrested on the suspicion of spying, the distribution of anti-
British propaganda and the engineering of a ‘clandestine loophole in
the blockade’.245 Her colleague was quickly released when it became
apparent that she had travelled across the Channel in good faith; mean-
while, further worrying discoveries were made about Nicole. In a letter
of March 1941, the Foreign Office revealed that Nicole, laden with
‘defeatism even before the Armistice’, had been sent over, with German
connivance, to spy on de Gaulle’s organisation and to execute a plan
whereby supplies would be sent to France, ostensibly for refugees but
in truth to break the blockade.246 It was because of the seriousness of
her crimes that the British government remained unmoved in the face
of protests from both Chartier and the American Red Cross.247 As one
official later reflected, she was ‘an unpleasant personage’ and ‘far from
being an injured innocent’,248 although it was agreed by all that
Holloway had not been the place to keep her, especially at the time of
the Blitz.249 Whether this treatment or her latent Anglophobia inspired
her later actions can only be guessed at. In August 1941, back in France,
she was reported to be in charge of the Section Sanitaire Automobile
where she was conducting anti-British propaganda which she proposed
to export to West Africa.250
With only a few French men and women interned in the first six
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months after the Armistice, it may have seemed that colonists had little
to fear for the future. Even if some retained an admiration for Pétain,
they could still point to their anti-German credentials. Yet the issue of
internment did not go away, especially given the turn for the worse in
British-Vichy relations at the start of 1941.
General internment?
With the dismissal of Laval on 13 December 1940, and his eventual
replacement by the Anglophobe Darlan as chief minister and dauphin
to Pétain, the Foreign Office braced itself for the worst. There seemed
to be a real possibility of war breaking out between Britain and France,
thus forcing government to return to those questions that had figured
in the War Cabinet discussions of July 1940. Where would the loyalty
of Frenchmen in Britain lie, and what policy should be adopted in their
regard?
It is testimony to the seriousness of these questions that they regu-
larly figured in government discussions for the first six months of 1941.
Strikingly, the minutes of the CFR reveal that the agency keenest on
some general internment was Carlton Gardens. Even though the Free
French did not have a seat on the CFR, it is significant that the Spears
Mission, still very much the porte-parole of de Gaulle, spoke most
emphatically about ‘doubtful’ French elements in this country. At the
meeting of 28 January 1941, Spears himself presented a memorandum,
which relayed the awful choices that had confronted Frenchmen in
Britain since the Armistice.251 While he acknowledged the Free French
were not entirely reliable, much praise was lavished on de Gaulle’s
men, who had at least chosen sides. ‘As long as there are any doubtful
Frenchmen in this country’, he continued, ‘there is bound to be a great
danger of this information percolating through to pro-Vichy individu-
als, who may pass it on to Vichy itself, and that is equivalent to its
falling into enemy hands.’ That there were ‘a great many Vichyites in
this country’, was not in doubt, and Spears berated MI5 for not doing
enough about them. The policy of the security services, he surmised,
was to do as little as possible to antagonise the French community,
hoping this would ‘prevent them from becoming violently hostile’.
This policy was flawed as no neutrally-minded person would turn into
a ‘dangerous pro-Vichyite’ simply because MI5 was watching him or
her. The inevitable conclusion was that ‘every Frenchman, who is not
enrolled with the Free French (and even these require very careful
watching) or who cannot be vouched for by English friends of long
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standing should . . . be requested to leave the country’. ‘There can be
only one consideration’, concluded Spears, ‘and that is security.’ If
there was an invasion, it was not inconceivable that the enemy would
attempt to get in touch with Frenchmen on British soil. Thus whenever
a French ship was intercepted in the future it should immediately be
put to work repatriating unreliable French nationals.
Calculating that these elements numbered only ‘a few hundred’,
Spears anticipated little opposition to his scheme. Yet the CFR was not
ready to rush into any hasty action and commissioned French Welfare
to prepare a report on the French community in the UK. This was
produced for the meeting of 5 February 1941 and focused principally
on the colons in London.252 Little effort, the authors acknowledged, had
been made to contact French residents in the provinces, as their
numbers were few and it was assumed that those living in Bristol,
Glasgow, Birmingham, Manchester and Liverpool, that is areas where
there were active Anglo-French societies, shared similar sentiments to
their compatriots in London. Within the capital, the report stated, the
key question was the attitude to adopt towards the Free French move-
ment. It was recognised, however, that those who were not for de
Gaulle were not necessarily for Vichy or anti-British, or that this atti-
tude towards the Free French ‘takes any active form beyond refusal to
cooperate’.
The above paper, together with that of Spears, was discussed by the
CFR Sub-Committee on Welfare and Security at its meeting of 7 February
1941, and at subsequent meetings that month.253 Here, the participants
reiterated their positions. For its part, MI5 declared that it had insuffi-
cient evidence to justify taking action against any Frenchman in respect
of anti-de Gaulle activities, a position supported by both the Home and
Foreign Offices. Against, Captain Knox of the Spears Mission argued that
those hostile to the Free French represented a real danger in the event of
an invasion. Knox was, however, in a minority. The overwhelming
opinion of the meeting was that the French community was not a threat
to national security. The most dangerous elements were deemed not to be
colonists, but the handful of sailors who had deserted from British camps
before repatriation and who were now wandering about the countryside
without proper papers. Nonetheless, there was a strong feeling that more
should be done to enlist the French community in support of the war
effort. There remained particular concern about men of military age who
had failed to join either the British armed services or de Gaulle, as we shall
see. 
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That the above conclusions amounted to a fudge was recognised by
the War Cabinet, which was becoming ever more jittery given the belli-
cose noises coming from Darlan. In a furious letter of 25 February
1941, Downing Street made known to the Foreign Office that the
Home Office was ‘failing altogether’ to get a grip on the issue of
Frenchmen in the UK.254 ‘They (ie the Home Office) give me the
impression’, it was declared, ‘of proceeding in a governess-cart at a
leisurely pace along a quiet Victorian by-road whilst the Germans are
minute by minute gaining upon them in a Mercedes, rushing along a
motor road.’ It was now eight months since the French collapse, yet no
machinery was in place to keep track of French servicemen discharged
from Ministry of Health hospitals, or for the police to monitor the
opinions of the colony. This was even more vital given the changing
circumstances of the war. It was not unlikely, suggested the War
Cabinet representative, that three French authorities could soon
emerge: de Gaulle in London; a Laval regime in Paris; and a Weygand
or Pétain government in North Africa, which might well be tempted to
re-enter the war on the Allied side. What, then, would be the position
of those French nationals in the UK? In this situation, they would have
to be confronted with the following statement: ‘Either you will support
one or other of the French leaders who stand for what we consider to
be true France, or if you persist in supporting the traitor Laval and his
crew, we shall treat you as an enemy alien and intern you forthwith.’
It is now known that Weygand, High Commissioner in North Africa
since September 1940, was doing little more than reorganising French
forces there. Despite his hatred of Nazism in general and Laval in
particular, whom he compared to a dog ‘rolling in the shit’ of a German
victory, he had no intention of siding with the Allies.255 Yet there is
little doubt that Laval, nursing his wounds in Paris, was talking with
Abetz and Déat about the possibility of creating an alternative govern-
ment to that of Pétain.
To be fair to the CFR, this scenario had already been discussed on 12
February 1941.256 Outwardly the issue seemed fairly straightforward.
The Laval government would duly be deemed hostile and its support-
ers in Britain interned as enemy aliens. The matter was confused by a
series of hypotheses raised by both the Home and Foreign Office.
Would the North African government immediately side with the Allies?
Would it be recognised by HMG? Would the Germans even bother
with a Laval government? Would they not merely place Vichy more
directly under their control, and leave the unoccupied zone in place? In
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any case, by this point would not Frenchmen have already been drafted
into labour or military service in Britain?257 Inevitably, such questions
made the phrasing of any legislation to intern Frenchmen nigh impos-
sible. When the Home Office put forward a draft clause providing for
the arrest of anyone who ‘adhered openly to the Vichy Government’,
French Welfare queried exactly whom it had in mind. The response was
anybody ‘who, in the event of France being occupied by the enemy,
adhered openly to the French authorities in enemy-occupied terri-
tory’.258 Should this have ever become law, it is not difficult to believe
that it would have been the source of endless wrangling.
It took events in Syria in summer 1941 for the Home Office to over-
come its scruples. With British forces fighting the troops of General
Dentz and Darlan promising air bases to Berlin, the possibility of war
with Vichy seemed imminent, bringing the question of security into
even greater relief. To meet this situation, a convoluted circular was
hurriedly drafted for police authorities throughout the British isles.259
Should HMG and Vichy find themselves at war, it explained, all French
citizens would technically become enemy aliens, at least until a
belligerent authority emerged in North Africa and was recognised as
such by London. It was understood, however, that a great many French
citizens in the UK would not adhere to a Vichy government in these
circumstances, so no general internment was being proposed. Rather
police authorities were requested to compile information on any
French national who was ‘unreliable’ and likely to pose a security
threat.
The replies to this circular, at least those that have survived, suggest
that there were few fifth columnists at large among the French
community. It is only a pity the London reports have not been
preserved. Crudely speaking, the responses fall into three categories.260
To begin with, there were those areas such as Dewsbury, Walsall,
Kilmarnock, Inverness-shire and, maybe not surprisingly, the Orkney
islands, where there were no French residents in the first place. Second,
there were areas such as East Lothian, Reigate, South Shields,
Middlesbrough, Belfast, Southampton and Worcester where there was
only a sprinkling of French men and women, none of whom was
regarded with suspicion. Typical was the reply of the senior officer at
Eastbourne: ‘9 French residents in district: four males and 5 females.
All are elderly and have resided here for many years. I have no reason
to regard any of these persons with suspicion.’ The final category are
cryptic in their reply, acknowledging that the circular had been
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received and its contents noted. Significantly, these came from poten-
tially sensitive areas where there was a relatively large French
community, for instance Manchester and Staffordshire, close to where
some of the sailors’ camps had been based. Even then, such cryptic
responses do not necessarily mean that colonists were fifth columnists,
merely that the police were being prudent.
In the event, the fighting in the Middle East did not lead to a splin-
tering of French authority, as Vichy experienced cold feet in supporting
the German war effort and only provided half-hearted military assis-
tance to Rommel; ultimately, Syria was conceded to the British. While
the armistice Dentz signed with the British deeply angered the Free
French, and destroyed the relationship between Spears and de Gaulle,
it did not beg any further questions about the loyalty of colons in
Britain. Berlin quickly abandoned any further collaborationist dealings
with Vichy to concentrate on prosecuting the invasion of the USSR.
When Hitler resumed his interest in France in April the following year,
bringing Laval back to power, it was obvious to everyone the extent to
which the marshal’s government was now subject to German domina-
tion. The round-up of Jews and the deportation of French labour to
Germany only confirmed France’s status as a milch cow in the Nazi
empire. As such, neither Vichy nor Pétain held any particular appeal to
the colons, and the issue of internment faded from the picture. 
Conscription
While the question of internment might have faded, there remained
that of conscription. This had been discussed in July 1940, but had
been put to one side, partially because of the position of the Admiralty
and the War Office, which had quickly put a ceiling on the number of
French recruits they were prepared to accept, largely because these men
were difficult to train and integrate into the ranks.261 It was further
appreciated that the Free French, not being a sovereign government,
could not be given the authority to conscript in the same way that the
Belgian, Norwegian, and Dutch authorities were doing. This would
only play into de Gaulle’s campaign to have himself recognised as a
head of state. In any case, as the Home Office pointed out, it was not a
crime for a Frenchman merely to adopt an indifferent attitude towards
de Gaulle, or for that matter, towards the British. How then could such
men be conscripted?
Despite these scruples, the issue dragged on. Those young men who
had not enlisted for de Gaulle were seen as a drain on morale, and it
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was asked why they should enjoy ‘a more favoured position than either
British or Allied subjects of similar age and health’.262 While it was
recognised that deportation was unfeasible in their respect, and there
was an awareness that neither the War Office nor the Admiralty wanted
any more French recruits, and that de Gaulle was not empowered to
conscript, it was still felt that more effort could be made to enlist these
men, possibly in the Transport and Supply Services or the Pioneer
Corps.263 It was further recommended that the Minister of Labour
should ‘make an order under his existing powers requiring the compul-
sory registration of all male Frenchmen between the ages of 18 and 65
in the same way as it is intended to require the compulsory registration
of all Allied nationals in that age group’,264 so that they could be
conscripted into employment. Any Frenchman who subsequently
refused such employment or service with de Gaulle or the British
would be liable to deportation, or at the very least, to internment
should he be engaged in subversive activities. 
This might have sounded a severe sanction, but was yet again a
fudge. Not only did repatriation remain a virtual impossibility in 1941
(witness the problems with the French consular staff later that year),
but few Frenchmen were likely to be caught engaging in subversive
behaviour, especially given the way in which the colony remained a
community apart. Nor was there government consensus over the issue.
The Ministry of Labour feared Germany would exploit any gesture
towards conscription for propaganda purposes.265 After all, it was not
until 1942 that Germany itself requisitioned French labour. It was also
feared that conscription might provoke retaliation against British
subjects in France.266 Taking recourse in international law, the Foreign
Office further objected that to conscript French labour forcibly was
contrary to Article 11 of the Anglo-French Commercial Treaty of
1882.267 Finally, doubts were raised about the exact numbers of
Frenchmen who were at large, who were not registered and who were
not employed in war work; in retrospect, it might be thought the
absence of information was even more of a reason to press ahead with
registration.268
It did not assist government deliberations that the FGB, and Carlton
Gardens, thought the occasion of registration an excellent opportunity
to press French Welfare and the Home Office yet again for a full list of
the names, addresses and occupations of all Frenchmen in the UK.269
These registrations, wrote Semet, ‘sont une source d’informations
précieuses’.270
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Naturally enough, no such material was handed over,271 yet the
order for compulsory registration was eventually issued in May, with
an amendment insisted upon by the Free French that stated that the
preamble should make clear that the war effort was not purely a
‘national’ affair, but a ‘common’ and ‘Allied’ one. Thanks to the British
government’s intense desire to keep the registration files secret, or least
hidden from Carlton Gardens, it remains unknown how many
Frenchmen were subsequently caught in the registration net; the
impression is very few. Even fewer appear to have been drafted into war
work. 
Postscript: nationality and restrictions
Although the questions of internment and conscription pointed to a
hard line on the part of Whitehall, it is known that Churchill had
favoured granting British citizenship to those men and women who
served either among de Gaulle’s army or the British forces, in many
ways a natural corollary to his earlier plans for an Anglo-French Union
in June 1940.272 To this end, various drafts of the necessary bill were
discussed, but these encountered numerous hold-ups, several engi-
neered by the Free French officials who feared they might lose their
identity should they adopt citizenship. They further pointed out that
the gesture was of little practical use as Vichy had not withdrawn the
nationality of their recruits, only in the cases of prominent individuals
such as Bois. Moreover, British nationality might well prove to be a
danger to those Free French taken as prisoners of war. Given that the
Dominions Office also had its reservations, fearing such moves would
have to be extended to Commonwealth and imperial troops, it is
perhaps no surprise that the matter came to naught. In any case, what
was more important to French residents in Britain was not so much the
possibility of a British passport, but the chance to be free of the Aliens
Restrictions Order. It was this issue over which the FGB and Carlton
Gardens would tirelessly campaign throughout 1941.
It was not until July 1942, when matters had quietened down on the
French security front, that the Home Office, after some prompting
from the Free French, agreed to the relaxation of the restrictions
imposed on aliens.273 These had led to some embarrassing incidents
when first implemented in the summer of 1940, for instance a convent
of French nuns was forcibly moved out of Norwich, the city being in a
‘restricted zone’, and had only been allowed back after Cardinal
Hinsley vouched for their political impartiality.274 In another case, a
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French family had been removed from St Leonards-on-Sea to Bromley,
despite having lived in England for thirty-three years.275 In 1942, such
obvious supporters of the Allied cause no longer had reason to fear
such dislocation. Those individual French men and women who were
deemed ‘trustworthy and loyal supporters of the allied cause’ could in
future apply to their local police authority for the freedom of move-
ment permitted to Allied nationals. Nevertheless, French residents
were still classed in an inferior position to other nationals at war with
Germany and could not visit certain coastal areas, especially in south-
ern England, points which irked Carlton Gardens although, to the
astonishment of the Foreign Office, they were never raised in negotia-
tions.276 It was not until after the D-Day landings in June 1944 that the
government moved to end this anomaly.277 Now that France was being
liberated and Vichy was in a state of disintegration, there seemed no
reason not to allow the French into what had previously been aliens-
protected areas.278 Additionally, the French were exempted from the
curfew although, like other foreigners, they still had to record their
movements and whereabouts with the police.
Conclusions
The fact that the colons largely escaped the punitive restrictions that
befell enemy aliens may be put down to a series of factors. While they
had retained much of their indigenous culture, they were well inte-
grated into British life and knew how to keep their heads down. As
such, they did not become targets for public hostility, even during the
fifth columnist scare of May-June 1940, and they no doubt benefited
from the growing tendency of the British to associate all French men
and women with de Gaulle. That the community was initially suspi-
cious of the general can hardly be disputed. He was a rebel, an
unknown, a seemingly dangerous element, who did not even enjoy the
wholehearted support of the British. Given the way in which Vichy
consular officials still operated in London, there were very genuine
fears about relatives in France. Yet antagonism to de Gaulle did not
necessarily equate with trust in Vichy. While many business elements
in the London-based community initially registered some sympathy
with Pétain, they still made plain their loyalty to Britain, and the over-
riding impression of the colony, despite internal quarrels, is that it was
as law-abiding as in the past. The most potentially disloyal group, les
catholiques avant tout, remained on the fringes, easily controlled both
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by the British authorities and by Cardinal Hinsley. In any case, it was
difficult to maintain much enthusiasm for Vichy after 1941. Just as in
France itself, the colons began to dismantle Pétain mythology, and saw
through Vichy’s hypocrisy. Accordingly, they were not to be feared,
and were treated leniently by government. While they might have
grumbled about restrictions placed on their freedom of movement,
unlike their compatriots on metropolitan soil they had no reason to
fear a knock on the door in the middle of the night and were never
subject to swingeing draconian legislation requiring them to work in a
foreign country. While they might also have grumbled at the ways in
which the Free French, and its supporters in the FGB, came to colonise
London life, taking over independent French institutions in the
process, they still retained an abiding faith in the Allied war effort, and
gradually overcame their mistrust of the general himself. Anti-
Gaullism would find its most articulate spokesmen in the ranks of
political exiles and their British sympathisers. These prejudices would
be transported back across the Channel in 1944; within London, the
community reverted to its normal way of life.
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6
Conclusion
Certes, j’aurai pu vivre dans un autre pays, en Grande Bretagne ou aux
Etats Unis, et m’y conduire en bon citoyen. Mais sans y trouver une patrie
de substitution. Raymond Aron1
If, since the 1970s, an ever-growing body of historians has carefully
disassembled the Gaullist notion of France as a ‘nation of resisters’,
revealing the complex and subtle ways in which public opinion
responded to the occupier, reactions often determined by time, place
and circumstance, the myth that the French in Britain were at least
supporters of de Gaulle and resolutely opposed to Vichy has remained
more or less intact. It is a myth that has remained untouched by the
huge literature that has carefully scrutinised the general’s every move
throughout the war years, from Bordeaux to London, from London to
Algiers, and from there, via London again, to Normandy and Paris.
Admittedly, something of the intellectual opposition to de Gaulle,
fronted by Labarthe and Aron, has been noted, as have the quarrels
within the Free French movement itself. Nonetheless, it is still the
general and his supporters who command centre stage. In his memoirs,
de Gaulle claimed that in making his stand in June 1940 he was enter-
ing ‘an adventure like a man thrown by fate outside all frames of
reference’.2 It was his achievement as a myth-maker that he soon
erected those ‘frames of reference’ through which all histories of the
French in wartime Britain have been written since.
There is strong irony that Britain, a country which in his incarnation
as president of the Fifth Republic, de Gaulle denounced as a threat to
both French and European interests, constitutes the refuge of one of
the last remaining elements of the right-wing ‘resistancialist’ mythol-
ogy carefully elaborated in the 1950s and 1960s. This is evidence not
only of the general’s skill in projecting his own particular reading of
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history, but also of the impact that he had on the British consciousness.
Although Mass-Observation surveys reveal that public opinion soon
tired of the quarrels that broke out among the Free/Fighting French
and while government officials despaired of the arrogance and obdu-
racy of the general himself, the man who would insist on using
Hampstead tube station even though there was an unexploded bomb
nearby,3 his individuality and his courage appealed to a nation that
had to confront recurrent bad news about the war effort in 1940–41. In
this sense, his call of 18 June 1940 drew on the same wellsprings as the
‘myth of the Blitz’: in neither case could any weakness in morale be
acknowledged. Instead, both de Gaulle and the British people drew
comfort from the heroic image of their unflinching and lonely resist-
ance against Nazism.
Factors other than de Gaulle’s consummate ability as a myth-maker
and the memories of wartime have also contributed to the notion that
all French residents in Britain were supporters of his cause. The fact
that the French were not a numerous body, nor an especially conspic-
uous one, despite the explosive arguments between Carlton Gardens
and Downing Street, have ensured that other exiled groups – notably
the Germans, Jews, and Poles – have received the lion’s share of atten-
tion. When French communities-in-exile have been studied in depth,
attention has naturally focused on the USA and Canada, where their
numbers were always greater than in Britain, and where French artists
and writers unquestionably bequeathed a more enduring legacy.
Whatever de Gaulle might have claimed for his movement, even he
could hardly assert that London was the French cultural capital in exile.
That honour must unquestionably be shared between Montréal and
New York. Other than the recently erected statue of de Gaulle in
Carlton Gardens and the half-pint glasses served in the York Minster,
now the French House, in Dean Street there are few reminders of the
French presence in Britain. No plaque adorns the houses in Pembury
Road in Tottenham or the racecourses in the North-West. The
consulate in Bedford Square is now just another office.
This study has demonstrated that we can no longer speak of the
French community in Britain in the singular. Aside from the Gaullist
forces, there were several other communities – the ‘forgotten French’.
Initially their numbers were larger than the recruits for de Gaulle’s
fledgeling forces, and it should be remembered that support for the
Free/Fighting French largely grew abroad, principally in those colonies
tired of the treachery and shenanigans of Vichy. While it is undeniable
Conclusion 251
2499 Chap6  7/4/03  2:45 pm  Page 251
that many of the French communities in Britain intermixed making it
extremely difficult to tell them apart – the image of MI5 officers,
disguised as continental refugees, intermingling in the bars and restau-
rants of Soho, attempting to identify fugitive French sailors and
Gaullist deserters among the colonist and overseas communities,
springs to mind – they nonetheless retained distinctive identities, rein-
forced by the circumstances of their arrival.
Unless they had wealthy friends or relatives to offer them shelter, or
active bank accounts to dip into, refugees lived a peripatetic existence,
shunted out from the refugee centres to various lodgings in London, a
life of austerity in which the task of keeping body and soul together
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remained paramount. Their plight was not all that dissimilar from that
of the asylum seekers of today, marked out by their clothes, inability to
speak English and the stigma of measly state handouts. As Mass-
Observation observed, they were especially conspicuous in shops where
the French habit of prodding food to test its freshness before purchase
was seen as evidence of greed and ‘wanting a lot for their money’.4
French servicemen likewise retained a separate identity, arrested in
ports at the time of the Armistice, and soon gathered together in make-
shift camps, principally in the north of England where they were visited
by Vichy consular officials, another group whose identity was readily
apparent. And, there remained from pre-war times, an extensive
French community, based in London and the Home Counties, that was
well assimilated into British culture. To be sure, its numbers shrank
with the onset of war yet, if anything, this process provided these
colonists with an even stronger identity as those who remained were
principally expatriates of long standing, with strong roots in Britain,
and well accustomed to avoiding unwelcome attention. The paradox
was that, with the defeat of France and arrival of de Gaulle, they could
no longer preserve their preferred anonymity. 
The diversity of the French communities raises a further observa-
tion: few of these men and women had chosen to be in Britain. These
were not ‘resisters of the first hour’, who had rallied to the appel of 18
June, undertaking a hazardous exit from France by travelling across the
Pyrenees to Spain or taking their chance on foreign-registered steam-
ers to Glasgow or Liverpool. Refugees were in Britain by happenstance,
driven across the Channel along with retreating British and French
troops at Dunkirk. Most other refugees who had participated in the
exode had retreated inland, making their way southwards to lands that
they might have encountered as a result of the Popular Front’s holi-
days, but all determined to escape the rush of German armour. As we
have noted, those civilians who arrived in Britain emanated from the
Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the territories that were squeezed by the claw-like
movement of Guderian’s tanks. Servicemen were similarly in Britain by
chance, either veterans of Narvik or Dunkirk, or more likely sailors
resting in British ports at the time of the Armistice.
Given these circumstances, it is not difficult to understand why
several refugees and servicemen sought early repatriation, as would the
large London-based diplomatic staff, which had grown significantly in
the course of 1939–40. While such luminaries as Cambon and Corbin
were too closely associated with Britain to seek immediate repatriation,
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and indeed Cambon would remain in situ throughout the war, other
high-ranking diplomats and their families quickly arranged their
passage back home, well ahead of those soldiers and sailors who would
have to wait until the close of 1940, and whose plight served the needs
of Vichy anti-British propaganda. Those diplomatic officials that
remained, members of the missions and the consuls, must have
bemoaned their luck, being left in a country, a former ally, now more
or less at war with France, with no particular jobs to do other than to
perform tedious administrative chores and fend off the snide asides of
Foreign Office and Gaullist officials, not to mention the acidic obser-
vations of those expatriates who had aligned themselves to the Allied
cause. The image of the Glasgow consul de Curzon, taking furtive
notes, and rebutting the jibes of his countrymen, comes to mind.
Unquestionably, these Vichy officials were anxious to book their return
home; only as the war developed, and the prospects of the Pétain
government deteriorated, and no doubt the opportunities for pensions
and career advancement worsened, did the prospect of resettling in
France appear less attractive. Even among the expatriates there was
discomfort. Although some were fugitives from religious persecution
across the Channel, descendants of seventeenth-century Huguenots or
members of the religious orders that had been originally booted out by
the legislation of Waldeck-Rousseau and Combes, the majority were
settled in Britain not because of any particular ideological reason;
rather Britain, and most likely London, had become the source of their
income, whether as merchants in luxury goods, whether as bankers or
industrialists, or whether as waiters and waitresses serving in the
capital’s hotels. No doubt it was reassuring that Britain, despite its odd
habits and customs, was a country, in many respects, similar to France.
It was after all only a short boat ride away, and had proved tolerant of
the strange ways and customs of foreigners – even if, in the 1930s, it
had not proved to be the welcoming haven for Jews and others that
some historians and commentators would have us believe.
The very fact that a majority of the ‘forgotten French’ were in Britain
by chance, and not out of any desire to oppose either Nazism or Vichy,
points to the fact that their attitudes were remarkably similar to those
of their countryfolk who remained on metropolitan soil. None took
any satisfaction in the defeat of their nation, and most looked forward
to the day of liberation, although few believed that this would be
achieved by Britain whose cause looked pretty dire in the aftermath of
the Armistice. Those who had fled across the Channel, especially the
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refugees, must have thought they had jumped out of the frying pan into
the fire, especially when the Blitz began in earnest. Exiled sailors and
soldiers also gave Britain little chance, and considered that it would not
be long before ‘perfidious Albion’ witnessed the inexorable march of
Blitzkrieg. It is also striking that few of the ‘forgotten French’ shed any
tears for the departed Third Republic. As in France itself, most believed
that the regime, unloved for so long, had been hopelessly discredited by
the speed and overwhelming nature of the German victory.
Significantly, there was a particular grudge felt towards the Popular
Front, notably among affluent business elements of the colony, even
though their livelihoods had not been directly affected by the intro-
duction of paid holidays and compulsory collective bargaining. It is of
further significance that nearly all of the ‘forgotten French’ accepted
that Vichy was the legitimate government of their country, as indeed it
was. Whatever René Cassin said about the unconstitutionality of the
vote of 10 July 1940, it was manifest that the National Assembly had
observed legal procedures to the best of its ability, and it had hardly
needed the machinations of Laval to ensure that Pétain received
absolute powers; indeed, the notion of a Pétain-Laval plot to overthrow
the Republic remained popular only among a small number of intel-
lectual exiles and the ever-mistrustful Free French. That said, there was
no particular enthusiasm for the values of Vichy’s National Revolution.
When this did become evident, it was principally among the consular
officials and high-ranking naval officers, traditionally conservative in
their outlook, who now spoke of important work needing to be done.
Les catholiques avant tout, notable among isolated elements of the
clergy, also threatened to become disciples of the National Revolution,
yet their numbers were few and their influence was curtailed by the
swift action of the Catholic hierarchy, the propaganda of the Ministry
of Information, the containment strategy of French Welfare and the
absence of any prominent spiritual figures who might have whipped up
trouble. No doubt had any of these right-wing sympathisers, Catholics,
high-ranking military men and Vichyite officials, been resident on
metropolitan soil, they would have gravitated towards the Pétainist
veterans’ organisation, the Légion Française des Combattants, or
would have become Vichy notables, those predominantly bourgeois
supporters of the Vichy state who manned the town halls and the
general administration of the regime. Perhaps the only other potential
band of supporters for the National Revolution was among those
Maurrasian-leaning volunteers for de Gaulle, men whose hatred of the
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Boche was fractionally stronger than their allegiance to reactionary
values.
So it was that few of the ‘forgotten French’ were what could be best
described as ‘active’ Pétainists in that they readily subscribed to his
political values. Most were ‘passive’ in their support, convinced that
the old man had France’s best interests at heart and would do his
utmost to protect his people from further suffering. Always viewed as
supremely pragmatic in his decision-making, and known to be
contemptuous of self-interested politicians, it was difficult to avoid the
conclusion that, in the summer of 1940, he had acted out of any motive
other than that of patriotism. The Armistice was the logical result of his
actions and, as Kedward suggests, to argue against this step was to fly
against reason and to invite ridicule.5 Viewed from the precarious posi-
tion of Britain, seemingly the next state to fall in Hitler’s unstoppable
game of conquest, this impression must have been even more
pronounced, especially among such vulnerable and anxious groups as
refugees and soldiers. It was only as the war progressed that it was
possible to deconstruct Pétainist mythology, although the rumour that
the marshal was a prisoner of Laval or the Germans was just as preva-
lent among the ‘forgotten French’ as it was on metropolitan soil; it did
not need Isorni, the marshal’s most able trial lawyer, to invent the
‘double-game’ or shield arguments. These were implicit in the cult of
Pétainism and the circumstances of the Occupation. How far the
various French groups in Britain eventually came to disassemble
Pétainist mythology remains decidedly unclear. The fact that, after
Montoire, neither the British nor the French press in London chose to
make personal attacks on the marshal, regarding these as counter-
productive, preferring instead to highlight his impotency and
shortcomings of judgement, may well have facilitated this deconstruc-
tion process. In this way, it was possible for the French in Britain to
express a loyalty both to Pétain and de Gaulle.6
That support for the general was slow in forthcoming is not in
doubt. It is striking that most members of his entourage came from
within France itself, and that support for the Free/Fighting French grew
principally in the colonies. All the various groups in Britain had reason
to be suspicious of this two-star general: he was an unknown figure
whose prestige compared badly to Pétain’s; he was rumoured to have
dubious elements among his entourage, whether left-wingers such as
Cot or extremist Cagoulards such as Passy, and maybe even Republican
anti-clericals; his politics were similarly vague and soon smacked of a
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Bonapartism that pleased neither right nor left; his personal manner
was marked by an arrogance and short temper which was let loose on
his fellow countrymen just as much as it was on the British; he had
disobeyed the legitimate government of France; he was seemingly
unable to offer any protection against Vichy or German retribution
against relatives in France; he appeared almost entirely dependent on
British support; he was unable to offer good rates of pay to his support-
ers; and his overall position seemed hopeless as did the whole Allied
cause in 1940. It is perhaps significant that those of the ‘forgotten
French’ who did rally to de Gaulle stemmed largely from the ranks of
the colonists, maybe because these men and women were the most
secure financially and socially, and understood how he was perhaps
their greatest hope, especially when it became clear that his politics
were not of the left. Even so, it is worth remembering that only two-
thirds of London-based colonists enlisted in the Français de Grande
Bretagne, a movement that was never truly Gaullist in the first place. It
is highly significant that when, in November 1941, the FGB organised
a rally for the general in the Albert Hall it was worried, in the words of
Lennon and McCartney, lest it could not fill the ‘4,000 holes’ with
French supporters.
Although backing for the general unquestionably grew, it is striking
that Britain never witnessed the ‘Gaullist juggernaut’ that Colin
Nettelbeck describes in the USA,7 an unstoppable takeover of existing
French exile institutions. To be sure, the Free French and their
supporters in the FGB did their very best to colonise all existing French
organisations in Britain, whether they were welfare clubs for refugees
in Manchester or prestigious cultural outposts such as the Institut
Français in London. Ultimately, this campaign had chequered results.
This was partially because of the suspicion of de Gaulle described
above, and the success of individuals such as Aron and Labarthe in
retaining an intellectual independence. Credit must also be extended to
Bessborough’s French Welfare. It is commonly said that, in 1941, the
Foreign Office became ever more sympathetic to de Gaulle after recog-
nising that Vichy was a hopeless case and that there was a need to
curtail Churchill’s pro-American enthusiasms. Yet French Welfare was
one part of the Foreign Office that was exceedingly wary of de Gaulle,
maybe because it regularly saw at close quarters the harm his men did
whenever they came into direct touch both with British citizens and
with French exiles. The number of occasions when British officials
withdrew their support after making contact with Carlton Gardens is
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truly astonishing. The ‘Gaullist juggernaut’ was also resisted by other
bodies, eventually the Spears Mission in 1941, but also the CEAF. The
British tradition of female bourgeois philanthropy, widely practised by
the likes of Lady Warwick and Lady Reading, was not going to crumble
before the maladroit advances of de Gaulle and his supporters, espe-
cially the smart-uniformed ladies of the Assistance Sociale who were no
match for the ‘women in green’ of the WVS.
With so much infighting going on, it is not surprising that the
‘forgotten French’ found it hard to settle in Britain. Refugees were very
much a group apart, often ‘apathetic’,8 powerless to shake off the
unpropitious circumstances of their arrival, and unable to integrate
easily in British life. Their poverty, partially enforced by a government
that had no wish for them to take up their pre-war jobs lest they upset
the indigenous workforce and that was further reluctant to pay much
out in the way of welfare relief, further dictated their existence, as did
the nature of the lodgings in the suburbs of the capital. Servicemen,
kept apart in camps well away from intelligence centres and London
itself, always excepting those at Crystal Palace and White City, also
thought they had reason to grumble, although in retrospect their
ordeal might well have been exacerbated by their own officers who
seemingly cared little about their men other than to exacerbate anti-
British feelings by destroying food, holding back radios and exerting
little discipline. Seemingly embarrassed by their anomalous positions,
the Vichy consuls led a furtive life, discovering that diplomatic charm
cut little ice with Foreign Office officials; the fact that they were
constantly suspected of fifth-columnist activities, even though few if
any were truly dabbling in espionage, only hardened their discomfort.
Even the expatriates, used to keeping their heads down and their quar-
rels to themselves, found life increasingly difficult. The arrival of new
exiles, the busy-body activities of the FGB and the dilemmas posed by
the enemy occupation of their mother country, brought them to the
attention of the authorities and threatened their traditional reticence.
Their failure to assimilate, their disparate nature, their frequent
squabbles, their lingering sympathy for Pétain, and their occasional
antagonism towards Carlton Gardens did little to endear the ‘forgotten
French’ to their British hosts, who were already attempting to reach a
conclusion about de Gaulle. Whereas the general eventually won round
the public, partially because of the manifest courage of his stand, the
‘forgotten French’ continued to arouse suspicion. While they escaped
the fifth-column scare of May–June 1940, the reluctance of those aban-
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doned soldiers and sailors to embrace the Allied cause and their
tendency to insist upon repatriation tarred the reputation of all the
French in Britain, even those belonging to de Gaulle. Their position
was further weakened by the contrasting manner in which other exiled
nationalities, especially the Poles, rushed to take up arms against the
Axis powers. According to Mass-Observation studies of 1940–42, the
British public no longer thought a future Anglo-French friendship
desirable and viewed the French as among the most exasperating of
allies, their popularity lagging behind that of the Americans,
Norwegians and Poles. It was this latter group that most frequently
earned sympathy, both for their courageous defiance of Hitler and the
appalling manner in which the Nazis had treated their homeland.9 It
was to the credit of the British population at war that many acts of
kindness were nonetheless displayed towards French exiles, especially
those in impecunious circumstances. It was a charity that contrasted
markedly with the attitudes of government bodies, few of which
showed any real goodwill. Refugees, even the small numbers involved,
were never wanted by the Ministry of Health, which soon relinquished
them to local committees and relief agencies. The Admiralty and War
Office lacked any enthusiasm for those sailors and soldiers, viewing
these men as poorly motivated, difficult to train and fundamentally ill-
disciplined. Only the RAF, desperate for recruits at the height of the
Battle of Britain, was free of such scruples. Meanwhile, the Foreign and
Home Offices, together with the security services, regarded the Vichy
consular and Mission officials with disdain, a sentiment that was not
altogether absent in the dealings with the colony. The ever-shifting
nature of Vichy foreign policy in 1940–41, especially the prospect of a
fragmenting of power between a Laval government in Paris, a Pétain
regime in Vichy and a Weygand authority in North Africa, meant that
a careful watch had to kept over the activities of the colons. Their
general internment was seriously considered although it was obvious
that few were overt admirers of the marshal, and that even these
managed to combine this stance with sympathy for the Allied cause.
The many shades of political opinion among the ‘forgotten French’
clearly irritated government bodies, and were not readily understood
even by seasoned watchers in Bessborough’s department.
Exile in Britain was not, then, a particularly happy episode for either
the ‘forgotten French’ or the British. As Ministry of Information officials
had forecast in 1939, while the two nationalities maybe shared the same
fundamental values, the differences in temperament and outlook were
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profound, and these were vividly exposed by the peculiar circumstances
of wartime, especially the anomalous position of the Vichy government,
which was alone in Hitler’s Europe in that it retained a sizeable measure
of autonomy. It would have been much easier for the ‘forgotten French’
if their government had accompanied them into exile as did those of the
Norwegians, Belgians and Poles. De Gaulle was no substitute. It would
also have been easier if they had been able to set aside their love of their
homeland. Throughout history, the French have generally made
unhappy exiles, and the events of 1940–44 only highlighted their inabil-
ity to adapt. In this respect, perhaps the last words should be left with
Tereska Torrès, a genuine Anglophile and truly courageous figure who
fled France to continue the struggle. In January 1942, on leaving the
Belgian restaurant Chez Rose in Greek Street, where she had eaten horse-
steak and chips, she went out into the streets of Soho, walking to
Piccadilly Circus, and up along lower Regent Street, before heading
home to her barracks. It was then that Big Ben struck two in the
morning, and as she gazed towards St James’s Park, and Westminster
Cathedral, she tried to fathom in which direction France lay.10 As
elsewhere in the world, the ‘forgotten French’ of wartime Britain were
‘forever French’, even if they were not always ‘fighting French’.
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Appendix 1
Reception centres for war refugees:
nationalities and admissions to 29 October 1940
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Appendix 2
Statistics for the year ended 31 December 1941
Immigration Office, Royal Victoria Patriotic School, London, SW18
Direct from enemy occupied  territory to the UK: 1A By small boats to the Shetlands &
east of Scotland ports; 1B By small boats from France to south coast ports or by small
boats from Holland and Belgium to east & south-east ports; 1C By stolen planes from
occupied countries to landing grounds in east & south England; 1D From raids on
occupied countries – rescued by British forces.
Through neutral countries or British territory abroad: 2A From, France, Belgium and
Holland via Spain and Portugal and thence by sea from Lisbon to UK ports, or by air
from Lisbon to Bristol airport or Poole airport, or via Spain and Gibraltar to UK ports;
2B From Vichy-controlled North Africa in small boats or stolen planes to Gibraltar and
thence to UK ports or from Dakar in small boats to Bathurst, Gambia and Freetown and
thence to UK ports; 2C From Vichy-controlled territory in North and South America
and the East to nearest British territory; 2D From France in Vichy-controlled ships to
neutral ports in America and the East and thence with the help of the nearest British
Code Belg. Czech. Da. Dutch Fr. Greek Norw. Pol. Yug. Various Total
1A 2,416 2,416
1B 5 66 52 123
1C 2 2 6 9 19
1D 147 147
2A 203 37 13 49 204 5 39 302 8 860
2B 15 21 35 6 48 76 124 66 3 394
2C 2 118 120
2D 1 3 842 49 895
2E 3 264 2 269
2F 2 1 1 42 81 14 141
3A 1,565 1,565
Total 230 59 54 169 1,276 81 3,071 433 11 1,565 6,949
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consul, to UK ports and members of crews of captured Vichy ships who have volunteered
to serve in Free French Forces; 2E From Norway and Sweden and thence via Russia,
Turkey and the Middle East to India or Africa for embarkation to British ports; 2F
From Norway on foot to Sweden or from Holland or Germany as seamen to Swedish
ports (where the ship is deserted) and thence from Stockholm airport to Leuchars
airport, Fifeshire; 3A Non-escapees, volunteers for allied forces, seamen arriving in the
UK for time since outbreak of war; evacuees from Gibraltar, stow-aways, volunteers for
war industry, general cases etc.
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Appendix 3
Note from Robertson, HO, B3, to L. W. Clayton, HO, February 1941
List of all detainees who have been at RPS for more than a week
Weekly return of refugees
Nationality Arrived from Date of arr. Destination
B— , B. T. Moroccan Dover 15.1.41 Discharged FFF,
disciplinary grounds
C— J. French Liverpool 15.1.41 Discharged FFF,
medically unfit
F— , E. French Plymouth 11.1.41 Waiting for a ship
G— , A. Polish Oratory School 11.1.41 In hospital, wishes to
join FFF
L— R— , P.-M. French Southampton 28.1.41 MI5 case pending
M-G, L. J. French Weymouth 22.1.41 MI5 case pending
Z— , S. Algerian Dover 15.1.41 Discharged FFF,
disciplinary grounds
Source: PRO HO 213 1978 203/2/107
20 names on list: 4 Poles; 4 ‘ex-Austrians’; 1 Belgian; 4 French; 1 Moroccan; 1 Czech; 1
Hungarian; 1 Norwegian; 1 Dane; 1 Dutch; 1 Algerian.
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Appendix 4
Extracts from the Diary of C— F— L— G—
(Senior naval officer belonging to one of the sailors’ camps in the Liverpool
area. This diary had been seized and translated by the British.)
23 June: Sad Sunday. In the evening we learn of the Armistice conditions, much
harder than 11.11.18 and dishonouring two countries, and which does
not even put an end to the war and is subject to the laying down of arms
and the acceptance of the Armistice imposed by Italy who has no military
success even when, with all her forces, she attacked a country already
beaten.
The English hope that like the Poles, Dutch and Norwegians, we will
continue to fight. They show themselves full of strength.
24 June: The proclamation of Gen de Gaulle is widely discussed. Some who
desire at all costs to finish with the whole business treat it offhandedly.
Others, who place no reliance on German promises, ask themselves where
their duty lies towards France. This dilemma boils itself down to an
appreciation more or less exact of British chances. What about Russia and
the USA?
5 July: Some of our officers still believe in maintaining friendly relations with
the English, in spite of the assassination at Oran.
8 July: The English are having typed a Journal du Camp full of lies and false
news, just like their ‘VICTORY’ over unarmed ships.
9 July: Commandant G— refutes the declaration of Gen de Gaulle that the
English were right in destroying our fleet, and doubtlessly to kill our
comrades.
10 July: Capitaine de Vaisseau L— told us after lunch that an honourable solu-
tion was on the point of being arranged between Admiral Cayol and
Admiral Dunbar Nesmith by leaving small French parties aboard the
ships to guard them, when the incident of the Surcoeuf occurred.
14 July: We receive some hogheads of our own wine with the compliments of
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the Admiralty. Lunch so insufficient that I have to complete it with
purchases at the canteen.
17 July: The propaganda of de Gaulle grows. They offer our men cigarettes,
women, and wine, 45/- per week for seamen.
18 July: Two lieutenants of Gen de Gaulle’s legion came to the camp to invite
us to go to Liverpool to listen to Gen de Gaulle. As one of their colleagues
had previously said that those of us who did not join them were ‘cunts’,
they were very badly received. Commandant S. . . took them by their coat
lapels and gave them the order to ‘fuck off’ if they did not want their faces
bashed. Thereupon Commandant L— C— intervened and led them
quietly away. He negotiated with them the return of  young R— and
young O— , who allowed themselves to be enrolled.
19 July: I go to de Gaulle’s recruiting centre to enquire who are the officers, I
am well received by the sailors and we chat for about a quarter of an hour
in a friendly manner, when a Lieutenant arrives who asks me to get out. I
follow him out but ask the seamen to witness and pitying them. Two
hours later a representative of the Legion and a seaman come and beg me
to return in order to receive the excuses of the Lieutenant.
26 July: The English informed the French government that repatriation was
beginning, but without notifying the hour or the route of the ship.
Torpedoing took place at 10 pm. The Germans had moreover said that
owing to the use of our flag by General de Gaulle they would torpedo any
ship flying the French flag.
27 July: The English decide to intern at Oxford the two Admirals. They send
into the camp a car with loudspeakers and an armed guard to protect it.
An officer photographs it. They try in vain to seize the camera. Finally,
more than 100 armed men surround the car, which beats a retreat to the
tune of the Marseillaise. Muselier informed of the state of mind post-
pones his recruiting tour.
28 July: Commandant G— is also taken away to Oxford. Gen Spears makes a
very able speech, but it seems that the officers will be separated from their
men in the hope of converting them to Gen de Gaulle, or at least so as not
to make an admission before the British public of the errors of Churchill’s
politics.
31 July: The English have decided that we will not be given our pay. Only those
who join de Gaulle will be paid. At the Aintree camp all remain faithful to
the French Gov. In other camps sentiment is divided and defections must
be foreseen.
7 August: At Doddington the starving men have had to kill and eat the swans.
A crime of lese majesté . . .
9 August: The Gaullists attempt to debauch our men by standing the drinks and
offering to get women for them.
12 August: This afternoon I discussed with the camp commandant and the
naval Liaison officer the internment of de T—. Great pressure is being
266 Appendices
2499 Append  7/4/03  2:45 pm  Page 266
brought to bear on us and the sailors to join de Gaulle. This evening they
decided that we must get back to camp an hour earlier and we will no
longer be supplied with drink. What undignified meanness on the part of
a strong people.
15 August: Two Gaullist sailors bring me an order from Admiral Watkins
authorising their entry into the camp without me giving permission to
contradict their propaganda. The German attack seems to intensify.
Numerous special boats gathered in Norway and Holland. Numerous
aerial attacks on the Channel Coast. Gun fire in the Dover region.
Parachutes found in Scotland.
16 August: Numerous aerial attacks. New Gaullist effort. Admiral Watkins has
repeated through the camp commandant the order to allow Gaullist
propaganda in the camp. As I do not give it any importance I expect to be
kidnapped.
20 August: I learn that as a result of a provocative speech by Gen Spears the offi-
cers protested, and as a punishment L. V. B— has been interned in a
barracks until the end of the war. At Oulton when this same general
showed himself the colours were lowered half mast.
21 August: Today I have been worrying about M— (wife). Have she and the
children got enough to eat. The bombardments of Brest etc with all the
British lack of precision which we discovered at Dunkirk and Calais, must
worry her terribly. How happy we would be without this war, which I
foresaw coming with anguish. What will be the physical state of the chil-
dren after this inhuman blockade. The adventure of de Gaulle is full of
uncertainty. What a utopia to believe one can serve one’s country in
receiving orders from a stranger who annoys the race!
23 August: A Gaullist Lieutenant, who like many other Gaullist officers, has
never fought, confirms to me that they have asked the English to shut up
a number of French officers, because they advised their men to remain in
the path of duty. Also they hoped shortly to land in Morocco and start a
civil war, to which the German would put a quick ending.
26 August: The bombardments of  Ramsgate, Dover, London and Birmingham
become serious. The English multiply their bombardments of our coasts
and aerodromes from Boulogne to Vannes. At Cherbourg the sea front
has suffered a great deal.
28 August: I learn that six officers of Oulton Camp, including D— B— and de
B— , who were on the repatriation list with me, have been kidnapped.
Every day they come with lorries to the camps to take away the men who
lower themselves by joining de Gaulle.
Source: PRO FO 371 24353 C10327/7407/17
Appendices 267
2499 Append  7/4/03  2:45 pm  Page 267
Appendix 5
List of officers, officials and staff of French missions in UK
Air Mission A 22
Air Mission B 21
Allied Military Committee Personnel 15
Anglo-French Coordinating Committee 11
Armaments Mission 22
Civil Air Mission 6
Coal Mission 39
Delegation to the Shipping Executive 6
Economic Warfare Mission 14
Food Mission 9 (plus staff of 12)




Sea Transport Mission 62 (mainly British)
Textiles Mission 17
Timber Mission 2
Source: CCC SPRS 1/134
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Appendix 6
French in London (1933), consulate figures
Male Female Total
Coiffeurs 167 15 182
Cuisiniers, hôteliers, chefs, garçons 879 — 879
Divers, artistes 121 198 319
Domestiques 37 558 595
Employés banque, commerce, industrie,
mode 977 850 1,827
Enfants de moins de 15 ans 518 392 910
Etudiants, Etudiantes 376 673 1,049
Gouvernantes, dames de compagnie — 616 616
Industriels, directeurs de compagnies,
de banques 95 14 109
Négoçiants, commerçants, agents 388 160 548
Ouvriers, ouvrières 244 390 634
Professeurs, institutrices 131 482 613
Religieux, religieuses 183 613 796
Sans profession 20 1,389 1,409
Totals 4,136 6,350 10,486
Source: H. Goiran, Les Français à Londres (Pornic, Editons de la Vagne 1933), p. 220.
Figures are missing for approximately one-third of French-based Londoners.
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Appendix 7
Census of French subjects over the age of 16 registered in
the UK and NI on 6 February 1941
Male Female Total
Metropolitan Police District 3,252 3,224 6,476
England and Wales (provinces) 1,697 3,087 4,784
Scotland 113 160 273
Northern Ireland 17 26 43
War refugees 352 607 959
Totals 5,431 7,104 12,535
Source: PRO FO 371 28365 Z1753/123/17
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Appendix 8
Detailed figures of French residents in districts having
50 or more residents (6 February 1941)
District Male Female Total
England and Wales
Berks 85 69 154
Bucks 42 99 141
Cardiganshire 38 30 68
Cheshire 22 35 57
Devonshire 45 172 217
Dorset 15 73 88
Glamorgan 29 22 51
Gloucestershire 12 60 72
Hants 61 120 181
Herts 41 102 143
Kent 25 109 134
Lancs 63 64 127
Monmouthshire 17 74 91
Somerset 17 128 145
Surrey 67 117 184
E. Sussex 17 65 82
W. Sussex 25 67 92
Isle of Wight 29 29 58
Yorkshire – West Riding 38 37 75
Birmingham 36 54 90
Brighton 15 80 95
Bristol 11 41 52
Dover 48 4 52
Hove 13 37 50
Liverpool 15 52 67
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District Male Female Total
Manchester 33 35 68
Reading 17 33 50
Southampton 23 31 54
Wolverhampton 17 38 55
Scotland
Glasgow 32 32 64
Source: PRO FO 371 28365 Z1753/123/17
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